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Preface
On 20 March 2018, the Council of the EU gave the EU Commission a mandate to
negotiate the creation of a new multilateral court for investment disputes. In an
important development, on 30 April 2019, the Court of Justice of the European
Union decided that the ISDS mechanism provided for by the free trade agreement
between the EU and Canada (CETA) is compatible with EU law. Already in 2017,
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) decided
to discuss a reform of investment arbitration, including the possible establishment of
a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC). This new development is intended to provide
a response to the strong criticism of international investment law, in general, and of
ad hoc arbitration between investors and states, in particular, which has been
expressed in recent years. UNCITRAL Working Group III was mandated to: first,
identify and consider concerns regarding ISDS; second, consider whether reform
was desirable in light of any identified concerns; and third, if the Working Group
were to conclude that reform was desirable, develop any relevant solutions to be
recommended to UNCITRAL. The decision to develop solutions was taken at the
37th session in New York (1–5 April 2019). The option of an institutionalized as
well as multilateralised investor-state dispute settlement mechanism will now be
discussed in detail. This “now freely available” perhaps study is supposed to be a
starting point for discussions at a time where still only few other comprehensive
proposals for a future ISDS system after a structural reform are tabled. This book is
by no means meant to be the result; rather, it is one point of departure for discussions.
The first edition of this “feasibility study”was originally launched in the course of
2017. The second edition with open access was prepared in spring 2019. It is
intended to contribute to a broader discussion on the option of establishing a new
international special court for investment protection. Although based on the debate
about a reform of investment arbitration, it does not discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of replacing the current system of investor-state arbitration. Rather, it
presents options for a potential institutionalized form of investor-state dispute
settlement and for the design of an MIC.
The “cornerstones” of such a new permanent court are its strict rule of
law-orientation, which includes the highest demands on the judicial appointment
v
procedure as well as on the personal integrity, independence and qualification of the
judges. Second, the costs should be significantly lower compared to the status quo.
Third, transparency considerations and aspects of consistency of case law should
receive particular attention. Fourth, decisions of anMIC would have to be effectively
enforceable.
This study was originally written in German with the support of Dr. Anja
Trautmann, LL.M., Mag. Céline Braumann, LL.M. and Mag. Sara Mansour Fallah.
The update for the second edition was assisted again by Mag. Céline Braumann, and
furthermore by Anna Holzer, Angshuman Hazarika and Andrés Eduardo Alvarado
Garzón. We are thankful for the good cooperation with Springer and the European
Yearbook of International Economic Law for accepting this publication as a Special
Issue.
Saarbrücken, Germany Marc Bungenberg
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1In March 2018 the Council of the European Union (EU Council or Council) gave the
Commission of the EU (EU Commission or Commission) a mandate to negotiate a
Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).1 Since July 2017 the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group III has been
discussing different options for a reform of Investor State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS).2 The UNCITRAL Working Group III was mandated to:
First, identify and consider concerns regarding ISDS; second, consider whether
reform was desirable in light of any identified concerns; and third, if the Working
Group were to conclude that reform was desirable, develop any relevant solutions to
be recommended to the Commission.3
Consensus to develop solutions (thus, enter stage 3) was reached at the Thirty-
seventh session in New York from 1 to 5 April 2019.4 On 30 April 2019 the Court of
Justice of the European Union decided that the ISDS mechanism provided for by the
free trade agreement between the EU and Canada (Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement—CETA) is compatible with EU Law.5 The option of a institu-
tionalized as well as multilateralised investor state dispute settlement mechanism
will now be discussed in detail.
2This study assesses both the option of a two-tiered MIC and of a Multilateral
Investment Appellate Mechanism (MIAM). Both models provide for a permanent,
pre-appointed judiciary according to rule of law standards. As yet, there are no other
1Council of the EU (2018).
2UNCITRAL (2017a).
3UNCITRAL (2017b), para. 264 and 447.
4UNCITRAL (2019).
5CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341.
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1
comprehensive and in-depth analyses in academic literature6 regarding the models
being put forward in this study which have been deemed visionary or even revolu-
tionary. Therefore, this study was one of the first feasibility studies considering both
models. Meanwhile, since these first statements and proposals of very general ideas
and announcements in the first edition of this study, the EU Commission has also
come up with in depth analyses7 that make proposals at least similar to those that can
be found in this study.
3 The starting point of this study is to take a look at the announcements of the EU
Commission and the respective plans in the CETA,8 the EU-Singapore Investment
Protection Agreement (IPA),9 the EU-Mexico Global Agreement10 and the
EU-Vietnam IPA11 to establish an MIC. The United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) made the following observation12:
A standing investment court would be an institutional public good serving the interests of
investors, States and stakeholders. The court would address most of the problems outlined
above; it would go a long way to ensure the legitimacy and transparency of the system,
facilitate consistency and accuracy of decisions and ensure independence and impartiality of
investors. However, this solution would also be the most difficult to implement as it would
require a complete overhaul of the current regime through a coordinated action by a large
number of states. [. . .]
4 A multilateral solution, whatever the form it might take, could result in more
substantive coherence and predictability as well as legal certainty for all concerned
and thus lead to increased acceptance of decisions. Still, the existing network of
mostly Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which contain the substantive standards
of protection, would remain applicable and serve as the material basis for the
institutionalized as well as multilateralized Investor-State dispute settlement system.
5 Should a multilateral consolidation of these substantative standards appear nec-
essary and feasible at some point in the future, it could be attained by a separate
opt-in convention. It would probably be easier to combine such an opt-in convention
on standards of protection with an MIC than with a standalone appellate mechanism.
6 Establishing an MIC or a MIAM entails challenging negotiations and significant
financial costs. Compared to other international courts, it could be run with a budget
within the low double-digit millions. By sharing the premises and staff/secretariat of
6But see on reform and structural reform options Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016, 2017),
Howse (2017), Happ andWuschka (2017), Brown (2017), Calamita (2017) and Hoffmeister (2017).
7European Union (2019) and European Commission (2017).
8Art. 8.29, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, OJ L 11, 14.1.2017, p. 23.
9Art. 3.12, EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019.
10Art. 14, Section- Resolution of Investment Disputes, EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for
signature) as on 2 April, 2019.
11Art. 3.41, EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019.
12UNCTAD (2013), p. 9; see also Howse (2017): “A multilateral court system is best suited to
offering standing or intervention to a wide range of actors who have concerns of international justice
that relate to foreign investment.”
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institutions like the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA), costs could be reduced even further. Under the assump-
tion that investment arbitration costs approximately EUR 800,000 per case (exclud-
ing the costs for legal counsel), even shifting only a small fraction of the currently
initiated cases to the MIC could lead to cost neutrality if the losing party had to pay
for those costs based on appropriate rules on fees.
7An MIC/MIAM requires a new approach in contrast to the current bilateral
Investment Court System (ICS) as stipulated by the EU in CETA, the EU-Mexico
Global Agreement, the EU-Singapore IPA or the EU-Vietnam IPA. Although the
ICS offers a good approach for reform in many aspects, a multilateral mechanism for
dispute settlement calls for additional, institutionally reinforced methods. A new
system of legal redressal for investment disputes that is functioning, efficient,
broadly legitimized and that follows the principles of the rule of law can only be
created with considerable commitment.
8A two-tiered court offers certain advantages compared to a mere appellate
mechanism in terms of the implementation of rule of law considerations and
systemic coherence, as there would be no shift from investment arbitration to an
international court between the first and second instance. A two-tiered MIC is also
preferable to a MIAM as an MIC would reform the current system of investment
arbitration more holistically and coherently. Nevertheless, the MIAM would still be
a significant improvement; however, it is advisable to pursue the creation of an MIC
if this proves to be realistic.
1.1 Preliminary Considerations Regarding
the Establishment of the MIC/MIAM
9The MIC as well as the MIAM could take the form of an independent international
organisation on the basis of a treaty, with its own organs and with separate legal
personality.
10From an economic perspective, an MIC might only make sense with a minimum
of approximately 40 members—thus, in addition to the EU with its 28 members, an
extra 10+ member states—as only then could there be certain savings on payments
made to the judges in comparison to the payments made to the arbitrators and the
judges in bilateral bodies such as ICS under the current system. The statute for an
MIC should only enter into force once it has a certain number of ratifications in order
to prevent the mere addition of another dispute settlement institution.
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1.2 Organisational Structure
11 Incorporating the MIC or the MIAM into another organisation does not appear to be
advisable as other organisations are either completely different in their structure or it
may require certain procedures to amend their statutes which might be too difficult to
achieve in practice. This is not to suggest that the MIC could not share the
infrastructure of other institutions.
12 A statute for the establishment of an MIC or a MIAM would constitute an
international treaty that should allow the accession of all states, independent customs
unions or Regional Economic Integration Organisations (REIOs) as well as terri-
tories with independent powers (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan).
13 The members of the new international organisation MIC/MIAM would be
represented in a plenary organ. This plenary organ would be responsible for the
appointment of judges and would set the budget. It could also adopt necessary
secondary law, in particular procedural rules, the remuneration of judges and the
rules for increasing the number of judges.
14 The new judges would have to be highly qualified, particularly in international
law, economic law and public/constitutional law, as well as independent and, as full-
time judges, be available on a permanent basis. Appropriate procedures for the
election and appointment of judges must reflect these qualifications. The
MIC/MIAM Statute should contain a code of conduct for the judges.
15 The MIC/MIAM should have a president and a vice-president who represent the
court externally. Additionally, for the purposes of decision making, chambers should
be established in advance and for an extended period of time. A party should only be
able to apply for a decision by the plenary (or grand chamber) under specific
circumstances. The criteria for the formation of the chambers should be stipulated
in the rules of procedure.
16 There should also be a Secretariat. Among other tasks, the Secretariat would
support the judges, administer the procedures, prepare translations and would be in
charge of the public relations work of the court. The Secretariat is crucial to the
transparency of the MIC or MIAM.
17 Furthermore, an Investment Advisory Centre (IAC) could be established as an
independent organ. The IAC could support small and medium-sized enterprises and
developing countries by preventing and settling disputes and offering legal advice
during arbitration.
18 It is recommended that the working language of the MIC/MIAM be English. In
addition to establishing a legal seat in the treaty, a headquarters agreement with the
host state covering privileges and immunities should be concluded.
19 The members will fund the MIC/MIAM and the concrete share of the budget paid
by each member could be determined by reference to the respective member’s share
of global foreign direct investment.
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1.3 Procedure of the MIC
20The procedure of the MIC should be two-tiered and similar to the procedure of
administrative courts. There should be the requirement of an application procedure
and the parties should have a right to an efficient and expedient procedure and it
should be conducted in an inquisitorial manner. The requirements of the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and the United Nations Convention on Transpar-
ency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauritius Convention) regarding
transparency should be fully incorporated in the procedural rules. Thus, procedural
documents should generally be published as long as this does not prejudice essential
interests like business secrets or the security interests of the parties. Hearings should
be open to the public and third parties should have the opportunity to deliver
statements.
21There should be a maximum duration for the proceedings of both the first and the
second instance. Only in exceptional cases should a prolonged duration be permis-
sible—as full-time judges hear the cases, the maximum duration of proceedings
should be shorter than in ad hoc cases.
22The MIC determines its own jurisdiction. The personal and subject-matter juris-
diction of the MIC should for the most part derive from International Investment
Agreements (IIAs) that have allegedly been violated. The claimant and the respon-
dent must both have agreed to the jurisdiction of the MIC. In the case of the investor,
this agreement can be inferred from the submission of the claim itself. As for the
respondents, their agreement can derive from IIAs which explicitly provide for the
MIC’s jurisdiction; the MIC Statute may also stipulate its jurisdiction over already
existing investment treaties, as long as the respondent is an MIC member and the
home state/territory has also ratified the MIC statute. Furthermore, the drafters of the
MIC must decide whether its jurisdiction extends to claimants who are not fromMIC
member states and whether parties can establish the MIC’s jurisdiction ad hoc if
neither the investor nor the respondent is (from) an MIC member state. However,
this should be accepted only if the rules on court fees are adapted accordingly.
23The MIC Statute could also stipulate rules aimed at preventing abuse of process
or treaty shopping.
24The costs of proceedings shall be allocated to the parties depending on the
outcome of the case; however, MIC members should cover the permanent costs of
the court, as it would be difficult to allocate the costs to specific proceedings. Fixed
MIC fees could be foreseen to shift part of the financial burden to the parties. Small
and medium-sized enterprises and individual investors should not be deterred from
initiating justified cases before the MIC as a result of court fees.
25Decisions should be in writing and fully reasoned to make them comprehensible
for future reviewers. If none of the parties appeals the decision, it can become
binding and enforceable.
26An appeal should suspend the binding effect of a decision of a chamber of first
instance. The appeals chamber could review the facts as well as the legal reasoning
of decisions. Moreover, appeals chambers should have further competences in
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addition to being able to annul decisions, for example on the grounds contained in
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. It is generally preferable for the appeals
chamber to possess extensive powers instead of remanding decisions back to the
chamber of first instance to decide again.
27 The judges of the second instance should also sit in chambers and an application
to have the proceedings before the plenary of judges should remain the exception.
28 The Statute should provide for the financing of procedural costs and legal aid. The
plenary organ or its members could later decide on details through secondary laws.
This secondary law could also regulate the admissibility of counterclaims, prelim-
inary injunctions and other interim relief as well as mass actions.
1.4 Applicable Law of the MIC
29 The substantive law of the MIC should be the applicable investment treaties and their
respective standards of protection. The presence of permanent judges will lead to
increased consistency in the application of these standards of protection and the MIC
Statute could also include provisions that require the judges to apply the protection
standards consistently. Additionally, the MIC Statute could contain an instruction to
take general principles of international law into account. An explicit reference to the
right to regulate could also be included in the MIC Statute.
30 Due to the special role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in
the Union’s system of legal protection, EU law—with the exception of the MIC
statute and specific free trade and investment agreements and investment treaties of
the EU13—should not qualify as applicable substantive law of the MIC.
31 Through its plenary organ, the MIC could adopt its own procedural law. The MIC
statute may already provide for core procedural principles, such as the principles of
transparency, accelerated proceedings, public disclosure and efficiency, an inquisi-
torial model, rules on procedural costs and rules against abuse of process.
1.5 Legal Remedies and Enforcement of MIC Decisions
32 The decisions of the MIC should be limited to (declaratory) findings of violations of
applicable IIAs and the award of damages and/or compensation.
33 As the MIC procedure is not a procedure covered by the ICSID Convention, the
enforcement mechanism of the ICSID Convention will not apply to MIC decisions.
34 Enforcement pursuant to the New York Convention would require that MIC
decisions embody arbitral awards as defined by this Convention. Although this
could be stipulated in the Statute (similar to Article 8.41(5) CETA), it is currently
13From an EU perspective, these investment treaties are an integral part of EU law.
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unclear whether such a provision would be accepted as binding by the domestic
courts of the enforcement state, especially with respect to enforcement in
non-member states of the MIC. In light of the desire for legal certainty, the MIC
should have its own enforcement mechanism, which would be more effective with a
greater number of MIC member states.
35One could also consider the establishment of a fund (enforcement fund) to which
all MIC members have to contribute and which could serve to expeditiously satisfy
final claims up to a certain amount. Claims against the losing party arising from an
MIC decision would be subrogated to the fund. The fund or the MIC could then
enforce these subrogated claims against the party in arrears.
1.6 Establishment of a Standalone Multilateral Investment
Appellate Mechanism (MIAM)
36Another, “smaller” solution would be the establishment of a MIAM. This would
entail a single-tier court system within a new independent international organisation.
37The organs of the MIAM would be identical to those of the MIC. This is
particularly true for the judiciary and the plenary organ. The Secretariat might turn
out to be smaller than that of an MIC.
38The applicable administrative and procedural law and the enforcement of MIAM
decisions could be designed similarly to what has been suggested for the MIC.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
39In March 2018 the Council of the European Union (EU Council or Council) gave the
Commission of the EU (EU Commission or Commission) a mandate to negotiate a
Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).1 Furthermore, since July 2017 the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group
III2 is discussing different options for the reform of Investor State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS).3 The UNCITRAL Working Group III was mandated to:
First, identify and consider concerns regarding ISDS; second, consider whether
reform was desirable in light of any identified concerns; and third, if the Working
Group were to conclude that reform was desirable, develop any relevant solutions to
be recommended to the Commission.4
Consensus to develop solutions (thus enter stage 3 of the UNCITRAL WGIII
mandate) was reached at the Thirty-seventh session in New York from 1 to 5 April
20195; the option of an institutionalized as well as multilateralised investor state
dispute settlement mechanism will now be discussed in detail inside and outside
UNCITRAL. This is all the more the case after the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) has given its Opinion 1/17 confirming the compatibility of the
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Investment
Court System with the EU Treaties. The CJEU recalled “that an international
agreement providing for the creation of a court responsible for the interpretation of
1Council of the EU (2018).
2UNCITRAL Working Group III is composed of the 60 member States of the Commission and
attended by observers from other UN member States, non-member States, intergovernmental
organizations and invited non-governmental organizations.
3UNCITRAL (2017a).
4UNCITRAL (2017b), para. 264 and 447.
5UNCITRAL (2019).
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its provisions and whose decisions are binding on the European Union, is, in
principle, compatible with EU law. Indeed, the competence of the European Union
in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international
agreements necessarily entail the power to submit to the decisions of a court that
is created or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and
application of their provisions”.6
This study assesses both the option of a two-tiered MIC as well as of a Multilat-
eral Investment Appellate Mechanism (MIAM). Both models provide for a perma-
nent, pre-appointed judiciary according to rule of law standards. The structure of the
new dispute settlement mechanism should pursue the following objectives:
– procedures adhering to the rule of law,
– independence and neutrality of judges,
– publicly appointed judges,
– uniform interpretation of the law,
– efficient and expedient procedures,
– protecting states’ right to regulate,
– transparency,
– an appeal mechanism.
Fulfilling these objectives would satisfy both the rule of law requirements which
must be taken into account when formulating international legal protection and the
legitimacy criteria.7
40 EU Commissioner Malmström mentioned the “Multilateral Court” for the first
time on 18 March 2015 in the Committee on International Trade (INTA Committee)
and at an informal meeting of the Council (Foreign Affairs) on 25 March 2015.8
Finally, UNCITRAL decided on 10 July 2017 to work on a reform of the investment
dispute settlement mechanism, including the possible establishment of an MIC.9
41 The EU Commission is currently investigating the feasibility of an MIC due to the
modernisation of investment protection and the ISDS mechanism10 in the CETA,11
6CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 106.
7Cf. for instance, Kastler (2017), p. 265.
8Malmström (2015): “However, I believe that we should aim for a court that goes beyond TTIP. A
multilateral court would be a more efficient use of resources and have more legitimacy. That makes
it a medium-term objective to be achieved in parallel to our negotiations with the United States. I
hope for Parliament’s support and advice as we try to achieve it.” Cf. in connection also European
Commission (2015), pp. 3 and 13; cf. previously already the proposals of Krajewski (2015) and the
French proposal, Vers un nouveau moyen de régler les différends entre États et investisseurs, May
2015; thereto Fouchard Papaefstratiou (2015).
9European Commission (2017b).
10European Commission (2017a).
11Art. 8.27 and 8.29, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, OJ L 11, 14.1.2017, p. 23.
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the EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (IPA),12 the EU-Mexico Global
Agreement13 and the EU-Vietnam IPA.14
42Since the first proposals in spring 2015, the discussion about an Investment Court
System (ICS) and multilateralisation has sparked an enormous debate.15 The Com-
mission presented the first basic structures of a bilateral investment court system in a
position paper in May 201516 and proposed this system to the United States of
America (US) in autumn 2015 in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations.17 At the same time, the EU Commission
managed to successfully introduce this dispute settlement system into the CETA
negotiations with Canada as well as into the EU Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam
at a relatively late stage. Also the EU-Singapore agreement was revised again after
negotiations had actually already been finished, also due to the “necessity” to isolate
investment law from trade law in these agreements due to a new Commission
approach as a consequence of the Singapore Opinion of the CJEU.18 This bilateral
approach on the ICS chosen by the Commission is also seen as a test or pilot phase
for a future multilateral system.19
43In addition to the bilateral investment court systems introduced in the CETA, the
EU-Vietnam IPA, the EU-Singapore IPA and the EU-Mexico Global Agreement, it
was stated in each agreement in almost the same wording that the parties to the
agreement intend to transfer the respective bilateral investment court system to a
multilateral system:
The Parties shall pursue with other trading partners the establishment of a multilateral
investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes.
Upon establishment of such a multilateral mechanism, the CETA Joint Committee shall
adopt a decision providing that investment disputes under this Section will be decided
pursuant to the multilateral mechanism and make appropriate transitional arrangements.20
12Art. 3.9 and 3.12, EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019.
13Art. 11 and 14, Section- Resolution of Investment Disputes, EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft
for signature) as on 2 April, 2019.
14Art. 3.38 and 3.41, EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019.
15Cf. European Commission (2016), Ghahremani and Prandzhev (2017), Blair (2017), Ambrose
and Naish (2017), Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016, 2017), Howse (2017a), Happ andWuschka
(2017), Hoffmeister (2017), Brown (2017), Katz (2016), Alvarez Zarate (2018), Ghori (2018),




18CJEU, Opinion 2/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376; on this see, inter alia Bungenberg (2017),
Hindelang and Baur (2019) and Usynin and Gáspár-Szilágyi (2018).
19Pauwelyn (2015).
20Article 8.29 CETA, Establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism;
Art. 3.41, EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019; Art. 14, Section- Resolution of
Investment Disputes, EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019; Art.
3.9, EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019.
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44 A number of procedural elements have also been included in the relevant
agreements and in the Investment Protection Agreements between the EU and
Singapore, EU and Vietnam and in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement in order to
achieve greater transparency and to reject clearly inadmissible or unjustified com-
plaints at an early stage. The rule on cost distribution states that the losing party has
to bear the costs. These provisions already constitute a number of innovative
elements in investment protection in comparison to the existing agreements of the
EU Member States, as well as to almost all other existing agreements.
45 The European Parliament “shares the ambition of establishing, in the medium
term, a multilateral solution to investment disputes.”21 Thus, in its resolution on the
TTIP negotiations in 2015, the Parliament recommended the following:
to ensure [. . .] to replace the ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes between
investors and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny, where potential
cases are treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed, independent professional
judges in public hearings and which includes an appellate mechanism, where consistency of
judicial decisions is ensured, the jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the Member States is
respected, and where private interests cannot undermine public policy objectives22
46 This feasibility study aims to illustrate options for the organisational and proce-
dural design of an MIC. For the specific design of this new system, the requirements
of Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) are a decisive prerequisite
from the EU’s perspective.23 Accordingly, this provision already indicates that the
EU shall plead primarily for multilateral solutions. At the same time, it stresses the
particular importance of complying with the EU’s rule of law principle.24 In light of
these rule of law considerations, procedural equality of arms should be ensured.25
For example, the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking also
21European Parliament resolution (2016), para. 68.
22European Parliament resolution (2015), para. 2.d)xv).
23The significance and compulsory consideration of Article 21 TEU was last emphasised again by
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its Singapore opinion. Cf. CJEU, Opinion
2/15, Singapore FTA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 142 et seq.: “One of the features of this
development is the rule laid down in the second sentence of Article 207(1) TFEU that ‘the common
commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s
external action’. Those principles and objectives are specified in Article 21(1) and (2) TEU [. . .].
The obligation of the European Union to integrate those objectives and principles into the conduct
of its common commercial policy in apparent from the second sentence of Article 207(1) TFEU
read in conjunction with Article 21(3) TEU and Article 205 TFEU.” See in regard to the relevance
of rule of law considerations etc. CETA, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341,
para. 105 et seq.
24Thereto in general, Schröder (2016) and Bungenberg and Hazarika (2019).
25On the aspect of “equality of arms” as an aspect of the rule of law, cf. Fleiner and Basta Fleiner
(2004), p. 250; hereto also for example the jurisprudence on Article 6 European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), cf. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), No. 2689/65, Del-court
v. Belgium; ECtHR, No. 8562/79, Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands; ECtHR, No. 14448/88, Dombo
Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands; ECtHR, No. 17358/90, Bulut v. Austria; ECtHR, No. 13645/05,
Ko-kelvisserij e.a. v. the Netherlands; thereto in the literature Safferling (2004), p. 181 et seqq.;
Grabenwarter and Struth (2015), Article 6, para. 46 et seqq.
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provide that “dispute settlement procedures should be fair, open and transparent,
with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse.”26 In various papers,27 the Council of
Europe has developed basic requirements concerning the rule of law for judicial
systems, which must be duly respected while designing the MIC.
47This study discusses the option of a two-tiered system as well as a multilateral
system of appeals. Both options bring ISDS in line with constitutional requirements
of the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights.28 The views and positions
on these proposed systems of other entities with international legal personality as
well as of third countries are being taken into consideration. In the long term, setting
up an MIC may also require convincing ‘heavyweights’ in the area of protection of
foreign investment such as China or the US, in addition to the EU and its current
28 Member States including their respective International Investment Agreement
(IIA) networks, of the advantages of such a system. Canada, Vietnam, Singapore and
Mexico have already committed themselves in this respect.
48The two-tiered solution and the mere appellate mechanism discussed below are
both different models of a multilateral approach.
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Targets for the Reorganisation
of the Investment Protection Regime
49A reorganisation of the investment protection regime by introducing a two-tiered
court system or a multilateral appellate body could offer advantages in comparison to
the current system.1 In a first step, the expected positive effects of the new approach
are discussed. In a second step, the two options of a two-tiered MIC and a MIAM are
compared based on the outcomes of the previous discussion.
3.1 Positive Effects of a New Approach
50Depending on the design of the system, it appears possible through enhanced
institutionalization2 to achieve greater consistency of decisions, to reinforce the
independence and neutrality of adjudicators, to improve expedience of investment
disputes, to limit costs for the parties involved, to ensure more accessibility for Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and finally, to offer greater transparency than in
current ISDS.3 These aspects are also related to the increased emphasis on the rule of
law—according to Articles 2 and 21 TEU.4
51An international investment court, in the sense of a permanent institutional court,
can facilitate streamlined procedures through its efficient organisation. The organs of
the court may deliver summons, execute the serving of documents and offer its
premises for negotiations and translation services, including simultaneous interpre-
tation. This can also reduce procedural problems which may occur if, for example,
1On this see also, European Union (2019), para. 40.
2Hereto in particular Schill (2015).
3European Union (2019), paras. 40 et seqq. A discussion on the problems which the EU seeks to
solve through the ICS and MIC can be seen in Alvarez Zarate (2018), pp. 2767 et seqq.
4Also emphasised in European Commission (2017), p. 38.
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the parties prefer not to make use of the services of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Secretariat, the International Criminal
Court or the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In addition, the MIC proposed
here can provide its own procedural rules, adapted to the specific needs of the
disputes, and can envisage its own mechanism for the implementation (recognition
and enforcement) of its decisions.5
3.1.1 Consistency of Decisions
52 Nowadays, a large number of arbitral awards are publicly available and they
facilitate the interpretation of individual clauses of investment protection treaties in
future cases.6 These awards are often said to be inconsistent—even in cases with
identical facts.7 Even substantive protection standards with nearly identical wording
have been interpreted in a contradictory manner in individual cases,8 such as the
applicability of the most-favored nation clause to procedural provisions in other IIAs
of the host state,9 the scope of so-called umbrella clauses10 or the attribution of
umbrella clauses,11 but also rules of procedure, like the possibility of a waiver of
rights.12 At the same time, however, it is noteworthy that a consistent application of
many substantive as well as procedural investment law standards has evolved. This
is remarkable considering the lack of binding precedence of arbitral awards, the
absence of review through an appeal mechanism and the diverging compositions of
the benches of arbitral tribunals. What is clear is that a smaller group of judges, as
well as an appeals mechanism can help to prevent inconsistent decisions.13 In fact, a
standing court with a permanent pool of judges can lead to a higher degree of
5On this see also, European Union (2019), para. 30.
6Publications of decisions and the status of individual proceedings on the ICSID website, https://
icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx.
7Cf. for instance CME v. Czech Republic and Lauder v. Czech Republic; see thereto Carver (2004),
pp. 23 et seqq.
8Cf. thereto in detail Griebel and Kim (2007), pp. 188 et seqq.
9On the application of the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause to dispute settlement agreements,
cf. Maffezini-decision on the one hand and Plama v. Bulgaria on the other hand; thereto Schill
(2016), pp. 251 et seqq.; Gaillard (2005); Douglas (2011), p. 97; Maupin (2011), p. 157; Paparinskis
(2011), pp. 14 et seqq.
10Cf. thereto SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 and SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6; thereto also Alexandrov (2004), pp. 555 et seqq.; Chung (2007), pp. 961 et seqq.;
Schreuer (2004), pp. 231 et seqq.; Sinclair (2004), pp. 411 et seqq.; Wälde (2005), pp. 183 et seqq.
11See thereto in particular Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11.
12Cf. thereto for instance SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 on the one hand and
LANCO v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6 on the other hand; see also European Union
(2017), paras. 22 et seqq.
13See also European Union (2019), paras. 43 et seqq.; European Commission (2017), p. 39.
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jurisprudential consistency, even without binding precedence.14 In any event, bind-
ing precedence could not be based on inconsistent interpretations of or diverging
substantive law.
53Proper consistency of judicial decisions can only be achieved if a
multilateralisation of the substantive law, as the basis of the decisions, is also
implemented. Nevertheless, the presence of permanent judges as well as a consul-
tation mechanism between judges of different chambers can prevent contradictory
decisions (see paras. 119 et seqq.).
3.1.2 Greater Legitimacy
54The current discussion also invokes the question of sufficient legitimacy and control
of international dispute resolution. Without engaging in the discussion as to whether
this criticism is justified,15 it is said that judges can enjoy a high degree of legitimacy
at international courts if they have passed a predetermined selection process and
have ultimately been elected or confirmed by states.16 Therefore, guidelines, in
particular those of the Council of Europe, should play a special role when designing
a new institution.17 This would add to the legitimacy of the judges through the
selection process in addition to the legitimacy derived from the international treaty
on which the dispute settlement is based.
3.1.3 Independence and Neutrality of Judges
55Arbitrators have recently been repeatedly accused of a lack of independence and
neutrality18 since they are at least partly appointed by private claimants and some-
times act as legal counsel in other proceedings.19 In addition, they are often accused
of showing an investor-friendly attitude.20 The validity of the latter point has not
14For similar views, see, European Union (2019), para. 41; European Union (2017), para. 7;
European Commission (2017), p. 28; Howard (2017), pp. 32 et seqq.
15Cf. thereto inter alia Steinbach (2016), pp. 1 et seqq.
16See for instance von Bogdandy and Krenn (2015), p. 420; von Bogdandy and Venzke (2012),
pp. 32 et seqq. See also European Commission (2017), p. 46; European Union (2019), para. 22.
17Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on the Election of Judges to the
European Court of Human Rights, Procedure for electing judges to the European Court of Human
Rights, Information document prepared by the Secretariat of 21.2.2017, AS/Cdh/Inf(2017)rev3.
18Cf. UNCTAD (2013), p. 4; Eberhardt (2014), p. 3; Schill (2017), p. 2; European Union (2019),
para. 6(ii); UNCITRAL (2018b), paras. 66 et seqq.; European Commission (2017), p. 28.
19Cf. UNCTAD (2013), p. 4; Paulsson (2010), pp. 339 et seqq.
20Cf. van Harten (2010), pp. 441 and 445; Brower and Schill (2009), p. 489: “arbitrators ‘will be
influence[d] by their self interest in reappointed in future cases’.”
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been proven empirically.21 Furthermore, the generally applicable International Bar
Association (IBA) Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration22
set relatively high standards for the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.
Notwithstanding these guidelines, these concerns could be further diminished by
reforms if judges are appointed by states in advance, independent of a specific
dispute, and for a long period of time.23 It is generally acknowledged that a
permanent court with permanent judges would strengthen independence and
neutrality.24
3.1.4 Lack of a Control Mechanism
56 In connection with the independence of the arbitrators, the problem of a non-existent
or very limited control mechanism is often mentioned,25 which can lead to the
above-mentioned inconsistent jurisprudence and lack of control by certain stake-
holders. Formally, an appellate body can review erroneous or questionable decisions
on procedural or substantive aspects of a case.26 The mere possibility of such a
review would presumably increase the legitimacy of decisions in ISDS.
3.1.5 Cost Efficiency
57 International arbitration proceedings may lead to considerable costs.27 According to
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the average
total procedural costs (including legal counsel costs) are around US$8 million per
case.28 Besides the procedural costs in the sense of the term defined in arbitration
law, such as costs for the arbitrators, interpreters and secretariats, legal fees and other
costs accrued for the representation of the parties, there are also other costs for legal
experts and other experts for the calculation of damages. In current arbitration
21Wuschka (2015); Franck (2009), pp. 435 et seqq. Similarly, Alvarado Garzón (2019), p. 484.
22IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Resolution of the Interna-
tional Bar Association Council of 23.10.2014.
23European Union (2019), paras. 18 et seqq.
24Cf. van Harten (2008), pp. 21 et seqq.; Howard (2017), pp. 26 et seq.; European Union (2019),
para. 47; see also, European Union (2017), para. 8.
25Hueckel (2012), p. 611; Chung (2007), pp. 967 et seqq.; UNCTAD (2013), pp. 3 et seq. Similarly,
Alvarado Garzón (2019), p. 488.
26On this see also UNCITRAL (2018a), para. 40; for a discussion on scope of review see, European
Union (2019), para. 14; European Commission (2017), p. 48.
27European Union (2017), paras. 33 et seq.; European Commission (2017), p. 14.
28Gaukrodger and Gordon (2012), p. 19.
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practice, tribunals are hesitant to order a full assumption of these costs by the losing
party.29
58In spite of an increase in arbitration proceedings, investor-state arbitration is not
an everyday instrument for redressing violations of investment law due to the high
costs of the procedures. SMEs in particular have problems to cover the costs of
investor-state arbitration.30 In addition, they cannot rely on compensation of their
expenses for the arbitration even if they win the case.
59Apart from financial risks for the plaintiffs, the high costs are also an enormous
burden for developing countries.31 Accordingly, it is argued that states have to bear
high costs for their defense, which can lead to a regulatory chill even in the event that
they win the case. Therefore as a starting point and in the interest of a more efficient
and cost-effective procedure, the establishment of an Advisory Center should be
considered.32 Furthermore, a limitation of the object of dispute, the introduction of a
principle of official investigation and by the possibility of imposing a limitation on
the ‘necessary costs’ etc. could lead to a reduction of procedural costs.
3.1.6 Access for SMEs
60As just pointed out, the question of cost-efficiency is directly related to the access for
SMEs to investment protection.33 On the one hand, the access of SMEs to invest-
ment protection is currently considered desirable.34 On the other hand, so-called
Third-Party Funding, mass as well as class actions etc. are considered extremely
problematic developments in international investment protection.35 A new multilat-
eral institution could constitute an opportunity to make institutionalized investment
protection ‘more suitable’ for SMEs, for example through cost reduction, access to
legal aid and/or procedural support through an advisory center and the acceleration
of proceedings. A further possibility would be to allow class actions by SMEs and
individual investors with respect to identical claims.36
29Hodgson (2015), pp. 749 et seqq.
30European Union (2017), para. 34; UNCITRAL (2018b), para. 111; European Commission
(2017), p. 53.
31UNCITRAL (2018c), paras. 8 and 94; UNCITRAL (2018b), para. 111.
32On this see also UNCITRAL (2018c), para. 101; UNCITRAL (2018b), para. 119; UNCITRAL
(2018a), para. 149; European Commission (2017), p. 54.
33See on this also CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, paras. 205 et seqq.
34UNCITRAL (2018b), para. 131.
35Cf. Hindelang (2015), p. 20; See also, UNCITRAL (2019), para. 16.
36On this see also UNCITRAL (2018a), Annex. p. 15.
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3.1.7 Transparency
61 The majority of existing IIAs do not require any public access to procedures (even
though decisions of the arbitral tribunals are generally published), resulting in the
allegation of a lack of transparency dominating the current criticism and discus-
sion.37 The Mauritius Convention38 adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2014
should ensure greater transparency going forward. With this convention, the
UNCITRAL transparency rules39 will be extended to existing IIAs.40 These rules
require inter alia public hearings and the publishing of essential procedural docu-
ments (memoranda, decisions) of investor-state arbitration proceedings. To date, the
Mauritius Convention has been signed by 23 states (including Germany), ratified by
five states (Cameroon, Canada, the Gambia, Mauritius and Switzerland) and entered
into force on 18 October 2017.41 The European Parliament has also called for
increasing transparency.42 Possible future models should explicitly take these recent
developments in transparency into account in their procedural rules—as was done in
the CETA, and planned for in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement and the
EU-Vietnam IPA.43
3.1.8 Time Efficiency
62 The long duration of arbitration proceedings is being increasingly criticised, partic-
ularly due to the heavy workload of arbitrators.44 Compared to WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedures (with an average of 15 months for the panel procedure and
37Cf. for instance UNCTAD (2013), p. 3; European Union (2017), para. 35; European Commission
(2017), p. 15; Peterson (2001), p. 13; Schill (2011), p. 66; Bastin (2012), pp. 223 et seq., 227; Public
Statement on the International Investment Regime—31 August 2010, http://www.osgoode.yorku.
ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/; Wuschka (2016),
pp. 32 et seqq.
38United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the
Mauritius Convention on Transparency), which was adopted on 10.12.2014 and entered into
force on 18.10.2017.
39UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Rules on Trans-
parency), which are in force since 1.4.2014.
40European Commission (2017), p. 15.
41Cf. www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Conventionstatus.
html.
42European Parliament resolution (2013), para. 43.
43See, Art. 8.36, CETA, OJ L 11, p. 23, 14.1.2017; Art. 19, Chapter: Resolution of Investment
Disputes, EU-Mexico Global Agreement (Draft agreed in principle on 21 April 2018); Art. 3.46,
Chapter 3: Dispute Settlement, EU-Vietnam IPA (Draft for signature as of August, 2018).
44Recently, the Yukos-process has caused sensation here, where apparently the presiding arbitrator
has transferred a large part of the actual tasks incumbent on himself to a co-worker. Cf. thereto
Newman and Zaslowsky (2015).
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a further 100 days for the procedure before the Appellate Body (AB)),45 current
investor-state arbitration proceedings are lengthy—and therefore cause considerable
costs. In 2012, ICSID procedures took 5 years on average,46 while another study
indicates an average duration for investment procedures of 3 years and 8 months.47
63A permanent bench of judges with far-reaching powers to control the procedures
could clearly contribute to the acceleration of proceedings, once the availability of
the judges is assured.48 Furthermore, the implementation of a maximum duration for
specific procedural stages should be considered in this context (see paras. 287 et
seqq.).
3.2 Advantages of the Two-Tiered MIC Option
64In the current discussion, a two-tiered MIC and a MIAM are principally, and for
good reason, considered as alternative solutions. Both options are discussed in the
following passages as both could constitute improvements in comparison to the
existing system. However, certain arguments speak in favour of a two-tiered court
(MIC)49 as opposed to a standalone appeal mechanism (MIAM), even if the latter
might, according to some literature, be easier to realise.50
65Some scholars emphasise in particular that a standalone multilateral appellate
body would not be sufficient to fully solve the legitimacy crisis of international
investment law.51
66In the long term, an MIC could develop a consistent interpretation of the overall
system of investment protection standards and could lead to consistency and thus to
legal certainty and predictability of decisions.52 Moreover, a particularly important
difference of the MIAM solution relates to concerns with respect to ad hoc arbitra-
tors, who are partly appointed by investors; they would still be the ‘first instance’ of
such a MIAM system and thus would have the power to decide on the legality of
45Johannesson and Mavroidis (2016), pp. 12 et seq.
46Raviv (2014), p. 6.
47European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (2014), p. 8; Hodgson (2014). Cf. also
European Commission (2015), p. 1: “The overall proceedings under the ICS, including appeal, are
limited to 2 years (the Tribunal of First Instance must decide within 18 months and the Appeal
Tribunal within 6 months). As a comparison, the average duration of proceedings under existing
investment treaties is 3–4 years, with annulment or set-aside (for procedural grounds) potentially
adding around another 2 years, meaning that the total length is often around 6 years (with many
taking longer).”
48On this see also European Commission (2017), p. 58.
49See also Howse (2017), p. 233; European Union (2019), paras. 39 et seqq.
50Schill (2015), p. 8.
51Voon (2017), pp. 7 et seqq.; European Commission (2017), pp. 28 et seq.
52Schill (2015), p. 8; European Commission (2017), pp. 57 et seqq.; European Union (2019), paras.
44 et seqq.
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regulations by the state. This, in addition to the varying and thus inconsistent
composition of the tribunals’ benches, would remain a weak point, as these are
considered to be the main reasons for inconsistency of decisions. The decision-
making process of a permanent investment court may therefore be more ‘morally
binding’.53
67 Furthermore, a standing appellate mechanism may suspend decisions of the first
instance tribunal, if those decisions were otherwise enforceable through the ICSID
Convention or the New York Convention (NYC). This possibility of enforcement
would likely be forgone when bringing an appeal before the appellate body. Regard-
ing the appellate court solution, there is a risk that an appeals decision rendered by
the MIAMwould be undermined by its lack of enforceability in states not member to
the MIAM.
68 The WTO Dispute Settlement System is often discussed in the context of the
two-tiered solution,54 although—on closer examination—the WTO system rather
constitutes a mixture of the two alternatives, since the adjudicators of the WTO’s
first instance panels are appointed ad hoc, and only after the dispute has emerged and
not based on a predetermined composition. However, the institutional and proce-
dural design of both the first instance (panel) and the second instance (Appellate
Body) are defined as a whole in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).55
Therefore, a full adoption of the WTO System for the resolution of investment law
disputes would entail that arbitrators of the first instance tribunal, administered by
the MIC, be appointed ad hoc, whereas permanent, full-time judges would sit on the
bench of the MIC’s Appellate Body.56
69 Overall, the following chapters on the design of a two-tiered MIC and a MIAM
will discuss the advantages as well as the challenges of the implementation of the
respective solutions.
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Design and Implementation of a
Two-Tiered MIC
70The EU Commission introduced a two-tiered investment court system to the debate
in 2015 and has since been able to implement it in three agreements—CETA, the
EU-Vietnam IPA as well as the EU-Singapore IPA. Similarly, the negotiated
renewed EU-Mexico Agreement provides for an investment court system. In its
‘Trade for All’ communication, the Commission also stated that all future agree-
ments concluded with the EU should contain this system for investment protection.1
Therefore, this ICS can be used as a starting point for the following assessment,
while also considering that this system should be converted into a multilateral
system if possible.2
71CETA, the EU-Vietnam IPA and the EU-Singapore IPA provide for a first
instance tribunal and an appeal mechanism. The same system will most likely be
foreseen in the EU-Mexico Trade Agreement. These agreements also set out the size
of the court system, the qualifications of the judges, the duration of their appoint-
ment, their remuneration and the limitations on the scope of their professional
engagements outside the court, the applicable law and the scope of the appellate
body’s review of the first instance decision, as well as time limits for lodging an
appeal and a maximum duration of the procedure.3
72In addition, in the following discussion, other proposals for investment courts
(see, for example, the International Law Association (ILA) Draft Statutes of the
1European Commission (2015), p. 24; This position was confirmed in European Commission
(2017), p. 27.
2Article 8.29 CETA, Establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism;
Article 3.41 EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019; Article 3.12 EU-Singapore
IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019; see also, Article 14 Section- Resolution of Investment
Disputes, EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019 EU-Mexico
Agreement (under negotiation). These versions of the EU-Singapore IPA, the EU-Vietnam IPA and
the EU-Mexico Global Agreement have been used throughout the Chapter.
3Cf. thereto for instance Article 8.18 et seqq. CETA.
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Arbitral Tribunal for Portfolio Investment and the Foreign Investment Court of
1948),4 already established investment courts (Arab Investment Court),5 permanent
arbitration tribunals (Iran-US Claims Tribunal6 (IUSCT), United Nations Compen-
sation Commission7(UNCC)), as well as other international courts (with a special
focus on the International Court of Justice8 (ICJ), the ITLOS,9 the International
Criminal Court,10 the European Court of Human Rights11 (ECtHR) and the Court of
Justice of the European Union12 (CJEU)) are taken into consideration from a
comparative law perspective. The aim is to adopt aspects in the implementation of
the MIC which are considered positive and/or functioning.
4Draft Statutes of the Arbitral Tribunal for Foreign Investment and of the Foreign Investment Court,
printed in: UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium Volume III—
Regional Integration, Bilateral and Non-governmental Instruments, 1996, p. 259 et seqq.
5The Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States, printed in:
UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Volume II, Regional Instru-
ments, 1996, p. 211 et seqq.; see also, Hamida (2006).
6Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), 19 January 1981 (a copy of the official
declaration can be downloaded from http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/2-Claims%
20Settlement%20Declaration.pdf); for more information on the IUSCT, see, http://www.iusct.net/.
7UNSC Resolution No. 687 (1991), UN Doc. S/RES/687, 8 April, 1991 (a copy of this resolution
can be downloaded from https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf); for more infor-
mation on the UNCC, see, https://uncc.ch/home.
8Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), 1945, 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945) (a copy
of the statute can be downloaded from http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf); for more
information on the ICJ, see, https://www.icj-cij.org/.
9Statute of the ITLOS, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561 (a copy of the statute can be downloaded from https://
www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/statute_en.pdf); for more information on the
ITLOS, see, https://www.itlos.org/.
10Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (a copy of the statute can be
downloaded from http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm); for more information on the ICC,
see, https://www.icc-cpi.int/.
11European Convention on Human Rights, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (a copy of the ECHR can be
downloaded from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20213/volume-213-I-
2889-English.pdf); for more information on the ECtHR, see, https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/
home.aspx?p¼home.
12Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU Statute), OJ C
203, 7.6.2016, p. 72 (a copy of the statute can be found at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri¼OJ:C:2016:203:FULL&from¼EN); for more information on the CJEU, see,
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/.
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4.1 Institutional and Procedural Design
73To be functional, an international organization like the MIC should envisage both an
effective institutional structure and an effective decision-making process. The sys-
tem proposed here aims to achieve an effective and legitimised dispute settlement
mechanism that adheres to the rule of law. This section therefore addresses the
members and the respective organs of an MIC, its general procedure and other
features.
74The organisational requirements should be set out in a statute (hereinafter MIC
Statute). Detailed questions such as the procedural rules, the Code of Conduct for
judges and other MIC staff etc. can be provided for either in a then very compre-
hensive MIC Statute or specified and in more detail in secondary law, if the MIC
Plenary Body is vested with the required law-making powers.
75A possibility of specification and amendment by the adoption of secondary law
by decisions of the Plenary Body could be established; such law-making powers
would have to be provided for in the MIC Statute. Alternatively, the details could
also be regulated in the MIC’s primary law. However, in the latter case, primary law
provisions should also facilitate simplified amendments of procedural rules by the
contracting parties in order to ensure the overall functioning of the new organisation
or take changes in the membership structure into account.
76Ideally, more detailed procedural rules would be regulated through secondary law
as this would provide for more flexibility, in case amendments are needed. Amend-
ments to primary law usually prove to be more problematic, since they are often
linked to further substantive issues, among others. The institutional framework of
other international courts—such as the ICJ, CJEU or ECtHR—is also legally
structured in this way. Moreover, a legal framework that is divided into primary
and secondary law can contribute to greater transparency.
4.1.1 Members of an MIC
77Membership should include all entities with international legal personality that may
be parties to IIAs. Of course, the members of an MIC should in particular comprise
states. TheWTO also permits autonomous customs territories to become members.13
However, unlike WTO law, a reference to customs territories is not applicable in the
context of investment law because in the latter, the impairment to foreign invest-
ments is tied to the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, international
(supranational) organisations vested with autonomous regulatory powers like the
13Cf. Article XII:1 sentence 1 WTO-Agreement: “Any State or separate customs territory
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other
matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this
Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO.”
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EU should be able to become members of an MIC. The same applies to atypical
entities with international legal personality or to actors such as special administrative
regions14 which are entities with only a partial international legal personality. In that
regard, it should also be possible for Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan15 to become
independent members of an MIC.
78 The EU can only negotiate and conclude international treaties to the extent that its
Member States have transferred corresponding competences to it. Whether the EU
alone or the EU together with its Member States are to take part as Members of the
MIC was at least partially clarified by the Singapore Opinion of the CJEU16 and by
the CJEU’s response as to what extent the EU enjoys shared and/or exclusive
competence to enter into treaties in the field of investment protection.
79 According to this opinion, the EU is not exclusively competent to regulate the
settlement of disputes between investors and states, but shares this competence with
its Member States.17 In particular, portfolio investments are not covered by the
exclusive competence of the EU. Since IIAs typically do not distinguish between
direct investments and portfolio investments and as the MIC’s jurisdiction should
cover the entire scope of IIAs (see para. 195 et seqq.), the EU as well as its Member
States should all become independent members of the MIC.
4.1.2 Plenary Body
80 A general Plenary Body exists in a large number of international dispute settlement
organisations, albeit with different names. In the WTO, for example, this Plenary
Body is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the General Assembly at the UN, the
Assembly at the World Health Organization (WHO) or the General Conference at
the International Labour Organization (ILO).18 In general, a Plenary Body makes all
central decisions within the respective organisation or institution. It can de facto deal
with all issues that fall within its mandate. Thus, plenary bodies could also, in a
broader sense, manage dispute resolution as a whole, i.e. appoint judges, assign them
to chambers or even adopt internal procedural rules. Furthermore, if the MIC Statute
or the rules of procedure permit, the Plenary Body may step in where issues of
enforcement of compensation awarded to a claimant arise. For example, payouts
from a member-financed fund could be approved by the Plenary Body (see para.
538 et seqq.), while the Secretariat should be in charge of the administrative
supervision of the payout. ‘Sanctions’ of a different nature—such as a suspension
of membership rights—could also be imposed by the Plenary Body.
14Ahl (2009), p. 98 et seqq., in particular. p. 114 et seq.
15Heuser (2010), p. 115 et seqq.; Craven (2014), p. 241.
16CJEU, Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.
17CJEU, Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, para. 285 et seqq.
18Cf. Ruffert and Walter (2009), para. 296.
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81Plenary bodies of comparable institutions are generally composed of representa-
tives of member states. Accordingly, the MIC’s Plenary Body would be composed
of representatives of all its Members, which also entails independent administrative
entities and international organisations. Regarding the transfer of competences from
EU Member States, at least concerning most aspects of foreign investment19 (as has
been the case with the WTO since its establishment in 1995 despite the incomplete
transfer of competences to the European Communities (EC)),20 the EU should
‘speak with one voice’, i.e. come to an internal agreement and be represented
externally by a single, common representative. The representation of the EU within
the WTO could serve as a model. However, all EU Member States should be
represented individually in the Plenary Body. Here too, as in the WTO, a parallel
membership of the EU and its Member States should be sought. The WTO System
has proven itself in this regard.
82The Plenary Body should also be able to form further internal subdivisions within
the scope of its competence. For example, they should be able to constitute com-
mittees that develop internal procedural rules, draft codes of conduct and evaluate
candidate judges. The adoption of interpretative statements for the future—which,
however, could only be of a general nature until the MIC applies uniform substantive
law—could constitute a counterweight or corrective to the case law of the MIC. The
MIC Plenary Body or its committees could only render interpretative statements for
an authentic interpretation of the multilateral legal instruments of the MIC; interpre-
tations of bilateral IIAs can only be issued by the respective parties to the agreement
or by the committees established through these IIAs (see para. 108 et seqq.).21
83The plenary sessions of all international organisations occur periodically at
predetermined intervals, but there is also the possibility of extraordinary sessions.22
This practice should also be adopted for the MIC Plenary Body.
4.1.2.1 Appointment of Judges Through the Plenary Body
Number of MIC Judges
84Only very few international courts require that each member state must be
represented by their own judge for plenary decisions (the CJEU and the ECtHR
constitute such exceptions). The ICJ has 15 judges (with 193 UN-Members) and the
ITLOS has 21 judges (with 168 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
19Thereto inter alia Bungenberg (2010), p. 135 et seqq.; Reinisch (2016), p. 3 et seqq.; Dimopoulos
(2011), p. 65 et seqq.
20ECJ, Opinion 1/94, WTO, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384.
21Schill (2015), p. 9.
22Cf. at the WTO, the meeting of the Ministerial Conference at least once every 2 years, and the
General Council, composed of representatives of the Member States, whenever appropriate, Article
IV of the WTO Agreement.
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(UNCLOS)-Member States). The number of MIC Judges should be limited, also for
cost reasons. The number of judges should not be based primarily on the number of
MIC Members, but rather on the number of cases brought before the MIC.23
Nevertheless, all major legal traditions or jurisdictions should be taken into account
in the composition of the bench (see para. 96 et seqq.).
85 A multilateral court with at least 40 Member States should envisage a limited
number of judges. The CETA rules on the appointment of judges, where each of the
two parties proposes a number of judges, who are then appointed by the mixed
CETA Committee,24 should therefore not be transferred to an MIC.
86 It can be assumed that only a certain number of cases will be heard under the
second instance and finally be decided by the Appellate Body. Therefore, the
number of judges in the second instance can be lower than in the first instance (see
para. 340 et seqq.). An MIC could, for example, envisage 15 judges in the first and
9 judges in the second instance, as well as provide for the option and respective
procedure for increasing the numbers depending on the number of MIC Members
and/or the workload.25
Nomination of Candidate Judges
87 It is put forth by some academics that decisions of states as to which judges to
nominate are influenced by the expected judicial behaviour,26 i.e. they would only
nominate candidates who are particularly mindful of states interests.27 The opposing
view argues that an investment court would, due to its very existence, privilege
investor interests.28 However, the prevailing view is the fear that an MIC could be
disadvantageous for investor interests.29 Therefore, the manner in which judges are
nominated will be important for the independence and acceptance of the MIC,
especially by investors.
23This approach is followed by European Commission (2017), p. 40 and discussed in UNCITRAL
(2017), para. 35. Similarly, Alvarado Garzón (2019), p. 485.
24Cf. Article 8.27 para. 2 CETA: “The CETA Joint Committee shall, upon the entry into force of
this Agreement, appoint fifteen Members of the Tribunal. Five of the Members of the Tribunal shall
be nationals of a Member State of the European Union, five shall be nationals of Canada [Footnote:
Either Party may instead propose to appoint up to five Members of the Tribunal of any nationality.
In this case, such Members of the Tribunal shall be considered to be nationals of the Party that
proposed his or her appointment for the purposes of this Article] and five shall be nationals of third
countries.” Similarly, Article 3.9 para. 2 EU-Singapore IPA, Article 11 para. 2 Section- Resolution
of Investment Disputes, EU-Mexico Global Agreement and Article 3.38 para. 2 EU-Vietnam IPA.
25This approach is followed by European Commission (2017), p. 40.
26Voeten (2009), p. 396 et seqq.
27Mackenzie (2014), p. 741.
28Woods (2016).
29Cf. American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), Executive Summary &
Conclusions and Recommendations, p. 13; Roberts (2017); Bernardini (2017), p. 48; Koeth
(2016), p. 12.
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88For the selection of judges, it is usually the members that nominate a pool of
candidates30 and an international committee/body that subsequently chooses and
appoints the judges.31 As a result, this election process also proves to be inherently
political. The decisive factor is that there is a sufficient number of sufficiently
qualified candidates to choose from, even if it is a political decision.
89An alternative would be for the governments of the MIC Members to nominate
candidates, which would then be confirmed by the Plenary Body, without leaving a
choice from a larger pool of proposed candidates. But such an approach has been
repeatedly criticized for lacking transparency in terms of how states pick the
nominees. Therefore, the Plenary Body choosing from a larger pool of suitable
candidates proposed by the MIC Members is the preferred solution.
90Accordingly, the Plenary Body could develop and adopt guidelines on how to
select nominees on the national level. In this regard, the practice of the Council of
Europe with regard to the ECtHR could serve as a point of reference.32 For the
selection of ECtHR judges, it is emphasised that even the national preselection has to
comply with a number of fundamental principles (“must reflect the principles of
democratic procedure, transparency and non-discrimination”).33 In various areas,
states are now beginning to advertise vacant posts so that candidates can apply
through a national preselection process.34 The states then choose which of these
applicants they nominate as candidates. This nomination by home states is envis-
aged, for example, for the selection of candidates for the WTO Appellate Body,35 for
30Like this, Article 4 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “The members of the Court shall be elected by the General
Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the following provisions.” and Art. 4 para.
1 ITLOS Statute: “Each State Party may nominate not more than two persons having the qualifi-
cations prescribed in article 2 of this Annex. The members of the Tribunal shall be elected from the
list of persons thus nominated.”
31Mackenzie (2014), p. 738; Abi-Saab (1997), pp. 176 and 178; Mackenzie et al. (2010), p. 100
et seqq.
32Cf. hereto von Bogdandy and Krenn (2014), p. 529 et seqq.
33Cf. in this sense also the Council of Europe Assembly Resolution 1646 (2009), Nomination of
candidates and election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights; Committee on the
Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights, Procedure for electing judges to the
European Court of Human Rights, AS/Cdh/Inf(2017)01rev4 of 27.4.2017.
34Cf. last in the EU to fill the “EU” AB position: European Commission, EU Launches Selection of
Candidates for the position of WTO Appellate Body member, Press release of 26.10.2016; as well
as the public tenders in Germany and Austria for the new appointment of their ECtHR judges’
offices: Richter mit Ruf gesucht, Handelsblatt of 24.11.2009; Straßburger Richter: Sechs Bewerber,
Die Presse of 3.11.2014.
35Article 17 DSU, cf. thereto WTO, WTO receives seven nominations for Appellate Body post,
News Items of 23.3.2016; European Commission, EU Launches Selection of Candidates for the
position of WTO Appellate Body member, News archive of 26.10.2016.
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the International Criminal Court36 and for the ITLOS.37 It is also foreseen for the
International Law Commission (ILC).38
91 Another alternative would be a direct application of potential candidates to the
organisation itself, which has been disfavoured in comparison to the option
discussed above. To date, the possibility of direct applications exists only in the
Civil Service Tribunal of the EU.39
92 From an investor’s perspective, this alternative of direct applications would have
the advantage that the influence of the home states of the candidates would be
reduced. In addition, this mechanism could avoid ‘vote trading’ between govern-
ments.40 However, there is an issue of acceptance of such a system of direct
application if the elected judges primarily rule over state actions and their compat-
ibility with investment protection standards without any possibility for the Members
to influence the selection process. In addition, such a direct application procedure
could lead to a very high number of potential candidates, which could result in
administrative problems in the process.
93 In case the members decide in favour of a nomination of candidates by the
members, time limits should be set and the names of the candidates together with
the documents required for an appointment—curriculum vitae, proof of professional
qualifications etc.—should be accessible to all voting members. The latter also
applies, of course, if the decision is made in favour of direct applications.
Screening Committee
94 Prior to the actual election of judges by the Plenary Body—and after the nomination
of candidates by the Members or direct application by the potential candidates—a
committee can be established to vet the qualifications, including expertise and
36Article 36 para. 4 lit. a) Rome Statute: “Nominations of candidates for election to the Court may
be made by any State Party to this Statute, and shall be made either: (i) By the procedure for the
nomination of candidates for appointment to the highest judicial offices in the State in question; or
(ii) By the procedure provided for the nomination of candidates for the International Court of Justice
in the Statute of that Court [. . .].”
37Cf. Article 4 para. 1 ITLOS Statute: “Each State Party may nominate not more than two persons
having the qualifications prescribed in article 2 of this Annex. The members of the Tribunal shall be
elected from the list of persons thus nominated.”
38Article 3 ILC-Statute: “The members of the Commission shall be elected by the General
Assembly from a list of candidates nominated by the Governments of States Members of the United
Nations.”
39Cf. indeed Article 3 para. 2 Annex I to the Council decision of 2.11.2004 establishing the
European Union Civil Service Tribunal, OJ L 333 of 9.11.2004, p. 7: “Any person who is a
Union citizen and fulfils the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 225a of the EC
Treaty and the fourth paragraph of Article 140b of the EAEC Treaty may submit an application. The
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the Court, shall determine the
conditions and the arrangements governing the submission and processing of such applications.”
40Mackenzie (2014), p. 124.
36 4 Design and Implementation of a Two-Tiered MIC
general suitability (independence, integrity and neutrality) of the candidates.41 Such
a committee now exists for the CJEU42 and the ECtHR.43 This additional instance to
mitigate the possibility of politically motivated and non-transparent national nomi-
nations of candidates, to prevent the candidacy of unsuitable persons could take the
form of a sub-committee of the Plenary Body (Screening Committee). This Com-
mittee would screen the candidates for their personal suitability, i.e. professional
qualifications, ethical standards as well as independence and neutrality.44
95Such an intermediate preliminary examination would strengthen the legitimacy
and acceptance of the MIC and would contribute to greater transparency and
objectivity in the appointment procedure.45 This would also ensure that member
states already set sufficiently high standards in their internal nomination proce-
dures.46 The election of the judges could then proceed from this pool of candidates
determined by the Screening Committee.
Diversity Among Judges
96To increase the acceptance of the MIC, the election process should ensure that the
various legal systems are represented within the judiciary.47 The judges should
reflect the legal systems and regions of the Members and seek gender balance—
and at the same time have the highest professional qualifications.48 The WTO
41Cf. for instance Article 36 para. 4 lit. c) Rome Statute: “Every candidate for election to the Court
shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of the
Court.” See hereto Resolution ICC-ASP/10/Res.5 of 21.12.2011, Strengthening the International
Criminal Court and the Assembly of States Parties, para. 20.
42See thereto Art. 255 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): “A panel shall be
set up in order to give an opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform the duties of Judge and
Advocate-General of the Court of Justice and the General Court before the governments of the
Member States make the appointments referred to in Articles 253 and 254. The panel shall comprise
seven persons chosen from among former members of the Court of Justice and the General Court,
members of national supreme courts and lawyers of recognised competence, one of whom shall be
proposed by the European Parliament. The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the panel’s
operating rules and a decision appointing its members. It shall act on the initiative of the President of
the Court of Justice.” Cf. consequently Council decision of 11.2.2014 appointing the members of
the panel provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2014/
76/EU), OJ L 41 of 12.2.2014, p. 18.
43Cf. Resolution on the Establishment of an Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election
as Judge to the European Court of Human Rights, CM/Res(2010)26 of 10.11.2010.
44Examples of unsuitable but elected judges of the ECHR in Engel (2012), p. 486 et seqq.
45Cf. insofar Hackspiel (2015), Art. 255 TFEU, para. 3 et seq.
46Cf. Hackspiel (2015), Art. 255 TFEU, para. 2; cf. insofar also already the European Convention,
CONV 734/03 of 2.5.2003, Art. 224a.
47Diversity is equally supported by European Union (2019), para. 50 and UNCITRAL Working
Group III (2018a), p. 6. See also Howse (2017b), p. 224.
48Cf. Article 8 ILC-Statute: “At the election the electors shall bear in mind that the persons to be
elected to the Commission should individually possess the qualifications required and that in the
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Appellate Body members represent the full range of WTO Members,49 including
geographic distribution, levels of development and legal systems.50 Hence, the
appointed judges must reflect the membership of the MIC so that judges mirror the
various legal and cultural backgrounds of MIC Members. As a consequence, and
taking into account the aspired number of member states, there should not be two
judges of the same nationality.51
97 In practice, the representation of the various legal systems is achieved through an
appointment of a certain number of judges per regional group.52 This requirement of
regional or geographical distribution exists in the statutes of numerous international
judicial bodies53 and is attained, for example, by certain quotas for regional groups.
Fair regional representation within the ITLOS is ensured by taking recourse to the
five geographical groups of the UN General Assembly (African, Asian, Eastern
European, Latin American and Caribbean and Western European and other
countries).54
98 To date, no international statute stipulates a fixed assignment of judges to specific
states. At the same time, it is informally accepted that certain states are guaranteed to
always have a judge of their nationality appointed if they nominate a candidate. For
Commission as a whole representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal
systems of the world should be assured.” Article 36 para. 8 lit. a) Rome Statute: “The States Parties
shall, in the selection of judges, take into account the need, within the membership of the Court, for:
(i) The representation of the principal legal systems of the world; (ii) Equitable geographical
representation; and (iii) A fair representation of female and male judges.” Article 9 ICJ Statute:
“At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should
individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the represen-
tation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be
assured.”
49Article 17.3 sentence 3 DSU: “The Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative of
membership in the WTO.”
50In this sense, Weber (2007), p. 135; Preparatory Committee to the WTO, Sub-Committee on
Institutional, Procedural and Legal Matters, Establishment of the Appellate Body, Recommenda-
tions, PC/IPL/13 of 8.12.1994, para. 6: “[. . .] Therefore factors such as different geographical areas,
levels of development, and legal systems shall be duly taken into account. The question of how this
balance is to be achieved is best left to be worked out during the actual consultation and selection
procedures.”
51See for instance Article 3 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “The Court shall consist of fifteen members, no two
of whom may be nationals of the same state.” Article 52 para. 2 American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR); Article 3 para. 1 sentence 1 ITLOS Statute.
52Mackenzie (2014), p. 744.
53Article 2 para. 2 ITLOS Statute: “In the Tribunal as a whole the representation of the principal
legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution shall be assured.”Article 36 para.
8 lit. a) Rome Statute: “The States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into account the
need, within the membership of the Court, for: (i) The representation of the principal legal systems
of the world; (ii) Equitable geographical representation [. . .]”. Article 9 ICJ Statute: “At every
election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually
possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the
main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.”
54See https://www.itlos.org/en/the-tribunal/members/.
38 4 Design and Implementation of a Two-Tiered MIC
example, the five permanent Members of the UN Security Council have always
appointed an ICJ Judge, although there is no such privilege stipulated in the ICJ
Statute (an exception to this occurred in 2017 for the first time). The same applies to
the WTO Appellate Body, in which since the founding of the WTO in 1995, the US
and the EU have always been “represented”.55 Such a fixed assignment of judges
cannot be included in the MIC Statute. Nevertheless, within certain regional groups,
members could be picked that will always send a judge to the MIC, whereas other
seats of the bench will be filled with judges from the remaining states of these
regional groups according to a rotation scheme.
99Within the EU, there could be a nomination of suitable candidates by the Member
States, possibly after a ‘job posting’ and an internal screening procedure. Member
States would then notify the Commission of their choice of candidates, which would
in turn conduct internal hearings and select the persons to be proposed to the MIC
Plenary Body as suitable candidates.
100As an alternative to the formation of regional groups, a free choice could be made
exclusively on the basis of the qualifications of candidates without an allocation of
seats on the bench to regional groups.
101The latter alternative, however, entails the danger that politically strong states will
usually be able to place their nationals on the bench, but developing countries may
face real problems in this regard. On the one hand, specifying certain geographical
and other criteria for a fair distribution of judges might result in a deviation from the
principle that the most qualified candidates should prevail. On the other hand
though, this may be necessary because otherwise the MIC would encounter a lack
of states willing to become members of the MIC and diminished acceptance
throughout the various legal systems.
102Concerning the option of selecting judges through regional groups, the com-
monly accepted election procedure for the ILC could be used as a model for an
appointment procedure for MIC Judges. The ILC candidates, as is the case with the
election of the ICJ Judges,56 are assigned to specific regional groups.57 From each
regional group, the plenary body (in this case, the UN General Assembly) elects a
certain number of judges. Therefore, elections in the MIC Plenary Body would be
organised through regional groups; all Members of the Plenary Body would vote in
their respective regional group and the candidates with the most votes of each
55Mackenzie (2014), p. 745.
56Cf. Article 5 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “At least three months before the date of the election, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a written request to the members of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration belonging to the states which are parties to the present Statute, and
to the members of the national groups appointed under Article 4, paragraph 2, inviting them to
undertake, within a given time, by national groups, the nomination of persons in a position to accept
the duties of a member of the Court.”
57Cf. Article 3 para. 2 ILC-Statute: “There shall be no fewer than three members from each
geographical group as established by the General Assembly of the United Nations.” See also Article
3 para. 2 ITLOS Statute: “There shall be no fewer than three members from each geographical
group as established by the General Assembly of the United Nations.”
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regional group would be elected as judges.58 The elections would be held by secret
ballot.59
103 In principle, it would be possible for the regional groups to reduce the influence of
third countries with regard to the election of judges within that regional group by
nominating only a number of candidates pursuant to the regional quota and agreeing
on an internal rotation scheme regarding the allocation of candidates. Of course, this
would have consequences for the legitimacy as well as for the independence of the
judges.
104 The formation of regional groups of an MIC with (initially) 15 judges in the first
instance could follow the model of the ICJ.60 At the ICJ, there are three judges from
Africa, two from Latin America and the Caribbean, three from Asia, five from
Western Europe and other countries and two from Eastern Europe.61 As either EU
Member States or EU nationals will be involved in proceedings before the MIC in
many cases and as the EU and its 27 or 28 independent Member States will also
make up a large fraction of MIC Members for a certain period of time during the
formation phase of the MIC, the EU and its Member States should also be
represented by an adequate number of judges in order to incorporate EU or
European legal traditions in the long-term legal development or interpretation of
the MIC. However, other potential MIC Members should not be discouraged due to
an overrepresentation of the EU, but should also be represented on the bench in a
well-balanced, fair manner. The following regional distribution should therefore be
proposed for the allocation of seats on the judges’ bench: three Asian, two African,
three Latin American and Caribbean, six Western European, North American and
Oceanian and one Eastern European. In the group of Western European and other
countries, the EU should fill at least two seats. Such a regional approach for the
appointment of judges would correspond best to the desired multilateral and univer-
sal orientation of the MIC.
105 A relatively recent development is the aim for a balanced appointment of judges
from a gender perspective.62
58Cf. Article 9 ILC-Statute: “1. Those candidates, up to the maximum number prescribed for each
regional group, who obtain the greatest number of votes and not less than a majority of the votes of
the Members present and voting shall be elected. 2. In the event of more than one national of the
same State obtaining a sufficient number of votes for election, the one who obtains the greatest
number of votes shall be elected, and, if the votes are equally divided, the elder or eldest candidate
shall be elected.”
59Cf. on the difficulties in choosing the ICJ judges in 2014, Akande (2014).
60Nevertheless, it must be highlighted that even the elections of ICJ judges can be criticised as
political. In this regard see Brower and Ahmad (2018), p. 793.
61Cf. http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1¼1&p2¼2.
62See here Article 36 para. 8 lit. a) sublit. iii Rome Statute: “A fair representation of female and male
judges.”; cf. also Art. 12 para. 2 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR Protocol): “Due
consideration shall be given to adequate gender representation in nomination process.” Cf. with
regard to ECHR Mowbray (2008), p. 549. For the MIC, following the example of Howse (2017b),
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4.1.2.2 Adoption of Specific Secondary Rules
106The Plenary Body should be considered as the political organ of the MIC. Through
the Plenary Body, the Members may, inter alia, pass further procedural rules either
by a qualified majority or unanimously and interpret the MIC Statute in a legally
binding manner, insofar as such a legislative power is provided for in the MIC
Statute.
Adoption of Internal Procedural Rules, Budget etc.
107The Plenary Body should be allowed to adopt supplementary procedural rules or
schedules of responsibilities, such as the remuneration of judges, procedural arrange-
ments for the organisation of the court of first and second instance, guidelines for
oral proceedings, regulations concerning procedural costs, codes of conduct for MIC
staff (so-called staff regulations, see para. 183), pension schemes for the MIC staff,
budgetary regulations and the adoption of the annual budget.
Interpretation, Including Subsequent/Authentic Interpretation
108The issue of rules of interpretation by the parties and, in the case of an MIC, by the
Plenary Body, is generally a controversial topic of discussion. Subsequent agree-
ments on interpretation are intended to eliminate ‘uncertainties’ regarding the
interpretation of the agreement in question and, in particular, to ‘readjust details’.
For example, interpretation agreements or decisions on matters of jurisdiction
regulated in the MIC Statute would be conceivable. Interpretation arrangements
that are independent of ongoing procedures also seem generally possible in light of
constitutional rule of law requirements. However, such interpretative decisions by
the Plenary Body could only affect the MIC Statute itself and only insofar as the
Plenary Body would be vested with a corresponding interpretative mandate. For
example, terms used in the MIC Statute could be explained using this interpretative
mechanism.
109An interpretation by the MIC Members of the various IIAs on which the dispute
settlement will be based is in principle not possible. IIAs can only be interpreted by
their respective contracting states. However, an interpretation of the underlying IIAs
by the MIC Members is possible if the parties to the IIAs have expressly consented
to it, for example through corresponding provisions in the MIC Statute. In this case,
the multilateral MIC Statute would amend the substantive bilateral agreements (see
in this respect also Article 39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)).
p. 225, MIC Members could be required to nominate equal number of men and women to fill the
vacancies of MIC Judges.
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The Plenary Body could be vested with a narrow interpretative competence for the
IIAs to this extent.
110 In principle, agreements on interpretation by the MIC Members can be problem-
atic during ongoing proceedings if the new interpretation were to apply to these
proceedings retrospectively. The facts on which the MIC has to decide would have
already been set at that point in time and the applicable law or its interpretation
would thus change post facto. One possible solution to this problem is to provide for
the possibility of a third party intervention by the parties that are interested in
clarifying the law in the MIC Statute; they could voice their legal point of view in
the current proceedings. This interpretation would of course not be binding.
Subsequent Increase of the Number of Judges
111 In case the workload of the MIC rises in such a way that it can no longer be handled
by the original number of judges, it should be the responsibility and within the
mandate of the Plenary Body to increase the number of judges in the first instance
and, if necessary, in the second instance and to decrease it further if appropriate (see
para. 86). For this purpose, the additional number of judges could be predetermined
in the MIC Statute.
112 Since the MIC Statute should not allocate a specific number of judges per State/
Member, the appointment of additional judges could initially occur irrespective of
accession of further Member States. However, a balanced regional representation
should also be taken into account in this regard. It should als be considered to
introduce a mechanism to be able to react to stronger participation in the MIC from
different regions of the world and adjusting in this regard the suggested key of judges
per region (see above para. 104). In order to facilitate a simplified amendment of the
regional distribution quotas—which of course does not constitute an allocation of
judges to specific Member States—in the case of changes of membership of the
MIC, the quotas should be stated in the procedural law, i.e. in the MIC’s secondary
law.63
4.1.2.3 Requirement of Majority for Decision Making
113 The decision-making process of the Plenary Body could envisage decisions that can
be taken with a qualified majority. The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO
generally operates under the principle of consensus. However, if consensus cannot
be reached, it is possible to pass decisions by a three-quarters majority. In any case,
certain matters are reserved for consensus.
63In a similar way, Howse (2017b), p. 226, suggests that the MIC should have a provision allowing
to add new judges when required.
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114The requirement of unanimity may in fact lead to a veto by a single member.
Therefore and in order to ensure the functioning of the MIC, a qualified majority
should be stipulated for the above-mentioned decisions regarding procedural rules
and the increase in the number of judges.
115In this context, it should be taken into account that—depending on the number of
MICMembers—if the EU and its Member States become Members of the MIC, they
should at least have a veto even if the requirement for a qualified majority exists as
far as the EU and its Member States “speak with one voice” like in the WTO.
4.1.2.4 Transparency in Proceedings of the Plenary Body
116Minutes of the Plenary Body’s sessions should be published online on the MIC
homepage as promptly as possible. Whether the sessions of the Plenary Body will be
held in public should be considered, also with regard to available space for such
sessions. In the WTO, the consistent objective is to improve the transparency of the
organisation. In the EU context, Article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
EU (TFEU) also stipulates for all institutions to generally respect of the principle of
transparency64; the European Parliament meets in public, as does the Council when
it deliberates or votes on legislation.
4.1.2.5 Seat of the Plenary Body and Frequency of Meetings
117The seat of the Plenary Body should be chosen. This would, in principle, make it
necessary to first decide whether all institutions of the MIC should be located at the
same seat or, as in the EU, have different seats. It should be a place where the
competent ministers or other representatives of the members already meet regularly.
This would be the case during the meetings of the WTO General Council in Geneva,
for example.
118In terms of the frequency of meetings, a flexible solution, like at the WTO, should
be considered. An annual meeting of the Plenary Body could be set as a minimum
requirement and further sessions could then be organised according to actual needs.
However, the Plenary Body should not handle tasks of day-to-day administration of
pending proceedings; rather, the Secretariat would be in charge of this.
64Article 15 para. 1 and 2 TFEU: “(1) In order to promote good governance and ensure the
participation of civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct
their work as openly as possible. (2) The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the
Council when considering and voting on a draft legislative act.”
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4.1.3 Judges at the MIC
119 The judges’ qualifications as well as their election process and, consequently, their
independence should be considered the core of a future MIC. The MIC Judges will
decide on matters of state interest. Thus, the election process should be subject to
high standards; only highly qualified judges ensure the necessary quality and thus
acceptance of the new multilateral institution. Personal and professional standards
have to be taken into consideration during the election process (see para. 124 et
seqq.). The design of the election procedure of the judges should be of particular
importance in the establishment of the MIC.65 There should be a division of judges
between the first and the second instance.
4.1.3.1 Full- or Part-Time Judges
120 One question is whether the judges will be employed full-time or part-time. In the
latter case, the judges could be available on demand, as is currently the case for the
first-instance judges for example in the CETA ICS.66
121 In addition to their work at the MIC, part-time judges could also engage in other
professions, for example as judges at national or international courts, as university
professors or in legal consulting. They could be paid a ‘stand-by lump sum’ as well
as an appropriate additional salary for the work they actually perform at the MIC.
122 Full-time judges, on the other hand, should focus fully on their work at the MIC.
Therefore, parallel occupations should be minimal. Accordingly, the remuneration
of full-time judges—in particular from the point of view of securing full judicial
independence (see para. 130 et seqq.)—should be regulated accordingly.
123 The alternative of part-time employment is likely to be less expensive initially. By
contrast, full-time employment would foster an effective, independent and high
quality judiciary that would likely lead to expedient procedures.67 Prompt and
(in terms of quality) ‘good’ decisions of the MIC will contribute to its accep-
tance—and should thus also lead to an increase in the caseload of the MIC in the
medium term, which should render the question of part-time or full-time employ-
ment of the judges superfluous in the long run. It should also be noted that overhead
costs for secretaries, employees etc. would give rise to expenses for the MIC—
irrespective of full- or part-time judges. In addition, even in the case of a smaller
caseload, the overhead costs for full-time judges would probably not be much higher
than those for part-time judges who receive a lump sum fee plus per diem allowances
65Mackenzie (2014), p. 738 with reference to Caron (2000), p. 21 et seq.
66Article 8.27 para. 12 CETA: “In order to ensure their availability, the Members of the Tribunal
shall be paid a monthly retainer fee to be determined by the CETA Joint Committee.” The same
applies to the second instance in Article 8.28 para. 7 lit. d. CETA.
67Europeam Union (2019), para. 16 suggests similarly that MIC judges should be full-time
adjudicators.
44 4 Design and Implementation of a Two-Tiered MIC
comparable to those of ICSID arbitrators. Full-time employment of judges would, at
least, provide no incentives for prolonging the processes.
4.1.3.2 Qualification
124CETA, the EU-Vietnam IPA and the EU-Singapore IPA already state qualification
requirements for judges, on which the MIC provisions could be based:
The Members of the Tribunal shall possess the qualifications required in their respective
countries for appointment to judicial office, or be jurists of recognised competence. They
shall have demonstrated expertise in public international law. It is desirable that they have
expertise in particular, in international investment law, in international trade law and the
resolution of disputes arising under international investment or international trade
agreements.68
125In addition to expertise in public international law, in particular investment
protection and trade law as well as dispute resolution, it should also be taken into
account that the MIC in principle decides on state actions directed against foreign
investors. In many cases, these are public law decisions that judges have to make
based on the protection standards provided for in the IIAs.69 Even though national
law should only be taken into account as a question of fact, it is also important for the
proper application of the governing law whether the judges have more of a private
law or rather a public law background. When interpreting the standards of protection
and deciding whether there are violations, these are matters of balancing interests
that are often comparable to the examination of fundamental rights violations under
national law. This is where the difference between investment arbitration and
commercial arbitration becomes apparent; such considerations have only been
taken into account to a minimum extent in past appointments of investment arbitral
tribunals. Corresponding professional requirements should be requested in the case
of MIC judges.70 In addition to knowledge of international law, especially in trade
and investment law, there could be a requirement of experience in national admin-
istrative and constitutional law.71
126Existing courts allow for the appointment of judges with varying professional
qualifications.72 Since the establishment of chambers should be assumed for the
68Cf. Article 8.27 para. 4 CETA, Article 3.38 para. 4 EU-Vietnam IPA and Article 3.9 para.
4 EU-Singapore IPA.
69In a similar way it has been addressed that ISDS cases touch upon public interest or public policy.
See UNCITRAL Working Group III (2018a), para. 31. Similarly, European Union (2019), para.
49 states the need of a public international law background, given the foundations of
investment law.
70American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), Executive Summary & Conclu-
sions and Recommendations, p. 7.
71See also Howse (2017b), p. 224.
72Article 36 para. 8 lit. b) Rome Statute: “States Parties shall also take into account the need to
include judges with legal expertise on specific issues [. . .].”
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MIC Statute and since the relevant facts may come from different subject areas due
to the very broad definition of ‘investment’ and the applicable protection standards,
there should be no requirement of specialist qualifications, such as in tax law,
environmental law etc. Even CETA abstains from a requirement for such sector-
specific specialist knowledge.73
127 CETA,the EU-Vietnam IPA and the EU-Singapore IPA require for the first and
the second instance that the members of the Tribunal are qualified to hold the office
of judges in their respective countries or are highly regarded jurists.74 It should be
noted that these are only bilateral agreements; the MIC, on the other hand, would
constitute a multilateral court which will contribute to the development of a consol-
idated body of international investment law. Therefore, the judges should be
assumed to have the highest qualifications.75 A specification of these prerequisites
could be made individually by the nominating Members and explained individually
to the screening committee. For pragmatic reasons, a future MIC Statute should state
a very broad description of the required qualifications for judges in the form of
general prerequisites.76 Additionally, regarding the judges at the ICS, it could be
suggested that the MIC Judges at the second instance (appeals) should be more
qualified and have more expertise and experience than the MIC judges at the first
instance in order to address the allegedly incorrect decisions of first instance.
128 Setting a minimum or maximum age for judges should be looked at with regard to
the issue of age discrimination and should thus be considered with great restraint,77
especially given that a screening committee can review the capabilities of each
individual candidate.
129 It remains an open question whether the eligibility/appointment of MIC Judges
should be made contingent on the home state of the potential candidate being a
member of the MIC.78 To allow MIC Judges to have the nationality of non-MIC
States would demonstrate the inclusiveness of the MIC towards other potential
member states. The eligibility requirements should rather depend on the qualifica-
tions and independence of the individual than on a certain nationality.
73Article 8.27 para. 4 CETA just mentions “[i]t is desirable they have expertise in particular in
international investment law, in international trade law and the resolution of disputes arising under
international investment or international trade agreements.” (emphasis added). Similarly in Article
3.38 para. 4 EU-Vietnam IPA and Article 3.9 para. 4 EU-Singapore IPA.
74Cf. Article 8.27 para. 4 and Article 8.28 para. 4 CETA Article 3.38 para. 4 and Article 3.39 para.
7 EU-Vietnam IPA and Article 3.9 para. 4 and Article 3.10 para. 4 EU-Singapore IPA.
75The importance of having adjudicators with the highest qualifications is recognised by European
Union (2019), para. 20.
76See also Wilske et al. (2017), p. 94.
77Neither WTO-AB, nor ICJ provide for age limits; the ECtHR provides for an age limit of 70 years,
cf. Article 23 para. 2 ECHR.
78This is not a requirement of the ILC, but so far no person has ever been elected to the ILC whose
home state is not a UN member.
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4.1.3.3 Independence
130Generally, the independence of judges and their autonomy should be essential.79
This means that all government representatives would be unsuitable to serve as MIC
Judges. Accordingly, WTO Law states that AB Members shall be “unaffiliated with
any government.”80 Even though domestic judges or university professors are also
financially dependent on states, their independence is to be assumed because they do
not fulfil government tasks under the instructions of and subordinated to the
government and are not directly involved in government actions, unless specific
objections concerning this independence arise in particular cases.81
131In addition to individual professional qualifications and independence from their
home states, it should be clarified that the judges appointed to the MIC do not act as
representatives of states, especially not of their home states, but perform an ‘inter-
national task’. Judges of the ECtHR, for example, act in their individual capacity in
accordance with Article 21 para. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR); they do not represent their home countries, but are “completely indepen-
dent from any instructions.” An appropriate remuneration of the judges should also
ensure their financial independence (see para. 145 et seqq.).
132Another question in relation to independence is whether judges should be allowed
to resume any kind of occupation in other areas of law after their terms at the MIC or
whether a cooling-off period should be required (see para. 141).
4.1.3.4 Ethics
133Judges will only be able to contribute to the acceptance of the MIC if they meet the
highest ethical and moral standards and possess the necessary integrity.82 Almost all
international courts explicitly require this.83 Ethical rules can be defined directly in
79On this see also CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 223 et seqq.
80Article 17 para. 3 sentence 2 DSU.
81On the harmlessness in these cases of state affiliation at the WTO-AB cf. Preparatory Committee
to the WTO, Sub-Committee on Institutional, Procedural and Legal Matters, Establishment of the
Appellate Body, Recommendations, PC/IPL/13 of 8.12.1994, para. 7: “[. . .] Members of the
Appellate Body should not therefore have any attachment to a government that would compromise
their independence of judgment. This requirement would not necessarily rule out persons who,
although paid by a government, serve in a function rigorously and demonstrably independent from
that government”. The CJEU held that Members of Tribunals such as law professors who receive
renumeration from a state but are not however involved in the determination of the policies of the
government of the state does not make that person ineligible, see CJEU, Opinion 1/17 30 April
2019, ECLI: EU:C:2019:341, para. 240.
82The need to guarantee impartiality and independence of MIC adjudicators was highlighted by
European Commission (2017), p. 45.
83Cf. insofar for instance Article 2 ICJ Statute: “The Court shall be composed of a body of
independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral
character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to
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the MIC Statute or be adopted by the Plenary Body as specific secondary law. As
most attention is paid to the independence and neutrality of judges in current debate
in the area, core provisions concerning the suitability and behaviour of judges should
be regulated directly in the Statute.
134 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct84 could possibly serve as a starting
point for the substantive ethics requirements for MIC Judges.85 The Bangalore
Principles, which have been compiled by working groups and endorsed by a UN
Resolution, can be seen as the model rules of judicial conduct requirements, with
particular emphasis on independence, objectivity and impartiality, integrity, propri-
ety and equal treatment of all parties to the procedure.
135 The opinion of the European Judges Council (CCJE) No. 3 on the principles and
rules governing judges’ professional conduct, in particular their ethics, incompatible
behaviour and impartiality, is based on the Bangalore Principles.86 Essential stan-
dards of conduct include impartiality, equal treatment and equality of arms of the
parties, diligence in the performance of judicial duties and in interactions with the
media, restraint, in particular in the exercise of political activities and also appropri-
ate behaviour in private life. Furthermore, the opinion emphasises that the rules
should be prescribed in written form.
136 Article 8.30 CETA87 comprises rules of ethics that refer to the IBA Guidelines on
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration.88 This should be taken into con-
sideration.89 The first part of the IBA Guidelines state seven general standards as
well as provisions (impartiality, independence, disclosure requirements for arbitra-
tors and parties, waivers of the possibility to challenge adjudicators, scope of
the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.”
Cf. also Article 36 para. 3 lit. a) Rome Statute; Article 4 para. 1 Statute of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (IACtHR Statute); Article IV para. 11 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean
Court of Justice (CCJ Agreement).
84The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001 adopted by the Judicial Group on Strength-
ening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace
Palace, The Hague, 25–26.11.2002.
85International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute Resolution on the Values Pertaining to
Judicial Appointments to International Courts and Tribunals of 31.10.2011.
86CCJE(2002)OP3DE of 19.11.2002.
87Article 8.30 para. 1 CETA: “The Members of the Tribunal shall be independent. They shall not be
affiliated with any government. [Footnote: For greater certainty, the fact that a person receives
remuneration from a government does not in itself make that person ineligible.] They shall not take
instructions from any organisation, or government with regard to matters related to the dispute.
They shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect
conflict of interest. They shall comply with the International Bar Association Guidelines on
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration or any supplemental rules adopted pursuant to
Article 8.44.2. In addition, upon appointment, they shall refrain from acting as counsel or as party-
appointed expert or witness in any pending or new investment dispute under this or any other
international agreement.”
88IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Resolution of the Interna-
tional Bar Association Council of 23.10.2014.
89For a different opinion see Howse (2017b), p. 228.
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application etc.). The second part describes various examples for the application of
these principles. These examples are assigned in a ‘traffic light system’; from a red
(absolute exclusion or serious reasons for disqualification), to an orange (legitimate
doubts about independence or impartiality), to a green list (no appearance of bias).
The EU Commission’s ICS proposal also already contains a ‘Code of Conduct for
Members of the Tribunal, the Appeal Tribunal and Mediators’90 in Annex II. This
document could be used as an initial starting point for a future MIC Code of
Conduct.
137In the rules of ethics, inter alia, the following should be regulated:
– independence,
– impartiality and neutrality,
– obligations for former judges after the termination of their term,
– confidentiality,
– basic code of conduct to protect the reputation of the court,
– sanctions in case of misbehavior, e.g. corruption of judges and their affiliates,
– other obligations.
138In addition, disclosure requirements of possible reasons for bias should also be
stipulated, as well as the prohibition to delegate judicial tasks to others etc.
139Disclosure requirements should apply to all facts that could affect judicial
impartiality or independence.91 A breach of these disclosure requirements in a
proceeding should be penalised and should lead to a prima facie disqualification in
this procedure due to bias. However, it should be considered whether a list of
hypothetical cases constituting problematic cases should be contemplated. In this
case, only an exemplary instead of an exclusive list would be recommended. These
requirements could be modelled after the IBA Guidelines.92
140Furthermore, judges should not be allowed to comment on political issues93 as
this could affect their independence. Judges must guarantee independence; therefore,
great restraint must be demanded from them concerning statements and comments
outside the court.
141The rules of ethics should also determine whether and under what circumstances
the judges may resume their professional activities as party representatives
90Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce,
Chapter II—Investment, Annex II, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_
153807.pdf.
91This was acknowledged as well by European Union (2019), para. 18.
92IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Resolution of the Interna-
tional Bar Association Council of 23.10.2014, General Standard 3—Disclosure by the Arbitrator in
connection to the Orange List.
93Cf. insofar also Article 16 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “No member of the Court may exercise any political
or administrative function, or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.” See thereto
also Art. 4 sentence 1 Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU Statute): “The Judges may not
hold any political or administrative office.”
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immediately after their term. WTO Law establishes clear cooling-off periods.94
Stipulating a cooling-off period during which the former judges may not engage in
certain occupations would speak for the quality and independence of the MIC. The
duration of the cooling-off period should be well-balanced and limited.95 However,
as far as such a requirement (which is also contained in the Commission’s ICS
proposal)96 goes, an adequate compensation for the loss of earnings should also be
granted to the former judges. In any event, any participation in cases already pending
before the MIC at the time of the termination of the appointment should be excluded.
In this context for example, the CJEU obliges its members to observe a cooling-off
period of 3 years, within which they are not allowed to participate as party repre-
sentatives in proceedings before the EU court system.97
142 Breaches of rules of ethics should be penalised. The combination of rules of
ethics and disciplinary action is considered an option, especially in the case of
serious misconduct, provided that the principle of proportionality is complied with
and the possibility of judicial review is provided for.98 The legal consequences
would depend on the specific case; in the event of serious breaches, such as a breach
of confidentiality or the delegation of judicial tasks to employees, a removal from
office should also be possible, as is the case with the CJEU if judges no longer fulfil
their obligations.99
94In this sense, Voon (2017), p. 27 et seq. WTO, Post-Employment Guidelines: Communication
from the Appellate Body, WT/AB/22 of 16.4.2014.
95Here one could also mention § 100 para. 2 No. 4 Aktiengesetz (German Stock Corporation Act) or
Article 42 para. 2 RL 2006/43/EG comparatively, because if this is the case in commercial law, then
this should a fortiori also apply in the area of binding arbitration. These regulations are based on
2-year periods.
96Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce,
Chapter II—Investment, Annex II, Code of Conduct for Members of the Tribunal, the Appeal
Tribunal and Mediators, Article 6: “All former members must avoid actions that may create the
appearance that they were biased in carrying out their duties or derived advantage from the decision
or award of the tribunal or Appeal Tribunal.”
97See also BVerwG (Federal Administrative Court), Judgment of 5.5.2017, Case Number 2 C
45.16, according to which the appearance of a retired judge as a lawyer in the court in which he
previously worked confuses the concern that the service is adversely affected and therefore justifies
him to prohibit him from doing so for a transitional period. A background consultation is however
possible.
98Cf. Consultative Council of European Judges (2002).
99Article 6 CJEU Statute: “A Judge may be deprived of his office or of his right to a pension or other
benefits in its stead only if, in the unanimous opinion of the Judges and Advocates General of the
Court of Justice, he no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from
his office. The Judge concerned shall not take part in any such deliberations. If the person concerned
is a member of the General Court or of a specialised court, the Court shall decide after consulting the
court concerned. The Registrar of the Court shall communicate the decision of the Court to the
President of the European Parliament and to the President of the Commission and shall notify it to
the President of the Council. In the case of a decision depriving a Judge of his office, a vacancy shall
arise on the bench upon this latter notification.”
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4.1.3.5 Availability
143Only those who can ensure that they will be available for office should be appointed
as judges. This is to ensure that they are actually able to be present and allocate the
necessary time to complete their tasks. It has already been stated above that a full-
time judiciary is the preferred option. As far as a judge habitually engages in another
occupation, such as being a university professor, the respective university manage-
ment could grant sabbatical or part-time leave to the professor, based on which a
temporary exemption from all duties as professor could be arranged if necessary to
engage in procedures before the MIC.
144In conjunction, an obligation for the judges to reside at the seat of the MIC could
be stipulated, provided that the judges are employed full-time at the MIC. Such an
obligation would serve the proper functioning of the MIC and is envisaged for other
international courts too.100
4.1.3.6 Remuneration
145Working as an MIC Judge is likely to boost the reputation and renown of the
individuals. Therefore, it can be assumed that professionally and morally suitable
persons can be found who would not refuse to work at the MIC purely for the lack of
great financial gain. The exact amount of remuneration can be determined by the
Plenary Body and then periodically increased depending on whether the judges are
in fact working full-time or, until the MIC has reached its full capacity, they would
only be available on call.
146The proposal made by the EU Commission for an ICS has already set forth
concrete sums: EUR 2000 per month for judges in the Court of First Instance and
EUR 7000 for judges in the Appellate Body.101 These are merely stand-by fees, to
which a remuneration according to daily allowances would be added. No concrete
100Cf. Article 14 CJEU Statute: “The Judges, the Advocates General and the Registrar shall be
required to reside at the place where the Court of Justice has its seat.” Article 12 para. 3 Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS Statute): “The President and the Registrar
shall reside at the seat of the Tribunal.”
101Article 9 para. 12 TTIP: “In order to ensure their availability, the Judges shall be paid a monthly
retainer fee to be fixed by decision of the [. . .] Committee. [Note: the retainer fee suggested by the
EU would be around 1/3rd of the retainer fee for WTO Appellate Body members (i.e. around €
2,000 per month)].” Article 10 para. 12 TTIP: “The Members of the Appeal Tribunal shall be paid a
monthly retainer fee and receive a fee for each day worked as a Member, to be determined by
decision of the [. . .] Committee. [Note: the retainer and daily fee suggested by the EU would be
around the same as for WTO Appeal Tribunal members (i.e. a retainer fee of around € 7,000 per
month)].”
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amount can be found in CETA,102 in the EU-Vietnam IPA103 or in the EU-Singapore
IPA.104 In these three agreements, the respective Joint Committee determines the
amount of remuneration.
147 The remuneration of MIC Judges may, if they are full-time judges, be based on
the remuneration of other international courts (ICJ,105 ITLOS106 and International
Criminal Court Judges107). However, in this case the remuneration would be well
below the salary of CJEU Judges.108
148 At the national level, the incomes of judges are generally paid out of public funds,
since judges exercise state functions. Accordingly, the MIC Judges’ renumeration
should also be paid by the parties to the agreement, i.e. the members of the MIC and
would thus be borne by public funds, not by the respective parties to the dispute; at
most, they might have to contribute to the costs through court fees (see para. 306 et
seqq.).
4.1.3.7 Oath of Office
149 The appointed judges should take an oath of office before commencing their activity;
for example, as in the case of the CJEU, this could be done in a public session of the
Court109 or even before the Plenary Body. The oath of office is designed to make the
102Article 8.27 para. 12 CETA: “In order to ensure their availability, the Members of the Tribunal
shall be paid a monthly retainer fee to be determined by the CETA Joint Committee.” Article 8.28
para. 7 lit. d) CETA: “The CETA Joint Committee shall promptly adopt a decision setting out the
following administrative and organisational matters regarding the functioning of the Appellate
Tribunal: (d) remuneration of the Members of the Appellate Tribunal”.
103Article 3.38 para. 14 EU-Vietnam IPA: “ In order to ensure their availability, the Members shall
be paid a monthly retainer fee to be fixed by decision of the Committee.”Article 3.39 para. 17 “(. . .)
The Committee shall fix their remuneration and related organisational matters.”
104Article 3.9 para. 12 EU-Singapore IPA: “ In order to ensure their availability, the Members shall
be paid a monthly retainer fee to be fixed by decision of the Committee.”
105International Court of Justice, Members of the Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/?p1¼1&
p2¼2: “Each Member of the Court receives an annual salary consisting of a base salary (which
for 2010 amounts to US$ 166,596) and post adjustment, with a special supplementary allowance of
US$ 15,000 for the President.”
106International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Finances, www.itlos.org/general-information/
finances/: “The President of the Tribunal, who resides at the seat of the Tribunal, receives an overall
annual remuneration of US$ 168,878 and a special annual allowance of US$ 15,000.”
107For instance, Conditions of service and compensation of the judges of the International Criminal
Court, ICC-ASP/2/10, para. 1: “The annual remuneration of full-time judges will be € 180,000 net.”
108Gartland (2016): “Judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union have received a pay
increase of 2.4 per cent this year, bringing their basic salaries to almost € 256,000.” Conversely,
European Commission (2017), p. 40 considers that the estimated that the remuneration of one
adjudicator at the MIC per year should be around EUR 285.000, which is higher than for CJEU
judges.
109Cf. Article 2 CJEU Statute: “Before taking up his duties each Judge shall, before the Court of
Justice sitting in open court, take an oath to perform his duties impartially and conscientiously and
to preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court.”
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judges swear to exercise their functions consciously and impartially, as well as to
adhere to confidentiality requirements at all times, even after the termination of their
appointment.
4.1.3.8 Immunity
150Judges should be granted immunity in relation to all acts connected with their duties,
as is provided for by various international courts.110 It should be provided that such
immunity could—like the removal from office—only be waived by the MIC as a
plenary in order to ensure the independence of MIC Judges.
4.1.3.9 Parallel Engagements
151The currently widely discussed issue111 of whether parallel engagements for judges
should be permissible or impermissible is directly related to the topics of availability,
independence and neutrality. As discussed and recommended above, appointed
judges should, if possible, exercise their predominant activity preferably in their
main position at the MIC. However, parallel engagements should still be considered
permissible.112 The limit of the scope of parallel engagements should be drawn
where the other activity could affect the judicial activity. Thus, for example, the
Judges of the German Federal Constitutional Court are prohibited to engage in a
parallel occupation in principle; the only exception is teaching at universities.
ECtHR and ICJ Judges are also limited in the type of occupation they may devote
themselves to.113 In fact, the ICJ Judges have now decided that they will frame rules
governing their participation in arbitration proceedings and will ‘not normally accept
110For instance Article 19 ICJ Statute: “The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of
the Court, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.” Article 15 para. 1 IACtHR Statute:
“The judges of the Court shall enjoy, from the moment of their election and throughout their term of
office, the immunities extended to diplomatic agents under international law. During the exercise of
their functions, they shall, in addition, enjoy the diplomatic privileges necessary for the perfor-
mance of their duties.”
111See, inter alia, Bundesrichter mit lukrativen Nebenjobs setzen sich Grenzen, FAZ of 3.4.2017,
p. 17; Die fragwürdigen Gehaltsexzesse der Bundesrichter, Welt.de of 5.1.2017.
112Wieduwilt (2017): “Genehmigungspflichtige Nebentätigkeiten sind zu versagen, wenn der
Richter mehr als 40 Prozent seines Jahresgehalts nebenbei kassiert.” (Authorisation for secondary
activities shall be refused if the judge collects more than 40% of his annual salary on the side). See
also the instructions of the Federal Finance Court. However, rather, the source of ancillary earnings
and the type of activity should be crucial—the amount cannot play a significant role.
113Article 16 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature”.
Article 21 para. 3 ECHR: “During their term of office the judges shall not engage in any activity
which is incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-time
office [. . .].”
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to participate in international arbitration’, in particular, investor-state arbitration or
commercial arbitration.114
152 If the decision was taken in favour of stand-by and part-time employment of
judges due to the MIC’s light caseload, there would be no need for the prohibition of
other professional activities, as long as it would not affect the availability of the
judges. Nevertheless, all parallel professional engagements should be subject to
approval. For instance, the parallel activity as an arbitrator is neither expressly
prohibited under the TTIP proposal nor under CETA, the EU-Vietnam IPA or
EU-Singapore IPA. Rather, it could even be regarded as appropriate.
153 For the authorisation of a parallel occupation, temporal limitations should be
introduced and the issue of independence should be taken into account. The line
between permissible and impermissible engagements would probably be blurred in
principle. As an abstract basic rule, parallel engagements could be declared permis-
sible only if they do not jeopardise the “confidence in the independence, impartiality
or objectivity” of the judges.115 As stated in the German Civil Service Law, a
distinction could be made between parallel occupations subject to notification and
those subject to approval; for the reasons stated above, the latter should be the rule.
154 Teaching at public institutions should, for example, not give rise to any issues. As
the MIC’s judiciary would comprise of highly qualified and/or specialised persons,
there is in principle no reason to disallow them to continue engaging in scientific
activities insofar as this is compatible with their work at the MIC and as long as they
would not deal with pending cases or cases to be decided by the MIC in the near
future. The representation of parties as legal counsel in other investment law pro-
cedures should be considered impermissible.116 Debates in recent years have made
this clear; the reason for this is the danger of bias or that a person may wear a ‘double
hat’.
4.1.3.10 Appointment/Election by the Parties to the Agreement
155 The procedure for electing judges has a direct impact on the quality and acceptance
of the entire court,117 as well as its proper functioning, but also on its
114Yusuf (2018), p. 11.
115Cf. Article 1 of the “Verordnung über die Nebentätigkeit der Richter im Bundesdienst” (Reg-
ulation on the Secondary Employment of Judges in the Federal Service) of 15.10.1965 (BGBl.
1965 I, 1719), last changed by Article 209 para. 3 of the law of 19.4.2006 (BGBl. 2006 I, 866).
116Similarly also at the ICJ, cf. Article 17 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “No member of the Court may act as
agent, counsel, or advocate in any case.”
117Cf. Institut de Droit International, Resolution on the Position of the International Judge, 6 RES
EN FINAL of 9.9.2011, Art. 1 para. 1: “The quality of international courts and tribunals depends
first of all on the intellectual and moral character of their judges. Therefore, the selection of judges
must be carried out with the greatest care. Moreover, States shall ensure an adequate geographical
representation within international courts and tribunals. They shall also ensure that judges possess
the required competence and that the court or tribunal is in a position effectively to deal with issues
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effectiveness118 and possibly even on the enforceability of decisions (see para.
479 et seqq.). Acceptance requires independent and neutral judges, effectiveness
necessitates them to be highly qualified. The Plenary Body should therefore carry
out the appointment of judges (see para. 84 et seqq.); the direct appointment by the
parties to the agreement would only be appropriate if every MIC Member
appointed one judge, as is the case with the CJEU and the ECtHR.119 A direct
appointment by the states might trigger doubt regarding the judges’ independence,
especially if a re-election or extension of the term of office should be possible.120
4.1.3.11 Duration of Appointment and Rotating Reappointment
156ICJ and ECtHR Judges are appointed for a term of 9 years each.121 Under WTO
Law, members of the Appellate Body (the panels of the first instance are appointed
on an ad hoc basis, thus they are not suitable for comparison for the MIC) are
initially appointed for 4 years and can be reappointed once.122 This approach has
been recently strongly criticized.123 However, the possibility of being re-appointed
after a (too) short term raises a problem of judicial independence, if the re-election
depends in particular on the consent of the respective home state,124 but also if a
of general international law. The ability to exercise high jurisdictional functions shall nonetheless
remain the paramount criterion for the selection of judges, as pointed out by the Institute in its 1954
Resolution.”
118Mackenzie (2014), p. 738; De Baere et al. (2015), p. 51.
119Also the provisions in the Algeria Accords on the establishment of the IUSCT, in CETA, in the
EU-Vietnam IPA and in the EU-Singapore IPA are not suitable for taking on the arbitrators or
judges’ appointment, since in these bilateral agreements one of the two contracting parties can
appoint one third of the judges and the last third should come from a third state. Cf. Article 8.27
para. 2 CETA: “The CETA Joint Committee shall, upon the entry into force of this Agreement,
appoint fifteen Members of the Tribunal. Five of the Members of the Tribunal shall be nationals of a
Member State of the European Union, five shall be nationals of Canada and five shall be nationals of
third countries.”
120In a similar sense, European Commission (2017), p. 46ff recommends an independent body to be
in charge on the appointment of judges at the MIC.
121Article 13 para. 1 ICJ Statute with the possibility of re-election; Article 23 para. 1 ECHR without
the possibility of re-election.
122Article 17.2 DSU: “The DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-
year term, and each person may be reappointed once.” Recently, a change was discussed (prolon-
gation without possibility of re-appointment), but blocked by the US, cf. Statement by the United
States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of 23.5.2016, The Issue of Possible
Reappointment of one Appellate Body Member, in particular. p. 7.
123United States (2016); Bacchus (2018), p. 10; For further discussion on this issue, see, Payosova
et al. (2018), Damme (2017) and WTO (2016).
124Possibility of re-appointment for instance also for CJEU Judges (Article 253 TFEU), but also in
the current CETA, Vietnam-EU IPA and EU-Singapore IPA ICS, cf. Article 8.27 para. 5 sentence
1 CETA, Article 3.38 para. 5 sentence 1 EU-Vietnam IPA, Article 3.9 para. 5 sentence
2 EU-Singapore IPA.
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judge appears to have decided ‘against the interests of a state’.125 An extension of the
term of office to 9 or 12 years without the possibility of re-appointment would
contribute to the solution of this problem.126 Various court statutes have recently
pursued this logic.127 In addition, the prolonged term of appointment would further
strengthen the consistency of decisions. However, this benefit is to be weighed
against the above-mentioned re-election, which may be related to a stronger depen-
dency on nominating states.128
157 Nevertheless, if the MIC is initially set up with fewer Members, potential new
Member States could be deterred due to the long term of the serving judges’
appointment. Therefore, it would be advisable to provide for a shorter term for
some of the judges in order to at least be able to promise new acceding states or
groups of states that their region and thus their legal culture will be represented
adequately in the MIC’s judiciary. As soon as the amount of Members exceeds a
higher number and states of all regions of the world are represented, a longer term of
office could be stipulated for all judges.
158 In the case of a larger number of Members, it should be taken into account that
after a certain period of time a certain proportion of the judges will be replaced, each
time according to the principle of seniority. If the MIC started to work immediately
with a larger number of long-term judges, the first replacements could be drawn by
lot.129 In that regard, it could be stipulated that one-third of the judges must be
re-appointed every 3 years for terms of 9 years.
4.1.3.12 Decisions on Instances of Bias by Judges
159 Judges of the second instance should have jurisdiction over possible instances of bias
by judges of the first instance. Additionally, and to ensure the independence of the
MIC, the plenary of the second instance should decide on the potential bias of judges
125The US recently blocked the re-appointment of Seung Wha Chang (Korea) as an AB member,
cf. Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of
23.5.2016, The Issue of possible Reappointment of one Appellate Body Member.
126Hereto inter alia Ulfstein (2009), p. 139. Cf. in the same sense also Institut de Droit International,
Resolution on the Position of the International Judge, 6 RES EN FINAL of 9.9.2011, Art. 2.1: “In
order to strengthen the independence of judges, it would be desirable that they be appointed for long
terms of office, ranging between nine and twelve years. Such terms of office should not be
renewable.” European Commission (2017), p. 42 follows the same approach of preferring long-
term non-renewable appointments.
127Article 36 para. 9 lit. a) Rome Statute: “Subject to subparagraph (b), judges shall hold office for a
term of nine years and, subject to subparagraph (c) and to article 37, paragraph 2, shall not be
eligible for re-election.”
128It has been held that non-renewable positions increase the perceived impartiality and indepen-
dence of judges, see in this regard Howard (2018), p. 45ff.
129Cf. for instance Article 13 para. 2 ICJ Statute: “The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of
the above-mentioned initial periods of three and six years shall be chosen by lot to be drawn by the
Secretary-General immediately after the first election has been completed.”
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of the second instance. Alternatively, it would be possible to have a third institution,
such as the ICJ, decide on bias within the second instance.130
4.1.3.13 Termination of the Appointment
160Apart from the regular replacement procedure and the end of a term, the office
should end also if a judge resigns, for example, due to health reasons.131
4.1.3.14 Removal from Office
161Judges should be removed from their office if they no longer fulfil their duties or are
‘guilty’ of substantial misconduct.132 There are several alternatives as to who should
be in charge of a decision on the removal of individual judges: the Plenary Body, the
plenary of the MIC’s Judges, a ‘disciplinary chamber’ at the MIC or even a single
judge or a committee of judges of another court.
162A removal from office133 of an MIC Judge by the Plenary Body would constitute
an impediment to the independence of judges. This should only be taken into
consideration if the basis for a removal was listed and if, in addition, the possibility
of an appeal to an independent institution or a third court was provided for. In order
to guarantee the independence of the judges, it would therefore be preferable to
stipulate a procedure for removal of an MIC judge on request by the President of the
MIC, the Plenary Body or by the other judges. The CJEU provides for the possibility
of removal from office by the other CJEU Judges through a unanimous decision.134
A removal by another international court like the ICJ upon the request of one of the
aforementioned could also be considered.135 The removal from office could also
result in the loss of pension entitlements.
130Cf. also American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), Executive Summary &
Conclusions and Recommendations, p. 14.
131Cf. Article 13 para. 4 ICJ Statute; Article 5 para. 4 ITLOS Statute.
132Cf. Article 6 CJEU Statute: “A Judge may be deprived of his office or of his right to a pension or
other benefits in its stead only if, in the unanimous opinion of the Judges and Advocates General of
the Court of Justice, he no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising
from his office. The Judge concerned shall not take part in any such deliberations. If the person
concerned is a member of the General Court or of a specialised court, the Court shall decide after
consulting the court concerned [. . .].”
133As provided for in the CJEU Statute and the ICJ Statute; cf. Article 6 CJEU Statute; Article
18 para. 1 ICJ Statute.
134Cf. Article 6 CJEU Statute.
135For other suggestions for cooperation with the ICJ and/or the WTO Appellate Body for the
removal of judges see Howse (2017b), p. 229.
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4.1.4 President of the Court and Vice President of the Court
163 In principle, the President of the Court and the Vice President of the Court are elected
by the members of the respective court.136 An election for the period of 3 years with
the possibility of re-election is provided for in the CJEU.
164 TheMIC President should chair all plenary sessions of the MIC, assign individual
cases to the chambers, assign judges to chambers, supervise the administration and
represent the Court in its external relations. Thus, the Secretariat should be subor-
dinated to the President of the Court. The MIC Judges should elect the President for a
term of 3 years. This time period would be sufficient to fulfil these duties, but would
not be too long either. The possibility of re-election should exist.
165 There could also be an appointment of several Vice Presidents of the Court. These
may each be the presiding judges of the chambers and it could be provided for that
they constitute a Grand Chamber; fundamental decisions could be decided by the
Grand Chamber. The dual role of the judges as members of the Grand Chamber and
as presiding judges of the chambers can contribute to a certain continuity in the
jurisprudence of the court.
4.1.5 Plenary Decisions, Chambers and Single Judges
166 International courts often provide for decisions by a bench of a predetermined
number of judges137 and only envisage plenary decisions by all judges in exceptional
cases.138 Commonly chambers consist of three, five or even seven judges. In
practice, chambers often consist of five judges (CJEU, Federal Civil Court of
Germany, Swiss Federal Court, French Cour de Cassation).
167 The assignment of members to the chambers should reflect the diversity of MIC
Members and, if possible, gender balance.139 The composition of the chambers can
be assigned by lot—taking into account regional diversity. The chambers should
always be established with an odd number of judges.
136As also provided for in Article 9a CJEU Statute: “The Judges shall elect the President and the
Vice-President of the Court of Justice from among their number for a term of three years. They may
be re-elected.”
137Cf. Article 16 CJEU Statute: “The Court of Justice shall form chambers consisting of three and
five Judges.” Article 25 lit. b) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14; Article 8.27 para. 6 CETA.
138For this see Article 25 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “The full Court shall sit except when it is expressly
provided otherwise in the present Statute.” It is however provided differently in Article 13 para. 1 of
the ITLOS Statute: “All available members of the Tribunal shall sit; a quorum of 11 elected
members shall be required to constitute the Tribunal.”
139Cf. Article 25 para. 2 sentence 2 Rules of Court of the ECtHR: “The composition of the Sections
shall be geographically and gender balanced and shall reflect the different legal systems among the
Contracting Parties.”
58 4 Design and Implementation of a Two-Tiered MIC
168The respective presiding judge of the chamber could be determined by the
members of the particular chamber140; alternatively, the presiding judge of the
chamber could be determined by the President of the Court. The respective presiding
judge should coordinate the proceedings, chair the hearings and supervise chamber
meetings and the drafting of the written decision.141
169The cases should be assigned to the chambers by the President of the Court. The
assignment to the chambers should be made on the basis of a scheme predetermined
prior to the initiation of proceedings. Such a scheme, namely the prior determination
of chamber assignments by means of certain objective criteria, would implement
various demands that arise from the general principle of the rule of law.142 Accord-
ingly, it should be clear in advance and verifiable in retrospect which chamber is
assigned to which case.
170This assignment according to objective criteria could either be attained by lot or
the cases could be assigned to the chambers according to predetermined criteria.
These criteria could be: the order of receipt of the specific case at the court (each
chamber being assigned one after the other on a rotational basis), the various subject
areas (if specialised chambers should eventually be formed) or the first letter of the
surname of one of the parties. However, it should not be possible for the claimant to
influence to be assigned to a specific chamber by selecting a particular name. If
specialised chambers are established, it should be decided at the discretion of the
President of the Court to assign the cases to them. The creation of specialised
chambers would only be required in case of a high annual caseload.
171In order to provide for a fairly uniform workload of the chambers, in the event of a
chamber being overburdened, the President of the Court or a decision by the plenary
should result in an allocation of cases which differs from the original allocation
scheme.
172In important proceedings that could create a ‘precedent’ and upon request of a
party to the case, the plenary or the Grand Chamber should decide on the case. In
addition, if a chamber considers that a case it is deciding on could be of exceptional
importance, the chamber should also be allowed to refer it to the plenary or the
Grand Chamber. In that regard, the Grand Chamber should then include the Presi-
dent of the Court and the Vice Presidents of the Court as well as the presiding judges
of the other chambers (if they are not simultaneously the Vice Presidents).
173In principle, the chamber deciding a case should not comprise a judge with the
nationality of the claimant investor or the respondent Member State, unless the
140Cf. Article 16, CJEU Statute: “The Judges shall elect the Presidents of the chambers from among
their number.”Working procedures for appellate review, WTO Dispute Settlement procedure, Rule
7.1: “Each division shall have a Presiding Member, who shall be elected by the Members of that
division.”
141Cf. WTO Law, WTO Dispute Settlement procedure, Working procedures for appellate review,
Rule 7.2: “The responsibilities of the Presiding Member shall include: (a) coordinating the overall
conduct of the appeal proceeding; (b) chairing all oral hearings and meetings related to that appeal;
and (c) coordinating the drafting of the appellate report.”
142On this see also CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 238.
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claimant and the respondent agree on the inclusion of that particular judge.143 With a
larger amount of chambers this should easily be avoided. The allocation scheme
should provide for conflict of interest rules in the event that a judge of the competent
chamber has the same nationality as the investor. Corresponding conflict of interest
rules should be in place in the event that one of the judges comes from the country,
international organization or state institution being sued. As an alternative to the
named conflict of interest rules, the subsequently competent chamber should take
over the case.
174 It is sometimes argued that judges of an MIC, if in doubt, would decide ‘pro-
state’144; with respect to the current ad hoc investment arbitration system it is argued
that it is generally investor-friendly.145 However, both lines of argumentation are not
based on any reliable evidence.146 One way of countering such allegations in the
MIC’s future could be to allow both the plaintiff investor147 and the respondent state
to appoint further judges ad hoc148 in addition to the permanent judges of an MIC
chamber.
175 For cost reasons, it was recently also proposed that, if the claimant is an SME, it
should be permitted to request proceedings to be brought before a single judge.149
However, the costs should not play a role for the disputing parties if the judges
receive a set salary from the MIC, paid by the MIC Members. The situation is
different if court fees were introduced (see para. 306 et seqq.) and if the amount
differed according to whether a single judge, a chamber or a plenary decided the
case. Concerning the question of allowing for single judge decisions, it should also
be noted that chamber decisions will bear a higher acceptance among claimants and
respondents. Only single judge decisions in apparently unequivocal cases—such as
in cases of clear inadmissibility (see para. 284 et seqq.)—seem appropriate, since
otherwise the likelihood of an appeal of single judge decisions would be high. In any
case, an immediate appeal should also exist for decisions taken by single judges.
143In case of the WTO Appellate Body, the members of the Chambers may be nationals of the
parties to the proceedings. Cf. Working procedures for appellate review, WTO Dispute Settlement
procedure, Rule 6.
144EFILA (2016), p. 15. Conversely, it was highlighted at UNCITRAL (2017), para. 36 that if states
participate in the election of judges at the MIC it does not necessarily imply a “pro-state” bias, since
states are both hosting investments and home states of investors.
145Eberhard (2014), p. 9 et seq.; van Harten (2010), pp. 441 and 445; Koeth (2016), p. 12.
146Cf. Wuschka (2015); Franck (2009), p. 435 et seqq. Similarly, Alvarado Garzón (2019), p. 484.
147Or other possible plaintiffs.
148As provided for in Article 31 para. 2 and 3 ICJ Statute; Article 26 para. 4 European Convention
on Human Rights: “There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber
the judge elected in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned. If there is none or if that judge
is unable to sit, a person chosen by the President of the Court from a list submitted in advance by
that Party shall sit in the capacity of judge.”
149Article 8.23 para. 5 CETA: “The investor may, when submitting its claim, propose that a sole
Member of the Tribunal should hear the claim. The respondent shall give sympathetic consideration
to that request, in particular if the investor is a small or medium-sized enterprise or the compensa-
tion or damages claimed are relatively low.”
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4.1.6 Appellate Mechanism
176A system based on the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism should provide for a
court of appeal, similarly as to how CETA, the EU-Vietnam IPA and the
EU-Singapore IPA provide for “the establishment of a multilateral investment
tribunal and appellate mechanism.”150 Based on the provisions of CETA, the
EU-Vietnam IPA and the EU-Singapore IPA, it should be assumed that there will
be a separate ‘appeal body’, unlike the case of the ECtHR, with a distinct set of
judges who do not also serve in the first instance (see para. 359 et seqq.).
4.1.7 Secretariat
177A large number of international courts and dispute resolution mechanisms also have
so-called ‘secretariats’ in a broad sense: at the WTO it is the WTO Secretariat, at the
ICJ the Registry.
178Secretariats generally assume the administration of pending cases. They should
also be in charge of the linguistic and formal proofreading of decisions, as well as the
necessary translation services in this context. In addition, translation services in the
form of simultaneous interpretation of statements of party representatives, judges
and witnesses during hearings and the monitoring of the necessary technical equip-
ment should be assigned to the Secretariat.151 Moreover, it could also supervise the
enforcement of MIC decisions.
179Secretariats can assist the judges, in particular for an expedient progression of
procedures and with tasks such as the preparation of memoranda and legal
research.152 Under no circumstances should decisions be drafted by the Secretar-
iat.153 Judges could also be allocated researchers as direct assistants. For example, all
CJEU Judges are supported by three legal research assistants. Depending on the
number of pending cases and the total number of judges, an appropriate number of
assistants should be provided to ensure the effectiveness of the MIC. It might be
150Article 8.29 CETA: “The Parties shall pursue with other trading partners the establishment of a
multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes.
Upon establishment of such a multilateral mechanism, the CETA Joint Committee shall adopt a
decision providing that investment disputes under this Section will be decided pursuant to the
multilateral mechanism and make appropriate transitional arrangements.” Similar provisions are set
forth in Article 3.41 EU-Vietnam IPA and Article 3.12 EU-Singapore IPA.
151The European Commission (2017), p. 49ff equally supports an independent Secretariat at the
MIC rather than using the secretariat in an existing organisation.
152See also Howse (2017b), p. 227.
153According to some authors a large part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and WTO panel reports are derived from work authored by the Secretariat. Cf. Howse (2000), p. 38
et seqq.
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appropriate to provide for a lower number of support staff initially and to increase
this number in the long term hand in hand with an increase in the number of cases.
180 In addition, some developing country respondents as well as claimant investors
could receive administrative support from the Secretariat. However, since the Sec-
retariat should already support the judges, conflicts of interest could arise in the case
of simultaneous support to the disputing parties. As a matter of principle, the
impartiality of the Secretariat should be ensured and, as a result, support for efficient
proceedings should prevail. Therefore, support for disputing parties and developing
countries should be provided through an Advisory Center independent from the
Secretariat.
181 The Secretariat should be staffed according to the tasks it must perform. For
example, the WTO Secretariat employs nearly 70 people for the field of dispute
settlement, with the Appellate Body Secretariat employing about 20 additional
people.154
182 The Secretariat could be run by a Director General, but his or her functions should
be clearly distinguished from those of the President of the Court. The Director
General should appoint and instruct the Secretariat’s staff. The Secretariat should
be assigned its own budget to ensure its autonomous functioning.
183 So-called staff regulations could be relevant for the employees of the Secretariat
in terms of the service rules. Disputes pertaining to service rules could be decided by
a chamber that is, among others, in charge of such matters. In view of the fact that,
from an immunity point of view, the employees of the Secretariat would be barred
from suing before national courts, such an internal dispute resolution mechanism
appears necessary.
184 The Secretariat could be divided into departments: a Legal Support Department to
assist judges, a Language Department, a Press and Public Relations Department, a
General Administration Department, an Infrastructure and Human Resources
Department etc.
185 Secretariat staff, just like the judges, should reflect the nationalities of the MIC
Members and their respective legal systems. However, according to a practice
recognised in most international organisations, there should be no compulsory,
legally binding rule on recruiting in accordance with a regional distribution of
posts.155
186 Secretariat staff should be subject to a strict obligation of confidentiality and be
obliged to adhere to the principle of independence. In this context, employees should
be required to take an oath for their employment.
187 Immunities of employees as well as tax exemptions for employees in the state
where the seat of the MIC is located must be regulated in an immunity or headquar-
ters agreement (see para. 150).
154Articles 17 para. 7 and 27 DSU. Cf. under https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_
e.htm. Pauwelyn (2015), p. 795 et. seq.
155Tietje (2003), p. 54, para. 41; Schermers and Blokker (2011), Art. 500 et seqq., with other
sources listed there.
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4.1.8 Advisory Centre
188An Advisory Center specifically for the support of developing countries and SMEs
as well as for providing training and further education could complement the
Secretariat.156 The Advisory Center could be set up as an independent body of the
MIC. A strict separation of information and responsibilities should be ensured
between the Advisory Center and the other bodies of the MIC.
189Developing States in particular could be structurally disadvantaged if sued by
multinational enterprises (MNEs) if they lack sufficient trained officials to represent
or defend them in proceedings.157 In addition, the respondent Members could reduce
their legal fees through the Advisory Center; United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) has recently reported that average legal defense costs
range between USD 4.4 million and USD 4.5 million.158 Furthermore, the Advisory
Center should provide legal support to the respondents to help to avoid disputes or
resolve them during the phase of consultations.
190At the same time, it would be advisable to enable SMEs to benefit from the
services of the Advisory Center in terms of the principle of ‘equality of arms’. If
respondents also make use of the services of the Advisory Center, consideration
should be given to an internal separation of services in the Advisory Center in order
to make this possible without creating issues of bias or confidentiality.
191Moreover, the Advisory Center could offer training on international investment
law to members of the MIC.
192Aspects of the Advisory Center for example its infrastructure, could be basically
financed through the MIC’s budget. In addition, funding can be secured, for exam-
ple, by donations of MIC Members—comparable to the WTO Advisory Center.
States could, depending on their wealth, pay fees for the use of the Advisory Center.
In the case of them prevailing, they would be reimbursed the expenses that they had
according to the ‘loser pays’ principle discussed below. The same would apply of
course to investors who want to use the services of the centre. For the sake of
efficiency, an Advisory Center could be affiliated with UNCTAD; their current
expertise in the area of investment protection could thus be extended.159
156The European Commission (2017), p. 52 conceives the idea of an Advisory Centre for
supporting SMEs at the MIC, although without further details.
157The European Commission (2017), p. 53 suggests that the Advisory Centre at the MIC could also
assist developing and less-developed countries.
158Hodgson (2015), p. 749.
159Cf. Advisory Centre of the WTO, www.acwl.ch.
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4.2 The Complaints Procedure Before the MIC
193 The procedure before the MIC should in particular comply with rule of law require-
ments (see para. 46). In the following sections, based on the aim of establishing a
two-tiered court, the possible options for the procedure will be discussed.
194 This chapter deals first with issues of jurisdiction, the relationship of the MIC to
other dispute resolution forums, general questions about proceedings and finally
specific procedural issues, including the applicable procedural law and substantive
law. The procedure in the broader sense also includes the (pronouncement of the)
decision and its direct consequences.
4.2.1 Jurisdiction of the MIC
195 The jurisdiction of the MIC should be determined within the MIC Statute. In this
context, the provisions of the ICJ Statute can serve as a starting point: a multilateral
court which decides on cases based on divergent legal instruments as applicable law.
196 Unlike the ICJ, however, the MIC’s jurisdiction should be limited to investment
law issues in particular. In the area of foreign investment, the jurisdiction of the MIC
could later be extended from ISDS to mediation procedures, if appropriate.
197 Disputes should only be covered by the jurisdiction of the MIC if and when the
disputing parties have given their consent to a submission to it. Furthermore, it
should be decided whether the jurisdiction of the MIC depends on the home states of
the claimant and respondent being Members of the MIC. In addition, there should
always be substantive, personal and temporal conditions (in particular the
categorisation as an investment and whether the investor must have a certain
nationality) that must be met to trigger the MIC’s jurisdiction. Details will be
discussed in the following sections.
198 In addition to the requirements laid down in the respective IIAs for jurisdiction
ratione personae (personal jurisdiction) and ratione materiae (substantive jurisdic-
tion), the MIC Statute could stipulate its own minimum requirements to avoid
‘universal jurisdiction’ of the MIC, since the role of the MIC is not to solve
commercial disputes of all kinds. In that sense, it would in fact be a matter of setting
negative jurisdiction requirements.
4.2.1.1 Membership of the Respondent State and of the Home State
of the Investor in the MIC
199 The basic requirement for the MIC’s jurisdiction should be the membership of the
respondent state and the investor’s home state to the MIC. A new (specialised)
international court in the sense of an international organisation should comprise
permanent members to ensure its acceptance, legitimacy, organisation and financing.
64 4 Design and Implementation of a Two-Tiered MIC
200For procedures under the ICSID Convention, it is assumed that the home state of
the investor or a national institution or body tied to the investor must be a member
state to the agreement.160 In light of the principle of reciprocity and in order to create
incentives for joining the MIC and protect nationals investing abroad, the home state
of the investor could in principle be required to be a member of the MIC to fall under
the MIC’s jurisdiction.
201However, in certain individual cases—comparable to the Additional Facility of
the ICSID—the MIC’s jurisdiction over investment disputes could also be
established if solely the respondent state is a Member of the MIC. Nevertheless,
even in this case an explicit consent to jurisdiction should be required. Jurisdiction
could come with mere MIC membership of the respondent, if the MIC Statute
explicitly provides for the possibility of unilateral consent to dispute settlement by
the investor. The MIC Statute could establish its jurisdiction in the same way as the
Mauritius Convention161 does; for example if only the EU and its Member States as
respondent are parties to the MIC, but the claimant’s home state is not and if a
‘unilateral offer to arbitrate’162 by the MIC Members was included in the MIC.
202However, restraint and caution should be exercised here because if third-state
investors were protected, i.e. without an accession of their home states, the incentive
for states to join the MIC could decrease (for example, to save costs). Nevertheless,
non-acceding states would still run the risk of being sued before an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal instead of before the MIC, which would deny them the MIC’s general, in
particular procedural, advantages; if the state lost the case before the ad hoc tribunal
the state might have to justify why it had not acceded to the MIC. However, in the
case of the ‘unilateral offer’, reservations or restrictions should be imposed from the
outset, such as making this ‘unilateral offer’ subject to certain reservations to be
specified by the parties to the agreement.163
203This MIC jurisdiction by ‘unilateral offer’ should be added only as an additional
option to the dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the underlying IIA, since
acceding to the MIC would not be a consensual amendment to the IIA according to
Article 30(3) of the VCLT if the home state of the investor has not joined the MIC’s
160Article 25 para. 1 ICSID Convention: “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national
of another Contracting State. [. . .]” Cf. for example, Griebel (2008), p. 130; Tietje (2009), § 4, para.
56 et seqq.
161Cf. Article 2 para. 2 Mauritius Convention: “Where the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency do
not apply pursuant to paragraph 1, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency shall apply to an
investor-State arbitration, whether or not initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in
which the respondent is a Party that has not made a reservation relevant to that investor-State
arbitration under article 3(1), and the claimant agrees to the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency.”
162See Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 86.
163Cf. Article 3 para. 1 lit. c) Mauritius-Convention: “A Party may declare that: [. . .] c) Article 2
(2) shall not apply in investor-State arbitration in which it is a respondent.”
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Opt-In Convention.164 This means that the investor would acquire an additional
alternative for dispute settlement.
204 However, many MIC Members could consider an MIC open for treaty shop-
ping—i.e. to bring the case before the MIC despite the claimant’s home country not
being a member of the MIC (see para. 585 et seqq.)—to be rather positive as this
could avoid ad hoc arbitration against them. The investor should then be required to
waive all rights to initiate an alternative ad hoc arbitration when filing a claim before
the MIC. Specific rules on who would have to bear the costs of the procedure should
be provided for this case.
205 The jurisdiction of the MIC could also be justified based on an ad hoc agreement
(compromis) after the dispute between the parties emerged. This could be a subsid-
iary and optional basis of jurisdiction if one wishes to bring a claim before the MIC
in case the previously stated alternatives are not applicable.
206 The possibility of bringing an action before the MIC against a non-member
respondent, i.e. jurisdiction through an ad hoc agreement, should not be included
in the Opt-In Convention and should generally be rejected. It would generally defeat
any incentive to join the MIC as a regular member if third-party states could decide
on a case-by-case basis in an ad hoc manner if they wish to fall under the MIC’s
jurisdiction. This option would also cause administrative problems—for example in
the election of judges (active and passive options/who elects, who may be elected)—
as well as financing problems. Furthermore, if the system sets up its own enforce-
ment mechanism, this alternative could lead to significant enforcement problems. In
any case, access to the proposed enforcement fund system would have to be denied
for awards stemming from non-member proceedings. Furthermore, specific rules on
who would have to bear the costs of the proceedings would have to be provided for.
207 For the two alternatives mentioned above—if one decides in favour of these
options despite the concerns expressed—the MIC Statute would have to state at the
very least that the jurisdiction of the MIC can be established based on an ad hoc
compromis.
4.2.1.2 (Written) Consent to the Jurisdiction of the MIC
208 However, joining the MIC Statute should not automatically mean that all matters of
investment law concerning the respective MIC Member can and must automatically
fall within the framework of the MIC rules. In addition to joining the MIC in general,
there should be an explicit submission of Members under the jurisdiction of the MIC
in relation to specific disputes.165 This could limit the MIC’s jurisdiction to only
cover disputes falling within the scope of specific agreements.
164Cf. Howse (2017a), p. 54 et seqq.
165See also Article 36 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which
the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
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209Similar to the ICJ, a special statement of consent to dispute settlement should
therefore be added in addition to the requirement of joining the MIC. For the purpose
of legal certainty, it should in principle be required that consent shall be given only in
writing.166 This can be done through further agreements, namely:
– multilateral conventions—the MIC Statute,
– bilateral agreements, in particular IIAs,
– if applicable investor-state contracts, or
– an ad hoc compromis of the disputing parties.
210A written consent to jurisdiction can be given simultaneously with the ratification
of the MIC Statute. This Statute could stipulate that the MIC constitutes the dispute
settlement body for certain (already existing) IIAs of the MIC Members if these
specific IIAs do not (yet) refer to the MIC. The MIC Statute would therefore change
bilateral IIAs of MIC Members that are already in force (see Article 41 VCLT).
Members of the MIC would thereby recognise the MIC’s jurisdiction to settle
disputes on the basis of certain existing agreements by consenting to the agreement
that establishes the MIC, namely the MIC Statute. The MIC Statute could also state
that future international treaties, in particular IIAs of MIC Members, automatically
accept the MIC’s jurisdiction in investment disputes. In this respect, the MIC’s
competence would no longer have to be stipulated explicitly in each of these
international treaties, i.e. new investment treaties and investment chapters in general
FTAs. The MIC Statute should thus include a ‘submission clause’ for all old and new
IIAs of the MIC Members.
211When establishing jurisdiction via the MIC Statute, a distinction should be made
as to whether only the respondent has to be a member of the MIC, or whether both
the respondent and the home state of the claimant must be members of the MIC.
212Consent to the MIC’s jurisdiction could furthermore be established through new
IIAs (see para. 569 et seqq.). In such agreements, the members had already
consented to investment arbitration in the past. However, there is no consent to the
jurisdiction of the MIC as long as it is not explicitly accepted by (new) IIAs. The
MIC’s jurisdiction should therefore cover all such disputes under other international
agreements, especially IIAs, that confer jurisdiction to the MIC.
213Jurisdiction could also be extended to existing investment protection treaties,
which refer to the MIC in a supplementary agreement (see para. 573) either exclu-
sively or in addition to other dispute settlement fora.
214Furthermore, consent to the MIC’s jurisdiction could result from other agree-
ments, such as investor-state contracts in which members of the MIC confer
treaties and conventions in force.” See also the requirements for ICSID under Article 25 para.
1 ICSID Convention; cf. Griebel (2008), p. 124 et seqq.
166For example, Article 36 para. 4 ICJ Statute: “Such declarations shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the
Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.”
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jurisdiction for future commercial law disputes with individual investors to the
MIC.167 However, this acceptance of jurisdiction would result in the need for a
decision on the applicable substantive law. It is assumed below that investor-state
contracts would not automatically constitute applicable law. Rather, this would
require corresponding rules in the MIC Statute regarding the MIC’s jurisdiction
and the applicable law. This would remove the public-law nature of investor-state
dispute settlement and the MIC would also have to decide on contractual or private/
commercial law issues.
215 Additionally, the domestic law of the host state of the investment could include
the option of giving written consent to the MIC’s jurisdiction for particular cases, for
example if the host state is an MIC Member that has not concluded IIAs, but only
investor-state contracts. Consent to jurisdiction in national laws alone appears
problematic considering sunset clauses and transparency principles. In the case of
an international court, establishing jurisdiction through national law appears to come
with considerable legal uncertainty.
216 Once a specific statement of consent to jurisdiction has been issued by a state for
dispute settlement before the MIC, it should only be possible to withdraw from it
under limited conditions for the sake of legal certainty and the protection of
investors’ interests—with long periods of notice, comparable to sunset clauses in
IIAs.168 Corresponding periods of notice and survival clauses should therefore be
included in the MIC Statute.
4.2.1.3 Jurisdiction Ratione Personae
217 The personal jurisdiction of the MIC should be based on characteristics of the
investor. Either the MIC Statute could entail a comprehensive definition of “inves-
tor” that would have to be met by the potential claimants in order to sue a state before
the MIC. Or alternatively, the MIC Statute may stipulate that the applicable IIA
should be the basis for the determination of investors with standing before the MIC,
i.e. that its definition of investor must be fulfilled, and that the MIC Statute does not
contain its own definition of investor. In the MIC Statute, however, ‘negative’
requirements for jurisdiction could be envisioned in this regard in order to rule out
abuse of process.
218 Since it might be difficult to reach an agreement on the definition of investor in
multilateral negotiations, especially because this definition would have to be in line
with the applicable IIA’s definition, it would be advisable to solely refer to the
applicable IIA’s definition. Additional requirements for classification as an investor
could be provided for directly in the MIC through negative jurisdiction
requirements.
167Cf. Johnson and Volkov (2013), p. 361 et seqq.
168See for example Braun (2012), p. 168.
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4.2.1.4 Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae
219International courts commonly require the existence of a dispute.169 In this context,
for the fulfillment of jurisdiction ratione materiae of the MIC there must be an
investment law dispute. It is therefore necessary that the dispute concerns rights
arising from IIAs or in connection with investments, which rules out disputes of a
purely political or economic nature.170
220First, it should be determined whether a foreign investor has made an investment,
as stipulated for example in Article 25 ICSID Convention. In that regard, it would be
necessary to decide how the provisions of the MIC Statute on substantive jurisdic-
tion could be coordinated with the ratione materiae and denial of benefits provisions
within the existing IIAs of prospective MIC Member States. Various alternatives
exist:
221The question of the definition of investment could be left to existing IIAs. In line
with that, for example, the arbitration rules of private arbitration institutions such as
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) do not state any additional prerequi-
sites. The MIC Statute would have to specify that all disputes under the IIAs in
question will be settled by the MIC in the future. This would result in an incorpo-
ration of the various rules on material jurisdiction in the IIAs.171 Furthermore, MIC
Members could be given the option of withdrawing their consent to all investor-state
arbitration proceedings under their IIAs in the Opt-In Convention, i.e. the MIC
Statute (see para. 577 et seqq.).
222Alternatively, to avoid ‘imperfect rights’ (substantive rights which are no longer
enforceable), an optional clause could be added to the MIC Statute, according to
which MIC Members adapt the investment definition in their BITs and bring them in
line with the MIC Statute. However, this would require a definition of investment
within the MIC Statute. This investment definition would replace those used in IIAs
between MIC Members. In the event that separate specific criteria are stated in the
MIC Statute, they could be based on the criteria for an investment as developed
under ICSID case law,172 which is also the model used for CETA.173 In that case, the
following criteria would have to be met:
169Article 21 ITLOS Statute: “The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all
applications submitted to it in accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided
for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.”
170Griebel (2008), p. 127; Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.-Dipenta v. Algeria, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/08, Award, 10.1.2005, 2.1, para. 8.
171Franke (2013), p. 185.
172Cf. Timmer (2012), p. 363 et seqq.
173Article 8.1 CETA: “investment means every kind of asset that an investor owns or controls,
directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, which includes a certain duration
and other characteristics such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”
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(1) use of a significant amount of capital for a certain period of time;
(2) expectation of profits; and
(3) the taking of a risk.
223 As a third alternative, an investment definition in the MIC Statute could supple-
ment the definition set forth in the IIA, i.e. establish additional requirements. In this
case, as is currently practised in ICSID cases, a twofold examination whether the
definition of investment is fulfilled would be required: first as to whether the criteria
of the respective IIAs are met and second whether the requirements of the MIC
Statute are satisfied.
224 Replacing the definition of investment of the existing IIAs with a new definition
in the MIC Statute would pose the problem that the presumably large number of
states negotiating the MIC Statute would have to agree on a uniform definition of
investment; this would prove difficult due to the various approaches to this term.174
Therefore, a determination of the MIC’s subject-matter jurisdiction in light of
existing IIAs would be preferable to a modification of the Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs) via the MIC Statute.
225 In addition, replacing the IIA requirements with an MIC investment definition
would result in some investors who would have had standing under the IIAs
retrospectively losing their rights. However, a consensual amendment of the IIAs
by their member states should in principle be possible, even without transitional
provisions.
4.2.1.5 Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis
226 Proceedings before the MIC should generally be open to investment disputes arising
after the entry into force of the MIC Statute and after the establishment of the MIC,
unless the respondent Members also agree to the MIC’s jurisdiction for ‘old cases’
and the MIC Statute states this option expressly. Otherwise, retroactivity and
legitimate expectations issues could possibly arise.
227 Furthermore, it would also be necessary to decide whether disputes, which have
arisen after the establishment of the MIC but before the accession of the home
country of the investor or before the respondent’s accession, may be filed. For
reasons of legal certainty, this should be regulated in the MIC Statute.
4.2.1.6 Avoidance of Abuse of Process and Negative Admissibility
Requirements
228 It is important to vest the MIC with the requisite powers to prevent abuse of process,
not only for the protection of states, but also for reasons of cost efficiency and to
prevent overburdening of the MIC. In order to rule out an abuse of process,
174Cf. Bischoff and Happ (2015), p. 495 et seqq.
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(in particular treaty shopping), and to remove existing legal uncertainties, criteria
and requirements beyond the definition of ‘investors with standing’ should be laid
down in the MIC Statute. These criteria would in fact supplement or substantiate the
IIAs’ jurisdiction ratione personae. These additional prerequisites to the require-
ments laid down in the respective IIA would, to that extent, constitute negative
admissibility requirements.
229If the requirements of an MIC Statute, in the sense of negative admissibility
requirements, go significantly beyond those specified in the respective IIA, i.e. if
they state more stringent requirements than those in the IIA, and if there remained an
option to sue before an ad hoc tribunal under the IIA, there would be a risk that these
requirements could be avoided by investors by filing disputes within the framework
of conventional ad hoc arbitration.
Dismissal of Inadmissible Claims and Claims Without Merit
230Control mechanisms within the framework of ICSID arbitration could serve as role
models to evaluate the grounds for dismissal of inadmissible claims. To begin with,
one could consider implementing the Secretary-General’s ‘jurisdictional screening
power’ as set out in Article 36(3) of the ICSID Convention, which makes it
impossible to register disputes that are “manifestly outside the jurisdiction” of the
ICSID Convention.175 Furthermore, the preliminary examination by the arbitral
tribunal, which has been enshrined in Article 41(5) ICSID Arbitration Rules176
since 2006 allows the tribunal to reject claims that are “manifestly without legal
merit”.177 In practice, Article 41(5) has so far—probably because of its strict
wording—has led to only a few dismissals of cases.178
175Article 36 para. 3 ICSID Convention: “The Secretary-General shall register the request unless he
finds, on the basis of the information contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside
the jurisdiction of the Centre. He shall forthwith notify the parties of registration or refusal to
register.”
176Article 41 para. 5 ICSID Arbitration Rules, 2006: “Unless the parties have agreed to another
expedited procedure for making preliminary objections, a party may, no later than 30 days after the
constitution of the Tribunal, and in any event before the first session of the Tribunal, file an
objection that a claim is manifestly without legal merit. The party shall specify as precisely as
possible the basis for the objection. The Tribunal, after giving the parties the opportunity to present
their observations on the objection, shall, at its first session or promptly thereafter, notify the parties
of its decision on the objection. The decision of the Tribunal shall be without prejudice to the right
of a party to file an objection pursuant to paragraph (1) or to object, in the course of the proceeding,
that a claim lacks legal merit.”
177Article 41 para. 6 ICSID Arbitration Rules, 2006: “If the Tribunal decides that the dispute is not
within the jurisdiction of the Centre or not within its own competence, or that all claims are
manifestly without legal merit, it shall render an award to that effect.”
178Trans-Global Petroleum, Inc. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/25, Decision on the Respon-
dent’s Objection under Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 12.5.2008; Brandes Investment
Partners, LP v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/08/3, Decision on the Respondent’s Objection
under Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 2.2.2009 (Appeal under Art. 41(5), but no
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231 Therefore, in the event of the ICSID Convention serving as a model, it might be
advisable to broaden the restrictive wording of Article 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitra-
tion Rules. Nevertheless, whether it would be advisable to no longer require claims
to be ‘manifestly’ without legal merits to dismiss them is questionable,179 since this
would necessitate an immediate examination of the merits of the case in the
jurisdictional phase of the proceeding. In the alternative, an elaboration of the
prima facie examination rules stipulated in CETA and in US BITs seems more
suitable.
232 In addition to a provision on claims that are ‘manifestly’ without legal merit in
Article 8.32(1) CETA180 (based on Article 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules),
CETA also provides for a possibility of a simplified dismissal in Article 8.33
(1) CETA181 if the claim, while assuming that the alleged facts were true, could
not constitute a claim under the IIA. The same option of a simplified dismissal is
provided for in Article 28(4) of the 2012 US Model BIT, which allows a petition for
a dismissal.182
233 Another means of avoiding abuse of process and claims in vain are separate court
orders on the costs during the procedure. However, the risk of having to bear the
costs for a futile claim at the end of the procedure does not always fulfil the purpose
of increasing efficiency and shortening the procedure.183 By contrast, preliminary or
separate court orders regarding costs can continuously influence the process in terms
of procedural economy.
dismissal); Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case
No. ARB/09/11, Award, 1.12.2010; RSM Production Corp. and others v. Grenada, ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/6, Award, 10.12.2010. Cf. Diop (2010), p. 312 et seq.; Raviv (2015), p. 673.
179Raviv (2015), p. 675.
180Article 8.32 para. 1 CETA: “The respondent may, no later than 30 days after the constitution of
the division of the Tribunal, and in any event before its first session, file an objection that a claim is
manifestly without legal merit.”
181Article 8.33 para. 1 CETA: “Without prejudice to a Tribunal’s authority to address other
objections as a preliminary question or to a respondent’s right to raise any such objections at an
appropriate time, the Tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by
the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim, or any part thereof, submitted pursuant to Article
8.23 is not a claim for which an award in favour of the claimant may be made under this Section,
even if the facts alleged were assumed to be true.”
182Article 28 para. 4 US Model BIT 2012: “Without prejudice to a tribunal’s authority to address
other objections as a preliminary question, a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary
question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for
which an award in favor of the claimant may be made under Article 34.”
183Sullivan and Ingle (2015), p. 736.
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No Jurisdiction over Political State-Owned Enterprises and Sovereign Wealth
Funds
234Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)184 usually
fall within the scope of IIAs, but generally there are no specific provisions for them
in the treaty texts—in areas such as transparency. Hence, SWFs and SOEs can be
considered as investors with standing under IIAs. This raises the problem that states,
acting via companies attributable to them, may file lawsuits against other states
through ISDS mechanisms.
235In this regard, it should be explicitly stipulated that SOEs and SWFs are only
included as investors under certain conditions, i.e. may they only trigger the MIC’s
jurisdiction ratione personae in certain cases.185 The generally accepted principle
that economic activities of state enterprises or SOEs should be protected, as long as
the investment itself is not of a political nature, should also be codified in terms of
jurisdiction ratione personae.186
236However, it must be determined which rules should prevail if corresponding rules
already exist with respect to SWFs and SOEs in the IIAs. It is true that the MIC
Statute could be considered as an amendment inter partes to existing IIAs if the
home state of the claimant and the respondent are Members of the MIC. However, a
simultaneous, fundamental amendment of all IIAs is likely to make the negotiations
for the MIC even more difficult (see para. 247 et seqq.). Therefore, the respective
provisions of the MIC Statute should apply only subsidiarily, i.e. they should not
contradict existing IIA regulations, but merely supplement or substantiate them.
Avoiding Treaty Shopping
237The elimination of possibilities of treaty shopping has been widely discussed. Treaty
shopping could occur with regard to the applicable IIAs or the MIC Statute and could
thus artificially influence the jurisdiction of the MIC.
238Regarding claims of legal persons, the MIC Statute could stipulate that besides
the seat or incorporation of a legal person being in the state to which the corporation
is attributed, and on whose IIA it is basing its claim on, a substantial economic
activity must also be performed within that State (as foreseen in recent IIAs) in order
to avoid abuse through treaty shopping.187 Despite critique that “substantial
184Cf. Tietje (2015), p. 1802 et seqq.; Konrad (2015), p. 545 et seqq.
185Bungenberg (2014), p. 410 et seqq.
186See Bungenberg (2014), p. 410 et seqq.; Tietje (2015), p. 1812 et seqq; Konrad (2015), p. 552
et seqq.
187See here Baumgartner (2016), p. 114 et seqq. Cf. Article 8.1 CETA: “For the purposes of this
definition, an enterprise of a Party is: (a) an enterprise that is constituted or organised under the laws
of that Party and has substantial business activities in the territory of that Party.” Article 1.2 lit. c)
EU-Vietnam IPA: “juridical person of a Party”means a juridical person of the EU Party ora juridical
person of Viet Nam, set up in accordance with the domestic laws and regulations of a Member State
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economic activity” is an indefinite legal term requiring interpretation,188 the MIC
could establish a consistent precedent to apply homogeneously in this regard.
239 Additionally, it could be stipulated that the investor should have the nationality of
the IIA party on whose IIA the claim is based, at the time the dispute arises and also
at the time of the filing of the claim.189
240 The MIC Statute could also eliminate the possibility of treaty shopping190 in
cases of dual nationality of natural persons by focusing on the more genuine link.191
It would also be necessary to decide whether jurisdiction should be ruled out in
principle if the claimant investor also has the nationality of the respondent host
state.192
241 As already explained in the previous section, provisions of the MIC Statute
should only be applied on a subsidiary basis in the context of treaty shopping,
namely if they do not conflict with the provisions of the applicable IIA but merely
supplement or substantiate it.
of the Union, or of Viet Nam, respectively, and engaged in substantive business operations in the
territory of the Union or of Viet Nam, respectively”.
188For this see Statements to be entered in the Council minutes, Commission Declaration on the
meaning of the term “substantial business activities” in Art. 8.1 of the Agreement (Definitions of
investment), OJ L 11, 14.1.2017, p. 9, No. 31: “The term ‘substantial business activities’ in CETA
is to be understood in the same sense as the term ‘substantive business operations’ used in Article V
(6) and XXVIII(m) of the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services. The EU has formally
submitted a notification to the WTO (1) stating that it interprets this term as equivalent to the term
‘effective and continuous link with the economy’ utilised in the General Programme for the
abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment adopted by the Council on 15 January 1962
pursuant to Article 54 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (2). It results
that the Commission considers that a Canadian corporation not owned by Canadian nationals could
only bring a dispute pursuant to Chapter 8, Section F of the Agreement where it can establish that it
has substantive business activities in Canada having an effective and continuous link with the
Canadian economy, in the sense of establishment as applied under the EU Treaty. This will be the
basis of the Commission’s attitude in the implementation of CETA.”
189See here, Baumgartner (2016), p. 166 et seqq.; cf. also Philipp Morris v. Australia, Award on
Jurisdiction, 17.12.2015, in particular para. 508.
190See also here Baumgartner (2016), p. 114 et seqq.
191Article 8.1 CETA: “A natural person who is a citizen of Canada and has the nationality of one of
the Member States of the European Union is deemed to be exclusively a natural person of the Party
of his or her dominant and effective nationality. A natural person who has the nationality of one of
the Member States of the European Union or is a citizen of Canada, and is also a permanent resident
of the other Party, is deemed to be exclusively a natural person of the Party of his or her nationality
or citizenship, as applicable.”
192See Article 25 para. 2 lit. a) ICSID Convention according to which the Convention is not
applicable for an investor who is a plaintiff in case he also has a nationality of the host state.
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Denial of Benefits and Dismissal of Claims in Case of Corruption
242A general denial of benefits clause could be another jurisdictional requirement of the
MIC,193 which allows the court to dismiss claims for overriding reasons, such as the
abuse of rights or for the enforcement of international sanctions. Most arbitral
tribunals treat denial of benefits as a matter of jurisdiction.194
243In addition to this, an anti-circumvention clause195 can be added to prevent
so-called time-sensitive restructuring, as was the case with the Philip Morris dis-
pute.196 However, such a clause is susceptible to factual limitations—questions as to
when the dispute arose and whether the ‘principal purpose’ of the restructuring was
to obtain the standing to sue are subject to case-by-case interpretation.197
244Finally, an investor should not be allowed to file a claim if the investment is
connected to a fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment of facts, corruption or
conduct that constitutes an abuse of process. This limitation can be found in more
and more IIAs.198 However, in its scope, this rule is controversial. Nevertheless, a
corresponding limitation is already stated in CETA and should also be included in
the MIC Statute.199
4.2.2 Relationship of the MIC to Other Courts and Arbitral
Tribunals
245The relationship of the MIC to other courts and arbitral tribunals should be regulated
in the MIC Statute. Under WTO Law, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) procedure
is mandatory and exclusive mode of dispute resolution for all WTO Agreements
(Article 2 para. 1 sentence 1 DSU). Such exclusive jurisdiction of the MIC for
193Cf. Lange (2016); Hoffmann (2015), p. 598 et seqq.
194Baumgartner (2016), p. 116 et seqq.; alternatively Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8.2.2005, para. 158 et seqq.
195See here, Article 3.43 EU-Vietnam IPA: “For greater certainty, the Tribunal shall decline
jurisdiction where the dispute had arisen, or was foreseeable on the basis of a high degree of
probability, at the time when the claimant acquired ownership or control of the investment subject to
the dispute and the Tribunal determines, on the basis of the facts of the case, that the claimant has
acquired ownership or control of the investment for the main purpose of submitting the claim under
this Section. The possibility to decline jurisdiction in such circumstances is without prejudice to
other jurisdictional objections which could be entertained by the Tribunal.”; a similar provision can
be found in Article 3.7 para. 5 EU-Singapore IPA.
196Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PLA Case
No. 2012-12.
197Baumgartner (2016), p. 274 et seqq.
198See also Lorz and Busch (2015), p. 577 et seqq.
199Article 8.18 para. 3 CETA: “For greater certainty, an investor may not submit a claim under this
Section if the investment has been made through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment,
corruption, or conduct amounting to an abuse of process.”
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investment disputes can only be imposed if the underlying MIC Statute, the IIAs and
the investor-state contract or the ad hoc agreement provide for it.
246 The IIAs concluded so far generally establish different dispute resolution fora.200
The extent to which these can be merged by a subsequent agreement between the
parties to the agreement—to the detriment of the investors since their choice
regarding the dispute settlement forum is limited—has not yet been settled conclu-
sively. It may be for the courts or arbitral tribunals called upon to decide the disputes
to determine that they have no jurisdiction if their past jurisdiction has subsequently
been changed by a party to the IIA.201
247 It should be possible to consider the MIC Statute as an agreement amending the
underlying IIAs if all parties to the IIA are Members of the MIC. However, legal
uncertainty remains, as ultimately an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, to which the parties
have recourse based on the dispute settlement mechanism of the respective IIA, will
decide whether or not it is still competent, despite the MIC’s parallel competence. If
the tribunal were to decide against its own competence, the dispute would no longer
fall within the jurisdiction of this arbitral tribunal but within the jurisdiction of the
MIC. In order to reduce the risk that arbitral tribunals continue declaring themselves
competent despite the amendment in the MIC Statute, the Statute may state that
arbitration awards made regardless of the MIC’s sole competence in the specific case
may not be enforced, at least not in MIC Member States. In that regard, the MIC
Statute could explicitly refer to Article V(1)(d) NYC202 and it could also be
explicitly stipulated that this provision would constitute a legal basis for the annul-
ment of the arbitral award within the meaning of Article 52 ICSID Convention.203
248 If a party to an IIA is not a Member of the MIC, no amendment of the IIA with
respect to the IIA’s dispute settlement provision may be made and the investor will
still be able to make use of the IIA’s ISDS mechanism.
249 If only the respondent is a member of the MIC, an IIA which may have been
infringed cannot be amended by the MIC Statute. The dispute settlement mechanism
provided for in the IIA would remain unchanged. However, the MIC Member
may—if stated in the MIC Statute—unilaterally offer investors from the non-MIC
states as an opportunity for dispute settlement before the MIC.
250 For example, as long as not all Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) Member States are
also members to the MIC Statute, the MIC may just have jurisdiction in addition to
the options set out in the ECT. Nevertheless, if the home state of the investor and the
200Generally on the issue of “Concurrent proceedings in international arbitration”:
UNCITRAL (2016).
201The underlying IIA between the parties may be amended in case both/all the parties to the IIA are
also parties to the MIC.
202Article V para. 1 lit. d) NYC: “The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties [. . .].”
203Article 52 ICSID Convention: “(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an
application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its
powers [. . .].”
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respondent state are both MIC Members, then the MIC could have exclusive
jurisdiction in relation to the dispute between two ECT Member States.
251Moreover, provisions could be drafted, such as those in CETA, which would
require the MIC to take other courts, which may be involved in the case simulta-
neously, into account during its own decision-making.204
4.2.3 The Relationship with Domestic Courts
252The relationship with domestic courts must also be regulated. For example, a
so-called fork-in-the-road clause could also be included in the MIC Statute. Such
clauses stipulate that an investor can initiate dispute settlement at the international
level only if he has not previously pursued domestic legal remedies, to the extent that
there would be an obligation to choose between the national and international legal
remedy.
253Alternatively, a mutual exclusiveness clause could be laid down between the MIC
and domestic courts, as currently stated in the TTIP proposal of the EU or in the
CETA.205 A claim at the national level or before the MIC would have to be
withdrawn in order to be able to take the other option of national or international
dispute settlement.
254However, a strict fork-in-the-road clause as well as mutual exclusiveness of
claims can cause disadvantages. For example, an early decision by the investor to
pursue the claims at the international sphere could deprive him or her of urgently
needed legal protection at the national level, since, in general, international legal
protection is solely aimed at compensation and damages and does not seek to
actively control state behavior. Such a decision would therefore preclude the possi-
bility of seeking legal remedies aside from compensation/damages as relief (see
para. 470 et seqq.).206 If, on the other hand, the domestic jurisdiction turns out to be
biased against foreign claimants but the investor has opted for this path, then,
according to the regulations currently being implemented by the EU Commission,
204Article 8.24 CETA: “Where a claim is brought pursuant to this Section and another international
agreement and: (a) there is a potential for overlapping compensation; or (b) the other international
claim could have a significant impact on the resolution of the claim brought pursuant to this Section,
the Tribunal shall, as soon as possible after hearing the disputing parties, stay its proceedings or
otherwise ensure that proceedings brought pursuant to another international agreement are taken
into account in its decision, order or award.”
205Article 8.22 para. 1 CETA: “(f) withdraws or discontinues any existing proceeding before a
tribunal or court under domestic or international law with respect to a measure alleged to constitute
a breach referred to in its claim; and (g) waives its right to initiate any claim or proceeding before a
tribunal or court under domestic or international law with respect to a measure alleged to constitute
a breach referred to in its claim.”
206Cf. Schill (2016a).
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the claim at the national level must be withdrawn.207 However, this will only be
possible before a decision has been rendered by the domestic court.
255 As a result, there is a need for a new approach, such as a combination of national
and international legal remedies. However, it should also be ensured that overly
lengthy procedures and other specific deficiencies of the domestic remedy do not
obstruct the effectiveness of the MIC’s legal protection. The literature also suggests a
preliminary ruling procedure comparable to EU Law.208
4.2.4 The Relationship with Inter-State (Arbitration) Dispute
Settlement
256 The MIC Statute should also clarify the relationship between ISDS and inter-state
dispute settlement. In this regard, various constellations must be differentiated.
257 First, the context and significance of inter-state arbitration between Members of
the MIC should be determined, and if that inter-state arbitration is based on IIAs
between these two MIC Members. Inter-state arbitration based on existing IIAs
could remain possible parallel to an MIC.209 Awards of inter-state arbitration tri-
bunals based on IIAs between MIC Members may be possible, if provided for in the
respective IIAs.210 These awards have a binding effect on the interpretation of
specific provisions of these IIAs.211 The MIC would probably also have to respect
this interpretation. However, it should be possible to eliminate such a binding effect
if explicitly stipulated in the MIC Statute. Such a rule would constitute a modifica-
tion of an earlier bilateral international agreement by a subsequent multilateral
agreement between the parties to the earlier bilateral agreement.
258 In case, as seen in most IIAs,212 such a binding effect is not stated, the MIC
Statute could order that such a binding effect must be assumed. Nevertheless, the
assumption of a binding effect of state-state decisions based on IIAs suggests that it
207Cf. Art. 8.22 para. 1 clause f) and g) CETA.
208Schill (2016a).
209For example, Chapter 29 of CETA provides for State-State dispute settlement. However, it refers
to all disputes regarding interpretation and application of the Treaty and not to investment disputes
alone. See also, Article 9 para. 1 and 2 of the German Model BIT 2009: “(1) Disputes between the
Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty should as far as
possible be settled by the Governments of the two Contracting States. (2) If a dispute cannot thus
be settled, it shall upon the request of either Contracting State be submitted to an arbitral tribunal
[. . .].”
210The interpretation may be binding only on the contracting parties, cf. Article 15 para. 8 sentence
1 Canada-China Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA): “The decision of the arbitral
tribunal shall be final and binding on both Contracting Parties.”
211Cf. discussion Roberts (2014), p. 55 et seqq.; Potestà (2013), p. 761 et seqq.; Trevino (2014),
p. 220 et. seqq.
212See also Potestà (2013), p. 762.
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would then be possible for individual MIC Members and arbitrators outside the MIC
System to influence subsequent decisions of the MIC. In addition, the IIA parties
chose to refrain from ordering a binding effect, which would have been possible at
any time. However, it should also be borne in mind that the MIC’s jurisprudence will
regularly refer to bilateral IIAs. The design of such IIAs nevertheless will remain the
responsibility of the respective IIA parties. If these IIAs have transferred the power
of interpretation to a state-state arbitration tribunal, those interpretations by state-
state tribunals should be taken into account.213 In any case, due to considerations of
the rule of law, only those decisions which were taken before an investor-state
proceeding concerning the same set of facts has been initiated should be taken into
consideration.
259In order to establish a coherent decision-making process, it would be advisable
that the MIC will also decide on state-state proceedings between MIC Members.
Therefore, the MIC Statute should rule out separate state-state arbitration possibil-
ities based on existing IIAs between MIC Members.
260Another question is the relevance of state-state proceedings if they were included
in the MIC Statute. There is no reason not to extend the MIC’s jurisdiction to state-
state disputes. In this case, it would again be necessary to clarify the relationship
between state-state decisions and investor-state decisions. In the event that the same
IIA is used, there is no reason to oppose a binding effect.
261With regard to a MIAM, the following should be considered: as long as a binding
effect of decisions in state-state proceedings is not expressly provided for in an IIA,
such a state-state arbitration decision should not have a binding effect on the MIAM
either. However, if a binding effect is stipulated by the IIA, the MIAM should also be
able to review in appeal decisions whether the arbitral tribunal of the first instance
applied the respective IIA “correctly”—i.e. in accordance with the previous state-
state decision.
4.2.5 General Procedure Before the MIC
262The procedural process before the MIC can be divided into several phases:
– consultations,
– first instance proceedings,
– second instance proceedings, and
– (recognition and) enforcement proceedings.
263The specific procedural arrangements for dealing with disputes submitted to the
MIC may be defined either in the MIC Statute itself or in a separate set of MIC
procedural rules. As stated above, rules of procedure would especially aim at further
substantiation of general rules, but key points or basic procedural principles should
213To that extent, see also Kulick (2016), p. 146 et seqq.
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be included in the MIC Statute. Rules of procedure specifying these principles could
be drafted by the Secretariat and adopted by the Plenary Body, which would also
offer the option of easier modification or amendment (see para. 107).
264 In the following passages there is no direct consideration of the mediation
process. However, a large number of IIAs nowadays provide rules to that end,214
such as the ICSID Convention215 or FTAs concluded by the EU.216 Mediation has
also been suggested in negotiations with, inter alia, Mexico and in the context of
TTIP.217 The mediation process is an alternative to dispute settlement through court
rulings as discussed herein. However, the MIC could offer the possibility of setting
up a mediation center in the realm of its organisation in order to better implement this
procedural aspect.
4.2.5.1 Compulsory Consultations?
265 With the objective of leaving the existing investment protection agreements intact as
widely as possible and complementing them “only” with an MIC that replaces the
current provisions on investor-state arbitration, procedural steps specific to certain
IIAs should continue to apply. Consultation obligations and time limits can be found
in almost all IIAs.218 Before initiating an arbitration procedure, the parties to the
214See. Article 9.18 para. 1 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is now part of the Comprehen-
sive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) by reference in Article 1
(1) CPTPP, or Article 10 para. 1 Germany-Oman BIT: “Disputes concerning investments between a
Contracting State and an investor of the other Contracting State should as far as possible be settled
amicably between the parties in dispute.”
215Article 33 ICSID Convention: “Any conciliation proceeding shall be conducted in accordance
with the provisions of this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the
Conciliation Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to conciliation. If any
question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Conciliation Rules or any
rules agreed by the parties, the Commission shall decide the question.”
216Cf. Article 8.20 CETA: “1. The disputing parties may at any time agree to have recourse to
mediation. 2. Recourse to mediation is without prejudice to the legal position or rights of either
disputing party under this Chapter and is governed by the rules agreed to by the disputing parties
including, if available, the rules for mediation adopted by the Committee on Services and Invest-
ment pursuant to Article 8.44.3(c). 3. The mediator is appointed by agreement of the disputing
parties. The disputing parties may also request that the Secretary General of ICSID appoint the
mediator.4. The disputing parties shall endeavour to reach a resolution of the dispute within 60 days
from the appointment of the mediator. 5. If the disputing parties agree to have recourse to mediation,
Articles 8.19.6 and 8.19.8 shall not apply from the date on which the disputing parties agreed to
have recourse to mediation to the date on which either disputing party decides to terminate the
mediation. A decision by a disputing party to terminate the mediation shall be transmitted by way of
a letter to the mediator and the other disputing party.”
217Section -Resolution of Investment Disputes- Article 4 EU-Mexico Agreement (under negotia-
tion); Article 3 TTIP.
218Markert (2009), p. 158 et seqq.; Schreuer (2004), p. 232 et seqq.; Douglas (2009), para. 322 with
further references.
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dispute (i.e. the investor and the relevant MIC Member) should first seek to reach an
amicable settlement within a specific negotiation period.
266Compulsory consultations beyond the scope of the IIAs do not appear to be
necessary, as at that stage parties are usually already past negotiations. In particular,
it is unlikely that investors will bring an action against an MIC Member without due
cause. Furthermore, it is certainly not necessary to insist on a consultation in cases
where it is clear from the outset that no agreement will be reached; for example, if
this has already been made clear by statements made by public authorities of the state
concerned. On the other hand, refraining from consultations should not undermine
certain explicitly determined cooling-off periods.219
267Consultations before the MIC may be initiated either by notification of a special
agreement or by filing the statement of the claim. In the broadest sense, TTIP,220
CETA,221 the EU-Vietnam IPA222 and the EU-Singapore IPA223 provide for time
limits for consultations and the submission of claims. These time limits aim at
ensuring legal certainty.224 Hence, maximum consultation periods could be
established, followed by the submission of a claim or termination of proceedings.
However, if such periods deviated from those of the applicable IIAs, the IIAMember
States would in turn have to declare their consent by ratifying the MIC Statute.
219See also Markert (2009), p. 158 et seqq.
220Article 4 para. 5 TTIP: “The request for consultations must be submitted: (a) within three years of
the date on which the claimant or, as applicable, the locally established company first acquired, or
should have first acquired, knowledge of the treatment alleged to be inconsistent with the provisions
referred to in Article 1(1) and of the loss or damage alleged to have been incurred thereby; or
(b) within two years of the date on which the claimant or, as applicable, the locally established
company ceases to pursue claims or proceedings before a tribunal or court under the domestic law of
a Party; and, in any event, no later than 10 years after the date on which the claimant or, as
applicable, its locally established company, first acquired, or should have first acquired knowledge,
of the treatment alleged to be inconsistent with the provisions referred to in Article 1(1) and of the
loss or damage alleged to have been incurred thereby.”
221Article 8.19 para. 6 CETA: “A request for consultations must be submitted within: (a) three years
after the date on which the investor or, as applicable, the locally established enterprise, first acquired
or should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor or,
as applicable, the locally established enterprise, has incurred loss or damage thereby; or (b) two
years after an investor or, as applicable, the locally established enterprise, ceases to pursue claims or
proceedings before a tribunal or court under the law of a Party, or when such proceedings have
otherwise ended and, in any event, no later than 10 years after the date on which the investor or, as
applicable, the locally established enterprise, first acquired or should have first acquired knowledge
of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor has incurred loss or damage thereby.”
222Article 3.3 EU-Vietnam IPA.
223Article 3.26 EU-Singapore IPA.
224For example, see Article 8.19 para. 8 CETA: “In the event that the investor has not submitted a
claim pursuant to Article 8.23 within 18 months of submitting the request for consultations, the
investor is deemed to have withdrawn its request for consultations and, if applicable, its notice
requesting a determination of the respondent, and shall not submit a claim under this Section with
respect to the same measures. This period may be extended by agreement of the disputing parties.”
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268 Although CETA requires the initiation of consultations, it does not provide the
extent to which serious attempts of amicable settlement actually need to be under-
taken by the parties. At any rate, 180 days after a request for consultations, a claim
may be submitted. In fact, this requirement resembles a cooling-off period. It may be
useful to provide that, upon request, this 180 day period can be waived and thus be
shortened if, for example, it cannot be expected that an agreement will be reached
and a further waiting period is unreasonable for the investor.
269 Parties should have the obligation to communicate about the conduct of consul-
tations to the Secretariat of the MIC to facilitate due administration of time limits. In
addition, a maximum time limit should be stipulated for the conduct of consultations
that should be prolongable pursuant to an agreement of the applicant and the
defending party.
270 Where IIAs do not stipulate any consultation obligations or any corresponding
time limits, the MIC Statute should establish an obligation to consult as well as a
time limit if both IIA parties are also MIC Members. If only the respondent is an
MIC Member, the MIC should, as stated above, be offered as an additional forum,
but with its own consultation obligations and time limits which can be specified in
the MIC Statute.
4.2.5.2 First Instance Procedure
The General Procedure
271 The institution of proceedings should in principle be effected by submission of a
claim, which is based on the claimant’s contention that an MIC Member has violated
the rights of the investor either by action or omission. This contention should be
contained in a written statement of claim to be submitted in compliance with the set
time limits. It could be provided that court fees be due upon submitting the claim (see
para. 306 et seqq.). In the initial statement of claim, the claimant should have to
demonstrate their right to bring a claim and the subject matter of the claim brought
(see para. 277 et seqq.). Immediately after the submission of the claim,225 the
President of the Court should assign the claim to a chamber, which should then
decide on the jurisdiction of the MIC as well as the admissibility and the merits of the
claim. It should be ensured that the workload of the chambers is equally distributed
(for the allocation of cases, see para. 169 et seqq.).226
272 Immediately upon submission of a claim, the chamber should review ex officio
whether the claim is inadmissible, manifestly ill-founded or if there is a manifest lack
of jurisdiction. This should also be done in order to save costs for all parties
225Cf. Rules of Court of the ECtHR, Article 51 para. 1 and Article 52 para. 1.
226See also Article 52 para. 1, Rules of Court of the ECtHR: “Any application made under Article
34 of the Convention shall be assigned to a Section by the President of the Court, who in so doing
shall endeavour to ensure a fair distribution of cases between the Sections.”
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concerned. In addition, it could be stipulated, if necessary, that the determination of
the correct respondent shall be made within a certain time limit (see para. 293 et
seqq.).227 Moreover, it should be reviewed whether there are any procedural objec-
tions impeding further proceedings. After this preliminary examination, the state-
ment of claim should be delivered to the respondent; a time limit could be set, within
which the defendant shall submit a rejoinder.
273Proceedings could—in a way similar to the ICJ—be separated into two phases;
after a first phase in which parties exchange written submissions, a second phase
could include an oral hearing, where witnesses, experts, representatives as well as
interested third parties are heard. It should be provided that, in certain individual
cases and after the consent of all parties to the dispute, the court may make its
decision without oral hearing.
274The respondent should have a certain period of time to submit their rejoinder
(cf. the principle of accelerated proceedings, para. 287 et seqq.). The possibilities of
surrejoinders should also be taken into account for the specific procedural design of
the first phase of the proceedings. Meanwhile, the chamber could at the same time
familiarise itself in depth with the claim. It could examine the Court’s jurisdiction
and the admissibility of the claim; in order to reduce costs, a preliminary ruling on
the jurisdiction of the MIC and the admissibility of the claim could be rendered. The
competent chamber should, within the limits of its jurisdiction, deal with all the
requirements necessary for a decision on the merits. Due to the comparability of the
situation—a private claimant being affected by state conduct—certain elements
might be designed in the style of both administrative proceedings at the national
level and the action for annulment by individuals under Article 263(4) TFEU at the
227Cf. Article 8.21 CETA: “1. If the dispute cannot be settled within 90 days of the submission of
the request for consultations, the request concerns an alleged breach of this Agreement by the
European Union or a Member State of the European Union and the investor intends to submit a
claim pursuant to Article 8.23, the investor shall deliver to the European Union a notice requesting a
determination of the respondent. 2. The notice under paragraph 1 shall identify the measures in
respect of which the investor intends to submit a claim. 3. The European Union shall, after having
made a determination, inform the investor as to whether the European Union or a Member State of
the European Union shall be the respondent. 4. In the event that the investor has not been informed
of the determination within 50 days of delivering its notice requesting such determination: (a) if the
measures identified in the notice are exclusively measures of a Member State of the European
Union, the Member State shall be the respondent; (b) if the measures identified in the notice include
measures of the European Union, the European Union shall be the respondent. 5. The investor may
submit a claim pursuant to Article 8.23 on the basis of the determination made pursuant to
paragraph 3, and, if no such determination has been communicated to the investor, on the basis
of the application of paragraph 4. 6. If the European Union or a Member State of the European
Union is the respondent, pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4, neither the European Union, nor the Member
State of the European Union may assert the inadmissibility of the claim, lack of jurisdiction of the
Tribunal or otherwise object to the claim or award on the ground that the respondent was not
properly determined pursuant to paragraph 3 or identified on the basis of the application of
paragraph 4. 7. The Tribunal shall be bound by the determination made pursuant to paragraph
3 and, if no such determination has been communicated to the investor, the application of paragraph
4.”
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EU level. Subsequently, the chamber should deal with the substance of the claim
and, if necessary, investigate ex officio the relevant facts (see the principle of ex
officio investigation, para. 452 et seqq.). In the course of this, the chamber as such
should engage in taking evidence (as to the taking and consideration of evidence, see
para. 305).
275 In particular cases, additional interim measures of protection could be imposed to
safeguard specific rights; such a possibility is provided for in almost all national legal
systems228 as well as in international court systems229 and is generally seen as an
inherent part of comprehensive and effective legal protection.
276 In the following parts, the question as to which procedural principles should
apply before the MIC will be addressed. Nevertheless, this aspect cannot be evalu-
ated conclusively in this legal study. Generally accepted procedural principles of
international judiciary do not exist. Arbitral tribunals occasionally resort to proce-
dural rules of the national lex arbitri applicable at the seat of the tribunal. However,
this cannot be an option for an international court. Instead, statutes and rules of
international courts provide for independent procedural requirements—even if
sometimes only in a fragmentary way. The application of certain procedural princi-
ples can however be justified for the purposes of an MIC, as set out below, such as
the principle of fair trial, the principle of independence and impartiality of judges, or
generally accepted principles as to the burden of proof etc.
Proceedings Upon Application, Submission of a Claim and the Statement
of Claim
277 In principle, the initiation of proceedings should only be possible upon application.
The MIC should not be able to initiate proceedings ex officio. Otherwise, the MIC
would enjoy the capacity to continuously exert a control function vis-à-vis its
members, which would not be compatible with the aim of the claims, namely to
receive compensation.230
278 The claimant should be required to clearly identify the alleged violations of
substantive standards and establish the reasons for the violation. The statement of
claim should therefore identify the specific measures at issue and give a summary of
the basic legal arguments brought forward by the claimant in his submission. The
statement of claim should at least demonstrate the alleged violation of rights and
contain a description of all the relevant facts. The latter should enable the chamber to
228In this context, see § 123 VwGO (Code of Administrative Court Procedure, Germany); Article
32 BVerfGG (Act on the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany).
229Article 41 ICJ Statute: “1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party. 2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested
shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the Security Council.” See also Article 25 Statute of the
ITLOS.
230See for example, Article 8.39 para. 1 CETA.
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infer the claimant’s right to bring a claim from the description. In this way, the
statement of claim should define the subject matter of the claim brought. In WTO
Law, the Panel is bound to adjudicate on grounds stated in the claimant’s request.231
However, in the MIC’s procedural rules, later submission of additional reasons
should be admissible at least until the oral hearing for reasons of effectiveness and
efficiency of the remedy, since new claims would be submitted otherwise. In
addition, the general principle of ex officio investigation needs to be taken into
account (see para. 452 et seqq.), which is opposed to an exceedingly narrow
confinement to the initially brought subject matter of the claim.
279For reasons of transparency (see para. 432 et seqq.) and legal certainty, the claim
should be submitted in writing. It should be possible to submit the claim through the
Secretariat. Further clarification will be necessary as to whether submissions in
electronic form by e-mail could meet the requirements of the written form and, if
so, which specific requirements the submission shall meet (such as electronic
signature, required file formats etc.).
280For reasons of transparency, basic information regarding claims submitted before
the MIC should be published on a website—in a way similar to the WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedure and ICSID Arbitration, where this has been practised since
about 2006.232 In particular, the subject matter of the claim should be provided.
Allocation of a Claim to a Chamber
281After submission of the claim (see, for example, the time limits for bringing pro-
ceedings, para. 287 et seqq.), the President of the Court should assign the claim to a
chamber (see para. 169) for a decision, in case chambers have been set
up. Otherwise, the President of the Court shall make an allocation to the judges
designated in accordance with a predetermined allocation procedure/scheme or by
drawing lots (see para. 170).233
282The decision as to which judge or chamber should decide a specific case should
not fall within the competence of the Plenary Organ, as this would undermine the
right of access to court, which is part of the internationally recognised principle of
the rule of law. At the same time, this ensures that the respondent MIC Member
cannot prevent or delay the allocation of a case to a certain judge or chamber by
exerting its influence in the Plenary Body and cannot in any other way interfere with
the constitution of a chamber.
283Insofar as the court is equipped with the necessary capacity, claims should not be
allocated to single judges, since full-time judges should be remunerated from the
budget of the MIC. This could be seen differently if varying court fees were charged
231Cf. Article 7 DSU; Hilf and Salomon (2010), p. 176, para. 29.
232The ICSID Secretariat publishes basic information about a dispute after registration of the
dispute.
233See on this also CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 238.
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depending on whether a single judge, a chamber or even a grand chamber deals with
a claim.
Examination of Jurisdiction, Inadmissibility or Manifest Ill-Foundedness
284 The MIC should be able to decide on its own jurisdiction.234 The chamber to which a
claim has been allocated should examine as promptly as possible—for this purpose,
a time limit may be set—whether:
(1) The MIC has jurisdiction;
(2) the claim submitted is inadmissible; or
(3) the claim submitted is manifestly ill-founded.
285 The judges competent in a specific case should be obliged to review the claim
immediately upon receipt of the statement of claim for possible abuse. In the event of
inadmissibility or manifest substantive ill-foundedness, the claim should be imme-
diately dismissed (a limine dismissal). Inadmissibility should generally be presumed
if the application is evidently inadmissible, i.e. if the inadmissibility is evident from
the documents underlying the proceedings to an unbiased observer who is aware of
the relevant circumstances without a detailed evaluation of the essential merits of the
case. A manifest ill-foundedness should only be presumed in cases where the
claimant’s submission does not show any connection with acts committed by the
respondent or is limited to frivolous contentions.
286 However, the dismissal of a claim as inadmissible or manifestly ill-founded
should, from the point of view of providing an effective remedy, be subject to a
possibility of appeal.
Time Limits for the Submission of a Claim
287 Provided that compulsory consultations are required under the applicable IIA,
maximum time limits should be set for submitting the claim after the consultations
have been terminated. Insofar as regulations in this regard are provided for in the IIA
on which the dispute is based, these provisions should be taken into account.
288 Such time limits may also be established in the MIC Statute if both states are party
to an IIA and are Members of the MIC. These time limits would amend the
respective IIA. If only the respondent state is an MIC Member, the MIC then only
constitutes an additional dispute resolution forum, whose use may be made subject
to separate conditions.
289 In order to ensure legal certainty, submitting a claim should only be possible
within 1 year from termination of a national procedure against state acts violating the
234As per the powers provided to the ICSID Tribunal in Article 41 of the ICSID Convention; in
International Courts, cf. Article 36 para 6 ICJ Statute.
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claimant’s rights. If no national proceedings have been carried out, submitting a
claim should only be possible within 1 year from the time when a claimant first had
knowledge of the state acts violating their rights. Generally, all claims should be
barred after 10 years from the time the respective act of the state was carried out,
regardless of the claimant’s knowledge of the state’s acts.
Respondent
290Generally, the claim should be directed against a Member of the MIC. Only parties
to the MIC Statute would have recognised the MIC’s jurisdiction by ratifying the
Statute or by having declared submission to the jurisdiction of the MIC. The claim
should in principle be directed against the MIC Members as such and not against
federal subunits. Here, a comparison to infringement proceedings in the realm of EU
Law can be helpful. These claims are also directed against the nation states as such
and not against single federal states, regions or municipalities which are more
closely related to the individual cases in question.
291However, this can be different for international organisations with autonomous
legislative powers, i.e. in the case of the EU and its Member States.
292Generally, investors should not appear as respondents before the MIC (with a
possible exception in the context of counterclaims against investors). First, they have
not given their consent to a decision by the MIC. Second, there is no such need
because host states, by virtue of their territorial sovereignty, can use executive and
legislative powers to put pressure on investors or can bring action against them in
domestic courts.
Determination of the Appropriate Respondent When International
Organisations Enjoying Autonomous Legislative Powers and Their Member
States Are Concerned
293Specific provisions should be foreseen regarding the determination of the appropri-
ate respondent, in particular in the case of parallel MIC membership of members of
an organisation and an international organisation itself. For instance, the EU as well
as all its 28 Member States are members of the WTO.235 Yet there are neither any
concrete rules in primary WTO law nor in secondary procedural law addressing the
question as to whether dispute settlement proceedings are to be initiated against the
EU, its Member States or both. Hence, third countries have a free choice in such
cases.236
235For more details about the parallel membership of the EU and its member states in the WTO, see
Tietje (2006), p. 161 et seqq.
236Herrmann and Streinz (2014), § 11, para. 154 et seqq.
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294 Within the framework of the MIC, there are various alternatives for dealing with
such “parallel memberships” in disputes before the MIC:
– first, as in the case of the WTO, the question of the appropriate respondent might
not at all be addressed, leaving the applicant with a free choice;
– second, at the primary level, i.e. in the MIC Statute itself, a specific provision
could be made;
– third, a provision could be included in the procedural rules which substantiate the
MIC Statute.
295 A specific provision governing this issue is recommended for ensuring legal
clarity. Investors should be able to foresee against whom they are supposed to
submit their claims, whether it is an “economic superpower” or a single state. It is
unacceptable for a claimant from a third state to be forced to examine and decide
whether a national measure has its origin in the law of the supranational organisation
or it is autonomous and strictly limited to the realm of national law. At the
international level, the “bilateral” CETA237 provides a specific rule governing this
question, as do the EU-Vietnam IPA238 and the EU-Singapore IPA.239
296 However, one could argue against stipulating such a rule at the international level
because clauses in multilateral treaties can only be changed with great difficulty or at
least after lengthy negotiations, in case they turn out to be impracticable at the end of
the day. Providing for such a rule in a quasi-bilateral treaty between the EU (as well
as its Member States—which in this respect could be obliged to “speak with one
237Article 8.21 CETA: Determination of the respondent for disputes with the European Union or its
Member States: “1. If the dispute cannot be settled within 90 days of the submission of the request
for consultations, the request concerns an alleged breach of this Agreement by the European Union
or a Member State of the European Union and the investor intends to submit a claim pursuant to
Article 8.23, the investor shall deliver to the European Union a notice requesting a determination of
the respondent. 2. The notice under paragraph 1 shall identify the measures in respect of which the
investor intends to submit a claim. 3. The European Union shall, after having made a determination,
inform the investor as to whether the European Union or a Member State of the European Union
shall be the respondent. 4. In the event that the investor has not been informed of the determination
within 50 days of delivering its notice requesting such determination: (a) if the measures identified
in the notice are exclusively measures of a Member State of the European Union, the Member State
shall be the respondent; (b) if the measures identified in the notice include measures of the European
Union, the European Union shall be the respondent. 5. The investor may submit a claim pursuant to
Article 8.23 on the basis of the determination made pursuant to paragraph 3, and, if no such
determination has been communicated to the investor, on the basis of the application of paragraph
4. 6. If the European Union or a Member State of the European Union is the respondent, pursuant to
paragraph 3 or 4, neither the European Union, nor the Member State of the European Union may
assert the inadmissibility of the claim, lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal or otherwise object to the
claim or award on the ground that the respondent was not properly determined pursuant to
paragraph 3 or identified on the basis of the application of paragraph 4. 7. The Tribunal shall be
bound by the determination made pursuant to paragraph 3 and, if no such determination has been
communicated to the investor, the application of paragraph 4.”
238Article 3.32 paras. 2, 3, 4 EU-Vietnam IPA.
239Article 3.5 paras. 2, 3, 4 EU-Singapore IPA.
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voice”) and a third state, such as Canada or Vietnam, seems less problematic than
providing for such a regulation in a multilateral treaty with considerably more
members. In order to address problems resulting from the distribution of compe-
tences, the (at the time) EC had issued a supplementary declaration240 with respect to
the determination of the appropriate respondent in the context of dispute settlement
under Article 26 of the ECT.241 Thus, secondary legislation substantiating the MIC’s
Statute in terms of procedural law (see para. 75) or the submission of a supplemen-
tary declaration in this regard, as in the case of the ECT, appears preferable.
297Secondary legislation determining the appropriate respondent should specifically
make provision for the question as to whether it is up to the international organisa-
tion (as stipulated under the EU-Vietnam IPA, the EU-Singapore IPA and CETA) or
up to the affected state (as stipulated under the EU Financial Responsibility Regu-
lation)242 to identify the appropriate respondent or whether a corresponding
240Council and Commission Decision of 23 September 1997 on the conclusion, by the European
Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency
and related environmental aspects, OJ L 69, 9.3.1998, p. 115.
241As stated, inter alia, in the Statement submitted by the European Communities to the Secretariat
of the Energy Charter pursuant to Article 26(3)(b)(ii) of the Energy Charter Treaty: “The Commu-
nities and the Member States will, if necessary, determine among them who is the respondent party
to arbitration proceedings initiated by an Investor of another Contracting Party. In such case, upon
the request of the Investor, the Communities and the Member States concerned will make such
determination within a period of 30 days.”
242Article 9 Regulation (EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July
2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state
dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is
party, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 121, Respondent status: “1. The Member State concerned shall act as
the respondent except where either of the following situations arise: (a) the Commission, following
consultations pursuant to Article 6, has taken a decision pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article
within 45 days of receiving the notice or notification referred to in Article 8; or (b) the Member
State, following consultations pursuant to Article 6, has confirmed to the Commission in writing
that it does not intend to act as the respondent within 45 days of receiving the notice or notification
referred to in Article 8. If either of the situations referred to in point (a) or (b) arise, the Union shall
act as the respondent. 2. The Commission may decide by means of implementing acts, based on a
full and balanced factual analysis and legal reasoning provided to the Member States, in accordance
with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 22(2), that the Union is to act as the respondent
where one or more of the following circumstances arise: (a) the Union would bear all or at least part
of the potential financial responsibility arising from the dispute in accordance with the criteria laid
down in Article 3; or (b) the dispute also concerns treatment afforded by the institutions, bodies,
offices or agencies of the Union. 3. The Commission may decide by means of implementing acts,
based on a full and balanced factual analysis and legal reasoning provided to the Member States in
accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 22(3), that the Union is to act as
the respondent where similar treatment is being challenged in a related claim against the Union in
the WTO, where a panel has been established and the claim concerns the same specific legal issue,
and where it is necessary to ensure a consistent argumentation in the WTO case. 4. In acting
pursuant to this Article, the Commission shall ensure that the Union’s defence protects the financial
interests of the Member State concerned. 5. The Commission and the Member State concerned shall
immediately after receiving the notice or notification referred to in Article 8 enter into consultations
pursuant to Article 6 on the management of the case pursuant to this Article. The Commission and
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declaration should be issued by the EU within a short period of time. Both sets of
rules have in common that it is an internal decision-making process. Otherwise, the
EU should in principle be the appropriate respondent.
298 Due to its financial strength and technical expertise—as compared to small
member states—there is reason to support the idea that in general an international
organisation that is an MIC Member, for example the EU, should be considered the
appropriate respondent. Moreover, if necessary, an additional short time limit should
be provided in which the international organisation and the Member State concerned
can jointly formulate a declaration that a Member State is to be considered as
respondent. A provision could be included in primary law that supranational orga-
nisations may determine such a rule and notify it to the MIC. If the MIC Statute
presumes a supranational organisation to be the respondent, unless otherwise noti-
fied, it would also be possible to provide for recourse against a Member State in
cases where the international or supranational organisation is ordered to pay dam-
ages, even though the measure at issue is in fact attributable to one of the Member
States of the organisation.243
Right to Bring a Claim and Subject Matter of a Claim
299 The claimant investor should have to demonstrate that their rights have been violated
by state acts or at least by acts attributable to the state.244 In this respect, it will be
necessary to clarify which rights the investor can invoke before the MIC, in
the Member State concerned shall ensure that any deadlines set down in the agreement are
respected. 6. When the Union acts as the respondent in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 5, the
Commission shall consult the Member State concerned on any pleading or observation prior to the
finalisation and submission thereof. Representatives of the Member State concerned shall, at the
Member State’s request and at its expense, form part of the Union’s delegation to any hearing and
the Commission shall take due account of the Member State’s interest. 7. The Commission shall
immediately inform the European Parliament and the Council of any dispute in which this Article is
applied and the manner in which it has been applied.”
243In this regard, the Financial Responsibility Regulation provides an opportunity for the EU and
Member States to agree on the legal costs as well the liability for damages in cases where the EU
acts as a respondent, but the responsibility lies with the Member States. Article 12 Regulation
(EU) No 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement
tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party, OJ L
257, 28.8.2014, p. 121, Acceptance by the Member State concerned of potential financial respon-
sibility where the Union is the respondent: “Where the Union acts as the respondent in any disputes
in which a Member State would be liable to bear all or part of the potential financial responsibility,
the Member State concerned may, at any time, accept any potential financial responsibility arising
from the arbitration. To this end, the Member State concerned and the Commission may enter into
arrangements dealing with, inter alia: (a) mechanisms for the periodic payment of costs arising from
the arbitration; (b) mechanisms for the payment of any awards made against the Union. This
Regulation applies to arbitration cases but not to a future MIC.”
244Cf. Article 8.18 para. 1 and 2 CETA: “claims to have suffered loss or damage.”
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particular whether these rights, such as protection standards defined in the IIAs,
should exclusively concern rights resulting from IIAs.
300The respective IIA and not the MIC Statute should state if, in addition to the
protection standards, the violation of market access commitments by the state can be
invoked before the MIC. This depends on the scope of protection of the specific
IIAs, which in principle should remain in force.
301The question as to whether agreements signed but not ratified can give rise to
actionable investor rights before the MIC and if the infringement of such rights will
then be individually actionable by an investor should be answered by recourse to the
IIA underlying the dispute (cf. the issue of provisional application in, for example,
Article 45 ECT).
302It also needs to be decided whether only possible violations of protection stan-
dards stipulated in IIAs, which the home state of the investor has concluded with the
respondent MIC Member, can constitute the substance of a claim, or whether the
investor should be entitled to rights granted by investor-state contracts as well.
Investors should only be able to invoke contractual rights that result from investor-
state contracts if this has been explicitly agreed on between the respondent and the
investor (see the question of applicable law, para. 366 et seqq.).
303The possibility of invoking a breach of national law could lead to great legal
uncertainty, in particular with regard to the extent of the claims to be expected. In
addition, these are subject matters and infringements that typically have to be
brought before national courts. From a EU Law point of view, this would also
interfere with the powers of the CJEU and would therefore be difficult to reconcile
with EU Law. Therefore, as in CETA, this possibility should be explicitly ruled
out.245
Right To Be Heard Before the Court
304The right to be heard should be guaranteed.246 The statement of claim should be
delivered to parties through the MIC to ensure that due notice of it is taken, as well as
the exchange of all other documents. In any case, it should be ensured that parties
have the possibility of submitting a rejoinder, a legal opinion etc. The judgment
should be based only on facts and evidence the parties are able to comment on. It
follows that, for example, the hearing should be reopened ex officio if a breach of the
245Article 8.31 para. 2 CETA: “The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of
a measure, alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic law of a Party. For
greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a measure with this Agreement, the Tribunal
may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of a Party as a matter of fact. In doing so, the
Tribunal shall follow the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts or
authorities of that Party and any meaning given to domestic law by the Tribunal shall not be
binding upon the courts or the authorities of that Party.”; See on this CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of
30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 121 et seqq.
246Cf. della Cananea (2010), p. 56 et. seqq.
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right to be heard is apparent. Although time limits may be short, they should be
chosen carefully to prevent any undue limitation to the right to be heard.
Oral Proceedings and “Free” Consideration of Evidence
305 Unless otherwise requested by the parties—due to business secrets of the investor or
security interests of the respondent—the MIC should render its decision only after
holding an oral hearing. The oral hearing should be public, as provided for in
CETA,247 the EU-Vietnam IPA,248 the EU-Singapore IPA249 or the UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules.250 The principle of holding oral hearings corresponds with the
demand for more transparency251 and is reflected in the more recent transparency
requirements of international treaties (see para. 432 et seqq.). The details of the
course of oral proceedings should be specified in procedural rules. At the same time,
the protection of business secrets of the claimant should be ensured.
Court Fees
306 It needs to be determined whether the claimant should pay MIC fees. For example,
proceedings before the German Federal Constitutional Court are generally free of
court fees.252 However, an abuse fee may be imposed. Also, for individual com-
plaints before the ECtHR, no procedural fees are charged. The same applies to
proceedings before the Courts of the EU.253 At a national level, however, parties are
247Article 8.36 para. 5 CETA: “Hearings shall be open to the public. The Tribunal shall determine,
in consultation with the disputing parties, the appropriate logistical arrangements to facilitate public
access to such hearings. If the Tribunal determines that there is a need to protect confidential or
protected information, it shall make the appropriate arrangements to hold in private that part of the
hearing requiring such protection.”
248Cf. Article 3.59 para. 9 EU-Vietnam IPA: “At the request of one of the claimants, the consol-
idating division of the Tribunal may take appropriate measures as it sees fit in order to preserve the
confidentiality of protected information of that claimant vis-à-vis other claimants. Such measures
may include the submission of redacted versions of documents containing protected information to
the other claimants or arrangements to hold parts of the hearing in private.”
249Article 3.24 para. 12 EU-Singapore IPA.
250Article 6 para. 1 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration:
“[. . .] hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument (“hearings”) shall be public.”
251Also calling for pertinent transparency rules for an investment court: Katz (2016), p. 188.
252The proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany are free of charge
according to Article 34 para. 1 BVerfGG (Act on the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany).
No one should be prevented from invoking their fundamental rights owing to cost reasons.
According to Article 34 para. 2 BVerfGG (Act on the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany),
misuse of this provision can be punished with a fine of up to EUR 2600.
253Article 139 Rules of Procedure of the General Court, OJ L 105, 23.4.2015, p. 1: “Proceedings
before the General Court shall be free of charge, except that: (a) where a party has caused the
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usually liable to pay the costs of proceedings, as for instance in Germany (with the
exception of the Federal Constitutional Court) and Austria.
307However, the prescription of court fees would prevent a scenario in which the
MIC Members would have to bear all the general costs, especially if some states will
probably never appear as respondents before the Court due to a high level of
compliance with international investment law. Nevertheless, the court also provides
legal remedy to all investors who can be attributed to an MIC Member. In addition,
for reasons of higher political acceptance, it should be considered that those inves-
tors who use the system should participate in its basic costs by paying court fees. If
investors succeed in proceedings before the MIC, they should be reimbursed their
expenses (see para. 319 et seqq.).
308For reasons of legal certainty and predictability of the proceedings, costs and fees
should be set out in the MIC Statute itself or in the procedural rules substantiating the
Statute. However, court fees should not reach a level that would make access to the
Court more difficult.254 For reasons of equity, costs should be reduced on request in
particular for SMEs.
309The court fees for MIC claims should first be due when the court receives the
statement of claim. However, the question which party ultimately has to bear the
costs should depend mostly on the outcome of the proceedings (see para. 319 et
seqq.).
310If fees were to be charged upon receipt of the claim, the Secretariat could, without
consulting the parties, provisionally determine the amount in dispute and, based on
this provisional determination, calculate the corresponding fees. The final determi-
nation could be made in conjunction with the final decision on the distribution of
costs as soon as a decision is rendered on the merits or when the procedure ends for
another reason.
311A framework for the court fees should be established. The amount of fees could
be determined according to the economic importance of the case as well as the
personnel and material expenditures. A chart of fees could be set up, which could
provide that, starting at a certain minimum, the fees could be increased up to a certain
maximum. The maximum would have to rank at a level that would ensure that all the
costs caused by the procedure before the MIC are covered.
General Court to incur avoidable costs, in particular where the action is manifestly an abuse of
process, the General Court may order that party to refund them; (b) where copying or translation
work is carried out at the request of a party, the cost shall, in so far as the Registrar considers it
excessive, be paid for by that party on the Registry’s scale of charges referred to in Article 37; (c) in
the event of any repeated failure to comply with the requirements of these Rules or of the practice
rules referred to in Article 224, requiring regularisation to be sought, the costs involved in the
requisite processing thereof by the General Court shall, at the request of the Registrar, be paid for by
the party concerned on the Registry’s scale of charges referred to in Article 37.” Correspondingly,
see Article 143 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, OJ L 265, 29.9.2012, p. 1: “Proceedings
before the Court shall be free of charge, except that [. . .].”
254See also European Commission (2017), p. 57; European Union (2019), para. 33.
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312 The ICSID administrative costs are charged as an annual lump sum. However, in
ICSID proceedings, the administrative costs are charged in addition to the arbitrator
costs. Since the MIC incurs fees for judges in addition to the administrative costs of
the Secretariat, the system of annual lump sums would be of only limited benefit.
Some inspiration could be drawn from the SCC Rules where arbitrator costs are
calculated based not on daily rates but on the amount in dispute (in the same way as
other administrative costs).255 Based on that amount, the court could then,
depending on the actual expenditure, increase or reduce the fees.
313 It would therefore make sense to favour a cost-oriented approach as, for example,
in the German court fee system. Fees should not significantly exceed the court’s
actual expenses. If, for example, in a matter of considerable economic significance,
i.e. when a particularly large amount in dispute is at stake, a decision may be drafted
with comparably little effort, the preliminary determination of the fees by the
Secretariat, which is based only on the presumed amount in dispute, should be
reduced in the final decision on costs taken by the court.
314 Another decisive factor for a reduction of fees could also be whether the applicant
applied for a decision by a single judge.
315 If the MIC is used by claimants from non-MIC Members or if the respondent is a
non-Member—assuming this would be permitted under the MIC Statute—then an
increased court fee should be provided for, as the funding of the MIC’s basic costs
would at least not be fully covered by the parties to the proceedings or their home
states.
Rules on Cost Allocation Schemes, Legal Funding and Legal Aid
316 Rules on cost allocation are a manifestation of the rule of law principle and are
therefore directly linked to the right of access to court. The allocation of the parties’
costs incurred in the proceedings as well as in the process of arranging legal funding
(or Third-Party Funding) should be laid down in the MIC Statute and further
elaborated in the substantiating procedural rules.
317 The cost allocation rules only affect the costs claimed by each party. General
costs for financing the MIC cannot be allocated to the parties of the dispute (see para.
604 et seqq.). Insofar as general court costs in the sense of court fees (depending on
the amount in dispute) are included in the Statute, these should also be part of the
cost allocation and thus the cost decision of the MIC.
318 Due to the general freedom of investment tribunals in deciding on the costs of the
procedure, the practice of cost allocation in the past has been inconsistent.
319 Originally, most cost decisions in investment arbitration followed the principle
that each party generally had to bear its own costs and the costs of the tribunal were
shared256; only in some cases, the costs were divided according to the criteria of
255Cf. http://www.sccinstitute.com.
256Dolzer and Schereuer (2012), p. 299.
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good or bad procedural practice by the parties of the dispute. Only recently, there
have been numerous cost decisions following the principles of “costs follow the
event” or “loser pays”, according to which the losing party of the proceedings has to
bear all costs.257 A common practice has emerged according to which procedural
“bad faith” of the litigants is sanctioned in the cost decision. In most cases, such
procedural actions are either unsubstantiated, malicious, unduly delaying the pro-
ceedings or otherwise abusive.258
320However, too rigid rules with regard to the decision on costs should be avoided. It
should rather remain largely at the discretion of the MIC. Nevertheless, the “loser
pays” principle should generally be considered relevant259 in order to reduce abusive
submissions. According to this principle, only the necessary or reasonable costs of
the other side should be borne by the loser. It would also make sense to establish a
catalogue of criteria that sets out exceptions to this principle, addressing for instance
the question as to whether SMEs can be ordered to pay the entirety of costs when
being subject to cost allocation.
321As far as the costs are concerned, it is still to be determined whether legal funding
shall be permissible, and if so, to what extent it must be disclosed to the court.260
Legal funding by third parties could also enable less financially strong investors to
enforce their rights by submitting a claim261 and could support the establishment of a
certain “equality of arms” in the proceedings.262 Additionally, the claim is presum-
ably not ‘meaningless’ or ‘futile’ if it is financed by legal funding.263 As a
counterargument, this can however lead to judges being “biased”, as they are
aware that a positive preliminary examination of the claims has already been carried
out.264 In addition, in the past, the possibility of conflicts of interest regarding
arbitrators has been an increasingly discussed topic. Arbitrators may have acted as
counsel in other proceedings where they might have been paid by litigation
funders.265 The latter argument, however, does not apply to full-time judges. Since
there can be no conflicts of interest regarding judges in this respect, little opposes the
permissibility of legal funding. For this very reason, it should also be considered that
257Bondar (2016), p. 46.
258Dolzer and Schereuer (2012), p. 299.
259Forwarding the same idea: Katz (2016), p. 187.
260See also Article 8.26 CETA: “1. Where there is third party funding, the disputing party benefiting
from it shall disclose to the other disputing party and to the Tribunal the name and address of the
third party funder. 2. The disclosure shall be made at the time of the submission of a claim, or, if the
financing agreement is concluded or the donation or grant is made after the submission of a claim,
without delay as soon as the agreement is concluded or the donation or grant is made.”
261Steinitz (2011), p. 1313; Lamm and Hellbeck (2013), p. 102; UNCITRAL Working Group III
(2018b), para. 63.
262Cf. von Goeler (2016), p. 87.
263Shaw (2017), p. 111 et. seq.
264Sharp and Marsh (2017).
265Scherer (2013), p. 96.
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the parties’ corresponding disclosure obligations in the case of the use of legal aid
should be waived.
322 With regard to SMEs in particular, who may have difficulties in enforcing their
rights due to a lack of financial resources, the idea of setting up a legal aid scheme
seems worth considering.266 The CJEU has in the CETA-Opinion 1/17 dealt with the
requirement of accessibility from the point of view of financial risks.267 International
dispute resolution institutions, such as the PCA, the WTO or the ICJ provide for
financial support from funds to which both states and natural and legal persons can
contribute voluntarily.268
323 In the case of the ITLOS, developing countries acting as parties to the dispute
before the Tribunal may also apply for financial assistance to cover their legal fees or
the travel and accommodation costs of their delegations incurred during oral hearing
held in Hamburg. This assistance is available through a voluntary trust fund set up by
the UN General Assembly and maintained by the United Nations Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS).
Non-appearance Before the MIC and Default Judgments
324 If a party does not appear in court, a default judgment should be allowed, as provided
for in various procedural rules.269 This has been widely practiced in arbitration, for
example in the Libya cases.270
325 In principle, the non-appearance of a party should not result in the termination of
the proceedings, but the party appearing—normally the claimant—should be
allowed to ask the court to rule in accordance with its claim. In this case, the court
should examine whether the claim is admissible, as well as factually and legally
well-founded. It should also be taken into account that the principle of ex officio
investigations should apply.
266Cf. Krajewski (2015), p. 20, Article 23.
267CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 208 et seqq.
268Permanent Court of Arbitration, Financial Assistance Fund for Settlement of International
Disputes, Terms of Reference and Guidelines (as approved by the Administrative Council on
11 December 1995); Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes
through the International Court of Justice, A/59/37221, 21.9.2004; Bekker (1993), pp. 659–668.
269Cf. Article 41 Protocol No. 3 CJEU Statute: “Where the defending party, after having been duly
summoned, fails to file written submissions in defence, judgment shall be given against that party by
default. An objection may be lodged against the judgment within one month of it being notified. The
objection shall not have the effect of staying enforcement of the judgment by default unless the
Court of Justice decides otherwise.” Similar provision in Article 53 ICJ Statute: “Whenever one of
the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon
the Court to decide in favour of its claim.”
270British Petroleum Co Ltd (Libya) v. Libya (1982); see also Mangoldt (1983), p. 503 et seqq.
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Intervention and Hearings of Interested Third Parties
326In other international proceedings, it is sometimes possible that third parties may join
a dispute if their legal interests are affected by the proceedings.271 This possibility
was also included in the EU’s TTIP272 proposal for the ICS. The previously, widely
recognised principle of an effect of ISDS procedures exclusively inter partes is
currently undergoing a change.
327A provision should also be made in the MIC Statute or in its procedural rules that
an MIC Member who demonstrates a legal interest in a pending dispute can be
admitted by the MIC as an intervening third party. This would be particularly
relevant when it comes to the interpretation of an agreement to which the MIC
Member is also a party. If necessary, a third-party intervention could even be
permissible in cases where MIC membership is not (yet) available. The provision
of the EU proposal for the TTIP Investment Protection Chapter goes even further, as
any natural or legal person able to show an interest in the procedure is allowed to
intervene.273
328In the event that a possibility of intervention is provided, it should also be taken
into account in connection with the cost allocation rules. An intervening third-party
who participates in the proceedings before the MIC should—due to the adversarial
character of the procedure—be judged according to the principles governing the
proceedings. Generally, interested private third parties wishing to participate in the
271Cf. Article 62 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be
permitted to intervene.” Article 10 para. 2 DSU: “Any Member having a substantial interest in a
matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as
a “third party”) shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions
to the panel. These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall be reflected
in the panel report.” See also Article 36 ECHR and Article 31 ITLOS Statute.
272Article 23 TTIP Proposal-Investment Chapter—Intervention by third parties.
273Article 23 TTIP Proposal-Investment Chapter: “1. The Tribunal shall permit any natural or legal
person which can establish a direct and present interest in the result of the dispute (the intervener) to
intervene as a third party. The intervention shall be limited to supporting, in whole or in part, the
award sought by one of the disputing parties. 2. An application to intervene must be lodged within
90 days of the publication of submission of the claim pursuant to Article 6. The Tribunal shall rule
on the application within 90 days, after giving the disputing parties an opportunity to submit their
observations. 3. If the application to intervene is granted, the intervener shall receive a copy of every
procedural document served on the disputing parties, save, where applicable, confidential docu-
ments. The intervener may submit a statement in intervention within a time period set by the
Tribunal after the communication of the procedural documents. The disputing parties shall have an
opportunity to reply to the statement in intervention. The intervener shall be permitted to attend the
hearings held under this Chapter and to make an oral statement. 4 In the event of an appeal, a natural
or legal person who has intervened before the Tribunal shall be entitled to intervene before the
Appeal Tribunal. Paragraph 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 5. The right of intervention conferred
by this Article is without prejudice to the possibility for the Tribunal to accept amicus curiae briefs
from third parties in accordance with Article 18. 6. For greater certainty, the fact that a natural or
legal person is a creditor of the claimant shall not be considered as sufficient in itself to establish that
it has a direct and present interest in result of the dispute.”
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procedure should not be reimbursed. This may be different in the case of states
intervening as third parties. In such circumstances, it could be provided that in
exceptional cases a reimbursement of expenses is left to the discretion of the MIC.
Experts
329 Chambers should be able to consult experts to clarify special questions. Questions in
the fields of environmental protection, specific technology, health etc. should be
answered in writing or in the course of oral hearings.274
Withdrawal of a Claim
330 In addition to the principle of investigation, one will often find the so-called principle
of “free disposition” by the parties in international courts. The claimant can therefore
withdraw their application/claim in almost all legal proceedings. Given that the
initiation of proceedings before the MIC should only be possible upon application
(see para. 277 et seqq.), the disputing parties should also be able to dispose of the
subject matter of the claim in full. It should therefore also be up to the claimant
before the MIC to withdraw their claim, although—if appropriate—the Court should
be able to issue a decision on the costs.275
Statement of Reasons and Minority Opinions
331 The chamber should in principle decide in the form of a judgment after holding oral
hearings. Judgments must be fully reasoned in order to ensure the rule of law and
increase confidence in the judgments.276
332 It should be determined whether dissenting or separate concurring opinions of
certain judges can be attached to the decision (for example, ICJ judgments provide
274Cf. Article 24 TTIP Proposal, Investment Chapter: “The Tribunal, at the request of a disputing
party or, after consulting the disputing parties, on its own initiative, may appoint one or more
experts to report to it in writing on any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety, or
other matters raised by a disputing party in a proceeding.”
275Cf. Article 89 Rules of Court of the ICJ: “1. If in the course of proceedings instituted by means of
an application, the applicant informs the Court in writing that it is not going on with the pro-
ceedings, and if, at the date on which this communication is received by the Registry, the
respondent has not yet taken any step in the proceedings, the Court shall make an order officially
recording the discontinuance of the proceedings and directing the removal of the case from the list.
A copy of this order shall be sent by the Registrar to the respondent.”
276Cf. della Cananea (2010), p. 56 et. seq.
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this possibility).277 This possibility can serve the judicial independence and trans-
parency of the decision.278 Therefore, dissenting or separate concurring opinions
should also be possible under the procedural rules of the MIC. In particular,
dissenting opinions underline that a court has dealt extensively with the case. By
virtue of additional reasoning, the quality of the judgments increase. The general
confidence in judgments could increase, especially if the disclosure of counterargu-
ments can promote further development of the law. In addition, dissenting or
separate concurring opinions can also be seen as evidence of the impartiality and
independence of judges. Providing for dissenting or separate concurring opinions
would altogether support the possible positive effects of the establishment of
an MIC.
Interim Measures and the Protection of the Claimant’s Rights
333As is usually the case before national and other international courts, as well as before
ICSID arbitral tribunals,279 provision should be made for preliminary protection of
the claimant’s rights. During ongoing proceedings before the MIC, the parties
should comply with any interim measures so that the final decision on the merits is
not deprived of its purpose and effect—for example if serious irreparable damage
has already occurred and the payment of compensation would not make sense. It is
questionable whether interim measures can also lead to a duty of omission of a state.
The final decision should always only require states to pay compensation and not to
refrain from specific measures.280 Thus, interim measures of omission cannot aim at
277Article 57 ICJ Statute: “If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous
opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.” See also Article
45 para. 2 ECHR.
278Lamprecht (1992), p. 376.
279Cf. Article 47 ICSID Convention: “Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it
considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.”
280Article 8.34 CETA: “The Tribunal may order an interim measure of protection to preserve the
rights of a disputing party or to ensure that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is made fully effective,
including an order to preserve evidence in the possession or control of a disputing party or to protect
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall not order attachment or enjoin the application of the
measure alleged to constitute a breach referred to in Article 8.23. For the purposes of this Article, an
order includes a recommendation.”
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general political regulations,281 but they can oblige a state to provisional omission of
coercive measures and criminal prosecution.282
334 Interim measures should contribute to the taking of evidence for the proceedings.
Counterclaims
335 Counterclaims are currently being discussed extensively in investment protection
law. It has to be decided whether the possibility of counterclaims should be provided
for at the MIC or whether, on the contrary, that possibility should be explicitly
excluded. In practice, the claimant’s behaviour is taken into account in the context of
counterclaims.283 However, counterclaims are explicitly excluded under CETA in
certain cases.284 Counterclaims should, if at all, only be allowed to a limited extent.
Although they would facilitate a comprehensive consideration of the facts, they
would require full consideration of questions of national law, because counterclaims
could often be reviewed under national private or administrative law, which should
281Cf. Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, 8.5.2009, para. 50: “It is pertinent to recall
that in any ICSID arbitration one of the parties will be a sovereign State, and where provisional
measures are granted against it the effect is necessarily to restrict the freedom of the State to act as it
would wish. Interim measures may thus restrain a State from enforcing a law pending final
resolution of the dispute on the merits [. . .]. While the enactment of a law by a sovereign State,
upheld as constitutional in that State, is a matter of importance, it cannot be conclusive or preclude
the Tribunal from exercise of its power to grant provisional measures. [. . .] At this provisional stage,
the Tribunal cannot approach the issue on the assumption that either party’s contention is correct. Its
role, analogous to that of the City Oriente Tribunal, is to dispose of disputes arising between the
parties in connection with the Participation Contracts.”
282Cf. Quiborax S.A., Non-Metallic Minerals S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2,
26.2.2010, para. 1 et. seq.: “1. The present decision deals with a Request for Provisional Measures
[. . .] by which Claimants request that the Arbitral Tribunal: (1) Order Bolivia and/or Bolivia’s
agencies or entities to refrain from engaging in any conduct that aggravates the dispute between the
parties and/or alters the status quo, including any conduct, resolution or decision related to criminal
proceedings in Bolivia against persons directly or indirectly related to the present arbitration;
(2) Order Bolivia and/or Bolivia’s agencies or entities to discontinue immediately and/or to cause
to be discontinued all proceedings in Bolivia, including criminal proceedings and any course of
action relating in any way to this arbitration and which jeopardize the procedural integrity of these
proceedings; (3) Order Bolivia and/or Bolivia’s agencies or entities to discontinue immediately
and/or to cause to be discontinued all proceedings in Bolivia, including criminal proceedings and
any course of action relating in any way to this arbitration and which threaten the exclusivity of the
ICSID arbitration. 2. In their Reply on Provisional Measures (‘Claimants’ Reply’), Claimants
supplemented this request with a fourth request for relief: (4) Order Bolivia and/or Bolivia’s
agencies or entities to deliver to Claimants the corporate administration of NMM sequestered in
the course of the criminal proceedings.”
283Hoffmann (2013), p. 438 et seqq.; Bjorklund (2013), p. 461 et seqq.
284Article 8.40 CETA: “A respondent shall not assert, and the Tribunal shall not accept a defence,
counterclaim, right of setoff, or similar assertion, that an investor or, as applicable, a locally
established enterprise, has received or will receive indemnification or other compensation pursuant
to an insurance or guarantee contract in respect of all or part of the compensation sought in a dispute
initiated pursuant to this Section.”
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not form part of the law to be applied by the MIC. In individual cases, an MIC
Member submitting a counterclaim could expressly allow the MIC to treat national
issues as well. It would also be possible to add a final, enforceable and undisputed
counterclaim to the calculation when it comes to assessing the amount of compen-
sation so that the court only decides on the difference. However, this possibility
would have to be examined in more detail, since it must be made sure that abusive
judgments are not used to eliminate legitimate claims at MIC level.
Mass Action
336Another highly discussed topic is the admissibility of mass and class actions, which
according to recent practice is partly affirmed, when it is not excluded in IIAs.285
However, it is argued that the reform of investment arbitration must be designed in
such a way that German and continental European legal traditions are taken into
account and that class actions should therefore be explicitly ruled out.286 However,
this thinking ignores the fact that mass or class actions could also serve to protect
shareholders and smaller companies, who otherwise may not be able to go through
independent investment protection proceedings. Therefore, consideration should be
given to the possibility of providing for collective proceedings in the MIC Statute at
least in clearly defined cases, such as for individual claimants, shareholders
and SMEs.
Finality and Legal Effects of Judgments
337The MIC judgments should—for giving effect to the principle of celerity (see para.
343 et seqq.)—become final if they are not appealed within a short period of time.
285Cf. Abaclat and others v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4.8.2011,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, para. 551(iii): “The procedure necessary to deal with the collective
aspect of the present proceedings concern the method of the Tribunal’s examination, as well as the
manner of representation of Claimants. However, it does not affect the object of such examination.
Thus, the Tribunal remains obliged to examine all relevant aspects of the claims relating to
Claimants’ rights under the BIT as well as to Respondent’s obligations thereunder subject to the
Parties’ submissions.” Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic (formerly
Giordano Alpi and others v. Argentine Republic), ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 8.2.2013. See also Beess and Chrostin (2012), p. 514 et seqq.;
van Houte and McAsey (2012), p. 235 et seqq.; Aggarwal and Maynard (2014), p. 825 et seqq.
286Cf. Hindelang (2015), p. 20: “Solche Klagen werfen zahlreiche Probleme auf, die sich bei
Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren schwer lösen lassen. Auch tragen sie zum Schutz des einzelnen
Investors wenig bei. Insbesondere ist die Gefahr des Missbrauchs und des Entstehens einer
Klageindustrie nicht ganz von der Hand zu weisen. Besonders gefährlich sind Sammelklagen,
wenn sie – vergleichbar den class actions in den USA – mit einem sog. Opt-out-Verfahren
ausgestaltet werden. Dieses problematische Rechtsinstitut darf daher keinesfalls in Deutschland
und Europa übernommen werden und entsprechend auch nicht Eingang in von der EU
abgeschlossenen Investitionsschutzabkommen finden.”
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338 Decisions of international courts in general have effect only between the parties
involved in the proceedings (inter partes).287 Since the MIC should only be able to
award individual compensation,288 the principle of inter partes effect should also be
expressly provided in the MIC Statute.
Legal Representation Before the Court
339 It is questionable whether a strict statutory requirement of representation by counsel
should be provided. MIC Members should rather have the possibility of being
represented by government representatives, civil servants or lawyers. Due to the
possibly very high costs incurred throughout the proceedings (both because of the
risk of a claim of being qualified as abusive and a possible “loser pays” principle)
claimants will in general prefer to rely on qualified representation during proceed-
ings. Hence, corresponding regulations do not appear to be necessary.
4.2.5.3 Second Instance Procedure/Appeal
340 So far, appeals mechanisms against decisions of international courts are rare. For
instance, appeals are possible against decisions of the General Court of the European
Union (GC) before the CJEU.289
341 Under investment law, an appeal option has been considered in various treaties
since 2002, notably in agreements with the US,290 and subsequently in agreements
287Article 59 ICJ Statute: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties
and in respect of that particular case.” Article 296 para. 2 UNCLOS: “Any such decision shall have
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular dispute.”
288in this sense too: Katz (2016), p. 185.
289Article 256 para. 1 and 2 TFEU: “Decisions given by the General Court under this paragraph
may be subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only, under the conditions
and within the limits laid down by the Statute.”
290Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, Trade Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-210 dated
6.8.2002, 116 Stat. 933, 19 USC 3801, Section 2102(3) G.iv): negotiating objective of “providing
for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of invest-
ment provisions in trade agreements.” See also US-Chile FTA 2003, Article 10.19 para. 10: “If a
separate multilateral agreement enters into force as between the Parties that establishes an appellate
body for purposes of reviewing awards rendered by tribunals constituted pursuant to international
trade or investment agreements to hear investment disputes, the Parties shall strive to reach an
agreement that would have such appellate body review awards rendered under Article 10.25 in
arbitrations commenced after the appellate body’s establishment.”
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with Canada,291 Australia,292 South Korea and China,293 as well as in the CPTPP.294
Thus, a larger number of states have already indicated that they consider the
introduction of an appeal mechanism to be favourable or at least conceivable.
Also, within the framework of ICSID, such an amendment has already been
discussed extensively,295 however without any precise results.296 There have also
been discussions within the framework of the OECD Investment Committee regard-
ing this issue.297 Most recently, the option of a second instance had been introduced
into treaty practice by the EU with CETA,298 the EU-Vietnam IPA299 and the
EU-Singapore IPA.300 Due to a proposal by the Commission as to the TTIP
Investment Protection Chapter301 as well as the Investment Protection Chapter in
291Canada-Korea FTA 2014, Annex 8-E: “Within three years after the date this Agreement enters
into force, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar
mechanism to review awards rendered pursuant to Article 8.42 in arbitrations commenced after
they establish the appellate body or similar mechanism.”
292China-Australia FTA 2014, Article 9.23: “Within three years after the date of entry into force of
this Agreement, the Parties shall commence negotiations with a view to establishing an appellate
mechanism to review awards rendered under Article 9.22 in arbitrations commenced after any such
appellate mechanism is established. Any such appellate mechanism would hear appeals on ques-
tions of law.”; Korea-Australian FTA 2014, Annex 11-E: “Within three years after the date of entry
into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate
body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered under Article 11.26 in arbitrations com-
menced after they establish the appellate body or similar mechanism.”
293China-Japan-Korea Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment
(Trilateral Investment Agreement) (2012).
294Article 9.23 para. 11 TPP, which is now part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) by reference in Article 1(1) CPTPP,: “In the event that an
appellate mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investor-State dispute settlement tribunals is
developed in the future under other institutional arrangements, the Parties shall consider whether
awards rendered under Article 9.29 (Awards) should be subject to that appellate mechanism. The
Parties shall strive to ensure that any such appellate mechanism they consider adopting provides for
transparency of proceedings similar to the transparency provisions established in Article 9.24
(Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings).”
295ICSID Secretariat (2004), p. 14 et seqq.
296ICSID Secretariat (2005), p. 4: “it would be premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID
mechanism at this stage, particularly in view of the difficult technical and policy issues raised.”
297Yannaca-Small (2008), p. 223 et seq.
298Article 8.28 para. 1 CETA: “An Appellate Tribunal is hereby established to review awards
rendered under this Section.”
299Article 3.39 EU-Vietnam IPA: “A permanent Appeal Tribunal is hereby established to hear
appeals from awards issued by the Tribunal.”
300Article 3.10 para. 1 EU-Singapore IPA: “A permanent Appeal Tribunal is hereby established to
hear appeals from provisional awards issued by the Tribunal.”
301Article 10 para. 1 Section 3 Investment-Chapter TTIP- Draft: “A permanent Appeal Tribunal is
hereby established to hear appeals from the awards issued by the Tribunal.”
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the EU-Mexico Agreement (under negotiation),302 the issue of a second instance is
now being discussed in connection with further agreements.303 The Commission’s
Impact Assessment regarding a multilateral reform of investment dispute resolution
also mentions that there should be a possibility of appeal in the context of a
multilateral investment court.304
342 The following parts demonstrate how a second instance could be designed as part
of a possible MIC. It seems reasonable to gear the design of the MIC particularly
towards that of the CETA Investment Protection Chapter.
The General Procedure of Appeals
343 The second instance procedure begins at the time of the filing of the appeal by the
parties involved in the first instance procedure, i.e. the claimant investor or the
respondent state. The possibility of lodging an appeal would therefore be open only
to the parties of the first instance.
344 If an appeal is filed against a judgment, the legal effect of the latter should be
suspended. Securities could be required from the appellant.305 In the event that a
fund system was provided for (see para. 538 et seqq.), it would not be necessary to
furnish security to the extent that it could be covered by the fund. If the claimant
investor files an appeal, it should provide a security up to the amount of costs
allocated to it in the first instance judgment.
345 It needs to be clarified whether intervening third parties should also be entitled to
lodge an appeal. The DSU expressly excludes this possibility for the WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedure.306 However, similar to the WTO Appellate Body procedures,
at least the right to make a statement should be granted to intervening third parties.307
346 As is the case with CETA, the competence to review a decision in a second
instance should, in principle, only exist in respect of first instance judgments, which
should already have been ruled on. An exception to this rule could only consist in
302Section -Resolution of Investment Disputes- Article 12 EU-Mexico Agreement (under negoti-
ation): “A permanent Appeal Tribunal is hereby established to hear appeals from the awards issued
by the Tribunal.”
303The possible establishment of an appellate body as a second instance for an MIC is also
mentioned in: UNCITRAL Working Group III (2018b), para. 42.
304European Commission (2017), p. 48; the demand for a two-tiered structure is also mentioned in:
European Union (2019), para. 13 et seq.
305Article 29 para. 4 Section 3 Investment-Chapter TTIP-Draft: “A disputing party lodging an
appeal shall provide security for the costs of appeal and for the amount provided for in the
provisional award.”
306Cf. Article 17 para. 4 sentence 1 DSU: “Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal
a panel report.”
307Article 17 para. 4 sentence 2 DSU: “Third parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial
interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may make written submissions to, and be
given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body.” See also Working procedures for
appellate review, WTO, Rule 24.
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cases where the impartiality of individual first instance judges is questioned (see
para. 159).
347Furthermore, appeals against first instance decisions should only be possible
within narrow time limits. If appeals are not filed within this period, the judgments
of first instance become final. For example, the TTIP stipulates a time limit of
90 days.308 The WTO DSU sets a time limit of 60 days for lodging appeals.309 A
shorter time limit of only 1 month (30 days) would be another viable option. Should
the claimant decide to appeal, it should be afforded an additional period of 1 month
within which it should submit the grounds for their appeal.310 Of course, this could
lead to the lodging of appeals as a mere precautionary measure. Such appeals might
later be withdrawn when the reasons of the appeal are drafted and a detailed analysis
of the first instance judgment takes place. Therefore, a court fee—as long as fees are
generally provided for—should be stipulated for the mere filing of the appeal. A time
limit of 60–90 days seems reasonable for filing an appeal.
348The grounds of the appeal should indicate both the scope of the appeal and the
arguments why the appellant claims an infringement of rights and on which grounds
they base their legal opinion.
349In the second instance, too, decisions should be rendered by judgment.
350The appellate instance should be able to confirm, amend or annul the judgments
of the first instance.311 In addition, the second instance could be equipped with the
power of “referring issues back to the Tribunal for adjustment of the award,”312
while the first instance Court would have the obligation to reach a new decision in
consideration of the legal opinion of the appellate instance. The introduction of this
possibility of referring cases in CETA was presumably motivated by the fact that it
allowed decisions to qualify as awards under the ICSID Convention so that it can be
enforced pursuant to the ICSID Convention. However, the power to refer cases to
lower courts could raise concerns because of the possible consequence of delays to
proceedings. As in the WTO DSU procedure, the appellate instance should therefore
make the final decision and not refer the case to the court of first instance.313
308Article 29 para. 1 sentence 1 Section 3 Investment-Chapter, TTIP Draft: “Either disputing party
may appeal before the Appeal Tribunal a provisional award, within 90 days of its issuance.”
309Article 16 para. 4 sentence 1 WTO- DSU: “Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel
report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party to the dispute
formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
report.”
310Similar to WTO-DSU. Cf. Working procedures for appellate review, WTO, Rule 20.
311Article 8.28 para. 2 CETA “The Appellate Tribunal may uphold, modify or reverse the Tri-
bunal’s award [. . .].”
312Cf. Article 8.28 para. 7 lit. b), para. 9 lit. c) subclause iii CETA.
313Baetens (2016), p. 381. Criticism was however expressed about a possibility of unplanned return
of cases in the WTO system. Cf. Pauwelyn (2007).
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351 In addition, referring cases back to the first instance would not be necessary if the
second instance had its own extensive investigatory powers.314
352 The procedural principles of the first instance—the principle of investigation (see
above at para. 274), celerity (see above at para. 337) and oral hearing (see above at
para. 305), as well as the principle of transparency (see above at para. 279, 280,
305, 332)—should apply analogously to the second instance. The second instance
procedure could be similar to the first instance procedure and should be divided into
a written and an oral procedure. Facts and evidence already submitted in the first
instance should generally be taken into account. Insofar as decisive declarations and
evidence have not been put forward in the first instance in spite of demand and time
limits, these should generally be precluded during the appeal procedure or be
admitted only under strict conditions.
353 It should be possible, as is the case of the claim in the first instance, to withdraw
the appeal at any time. However, a decision on costs should be possible in this case,
if necessary, at the request of the respondent of the appeal. The withdrawal of the
appeal should give legal force to the judgment of the first instance and, at the same
time, result in the loss of the possibility of a new appeal.
Duration of Proceedings
354 For example, in the EU-Vietnam IPA315 or in the WTO DSU,316 maximum duration
of proceedings is stated for the second instance according to the first instance rules.
Depending on whether at the level of the second instance only a review of the legal
assessment or also an assessment of the facts should be carried out, the appropriate
length of proceedings needs to be measured. The TTIP proposal, as well as the
EU-Vietnam IPA establish a length of proceedings of up to 180 days, but in no case
314For more information on powers of the second instance, see American Bar Association
Section on International Law (2016), Executive Summary & Conclusions and
Recommendations, p. 80.
315Article 3.54 para. 5 EU-Vietnam IPA: “As a general rule, the appeal proceedings shall not exceed
180 days calculated from the date on which a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to
appeal to the date on which the Appeal Tribunal issues its decision. When the Appeal Tribunal
considers that it cannot issue its decision within 180 days, it shall inform the disputing parties in
writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will issue
its decision. Unless exceptional circumstances so require, the proceedings shall in no case exceed
270 days.”; a similar provision can be found in Article 3.19 para. 4 EU-Singapore IPA.
316Article 17 para. 5 DSU: “As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the
date a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body
circulates its report. In fixing its timetable the Appellate Body shall take into account the provisions
of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if relevant. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its
report within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an
estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed
90 days.”
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proceedings before the appellate instance should take more than 270 days.317 The
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure generally states a time limit of 60 days for the
review of appeals, which in no case should take more than 90 days.318 As in the first
instance procedure, the principle of celerity of proceedings should apply; the con-
sequences arising out of this principle should apply as well. Full-time judges should
be able to render a decision within a maximum of 2 months in cases where the facts
are mostly clear. In individual cases, however, the respective chamber must be free
to extend the duration of the proceedings for an important reason.
355If there are repeated procedural extensions due to an overload of the appeal
mechanism, this is an indication for the Plenary Body to increase the number of
judges in the second instance.
Scope of Review and Investigative Competence
356In the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, the competence of the Appellate Body is
limited to the legal issues dealt with in the panel report and the corresponding
interpretation of the law by the Panel.319 Primarily, the purpose of the appeal
procedure is objective legal control. However, particularly serious errors can lead
to reversal of a panel report.320 The ICSID proposals of 2004 provide that an appeal
could be brought against decisions based on the grounds listed in Article 52 ICSID
Convention, but also because of a “clear error of law” or a “serious error of fact”.321
Similarly, in CETA, in addition to the grounds set out in Article 52 of the ICSID
Convention,322 an appeal is also possible due to “errors in the application or
317Article 29 para. 3 TTIP: “As a general rule, the appeal proceedings shall not exceed 180 days
from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appeal
Tribunal issues its decision. When the Appeal Tribunal considers that it cannot issue its decision
within 180 days, it shall inform the disputing parties in writing of the reasons for the delay together
with an estimate of the period within which it will issue its decision. In no case should the
proceedings exceed 270 days.”
318Article 17 para. 5 DSU: “As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the
date a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body
circulates its report. In fixing its timetable the Appellate Body shall take into account the provisions
of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if relevant. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its
report within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an
estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed
90 days.”
319Article 17 para. 6 DSU: “An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the panel.”
320Ohlhoff (2003), C.I.2, para. 106.
321ICSID Secretariat (2004), Annex, p. 4.
322Article 52 ICSID Convention: “(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an
application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its
powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been
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interpretation of the applicable law”, due to “manifest errors in the appreciation of
the facts, including the appreciation of the relevant domestic law.”323 It is criticised
that two different concepts—annulment and appeal—would be mixed together.324
However, it is not clear why an appellate instance should not have the jurisdiction to
deal with annulment as well as with appeal. In particular, if there is no provision for
the remanding of a case back to the first instance, the review and corresponding
decision-making jurisdiction of the second instance should be widely used.
357 The applicable law in litigation at first instance must also include procedural law,
i.e. there must be a possibility of reviewing compliance with the procedural princi-
ples. This is already required under rule of law principles.325 The question as to
whether the investigation of the facts/fact-finding was carried out correctly by the
first instance can also be regarded as a legal question, namely whether an “objective
assessment of the facts” has been carried out.326 In addition, according to the drafts
previously available, a review of “serious errors of fact” should also be expressly
made.327
358 Generally, it would be necessary to clarify whether a reference to Article
52 ICSID Convention should be made—and thus the interpretation of this provision
by ICSID Arbitral Tribunals should be given greater consideration—or whether the
grounds for annulment listed in Article 52 ICSID Convention should be included in
the MIC Statute, thus allowing for a full independent interpretation by the MIC. In
view of the creation of an independent new institution and the avoidance of conflicts
of interpretation or problems of delimitation with other institutions, we believe that
the latter should be preferred as far as is practicable (see para. 556 et seqq.).
Chamber or Plenary Decisions In This Sense, Alvarado Garzón (2019), p. 491.
359 The ICSID proposal for the establishment of an appellate instance provided for an
Appeals Panel of 15 judges of different nationalities.328 The WTO Appellate Body,
a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the
reasons on which it is based.”
323Article 8.28 para. 2 CETA: “[. . .] (a) errors in the application or interpretation of applicable law;
(b) manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of relevant domestic
law; (c) the grounds set out in Article 52(1) (a) through (e) of the ICSID Convention, in so far as
they are not covered by paragraphs (a) and (b).”
324EFILA (2016), p. 29 et seq.; American Bar Association Section on International Law
(2016), p. 78.
325Cf. Schill (2016b), p. 118.
326Cf. Ohlhoff (2003), C.I.2, para. 106.
327Making a similar proposal: European Commission (2017), p. 63.
328ICSID Secretariat (2004), Annex, p. 3: “Such a set of ICSID Appeals Facility Rules could
provide for the establishment of an Appeals Panel composed of 15 persons elected by the
Administrative Council of ICSID on the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Centre. The
terms of the Panel members would be staggered. Eight of the first 15 would serve for three years; all
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however, has only seven members three of whom shall serve on any one case.329
This relatively low number of Appellate Body members has so far had no negative
impact on the acceptance of the WTO DSU System. Based on this, it is also
determined in CETA that decisions should be made in the second instance in panels
of three appellate body members.330
360At the level of the second instance of the MIC, it should be possible to have a
decision by chambers or by the plenary of judges. Plenary decisions would have
even greater significance and would prevent substantively divergent decisions
between different chambers. However, if it is assumed that an MIC is successfully
established and accepted, a high utilisation of the MIC with its appellate instance
could argue against the possibility of a plenary decision. It should therefore be
applied very restrictively. Chambers should thus decide unless a plenary decision
is requested by one of the parties in dispute “for important reasons”, such as
divergences in the decisions.
361When the MIC is established, there should be enough judges to allow for
decisions in larger adjudicating bodies, which might lead to higher acceptance of
judgments. If chambers are introduced, a requirement to exchange arguments
between all judges of the appellate instance might also be stipulated, as is the case
with the WTO Appellate Body.331
Second Instance Judgments As Precedent?
362As is usually the case with international courts, a formal precedent of judgments in
the sense of a case law system should not be provided for. From the principles of
predictability and legal certainty, a de facto precedent should only be adopted for the
interpretation of specific provisions of the agreement on which a specific decision
has been taken. Irrespective of this, however, through a permanent staffing of the
chambers and, if necessary, an obligation to consult fundamental questions between
all judges of the second instance, constant lines of authority would still develop.
others would be elected for six year terms. Each member would be from a different country. They
would all have to be persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, interna-
tional investment and investment treaties.”
329Article 17 para. 1 sentence 3 DSU: “It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall
serve on any one case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation.”
330Article 8.28 para. 5 CETA: “The division of the Appellate Tribunal constituted to hear the appeal
shall consist of three randomly appointed Members of the Appellate Tribunal.”
331Working procedures for appellate review, WTO, Rule 4.3: “In accordance with the objectives set
out in paragraph 1, the division responsible for deciding each appeal shall exchange views with the
other Members before the division finalizes the appellate report for circulation to the WTO
Members. [. . .].”
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4.2.6 Consolidation of Pending Procedures at the MIC
363 Consolidation of pending procedures with the MIC would promote some of the
objectives outlined so far, namely efficiency in proceedings, coherence and cost
reduction.332
364 In an international context, both courts and arbitral tribunals use the possibility of
consolidation of pending procedures. Thus, Article 47 of the ICJ Rules of Procedure
provides for the power of the ICJ to combine proceedings in two or more cases.333
Similarly, Article 47 of the Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea
regulates the competence for combining procedures.334
365 In addition, various investment protection agreements provide for the possibility
of combining pending procedures.335 The MIC provisions should also follow these
examples and provide for the possibility to consolidate proceedings.
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366One of the central concerns in establishing an MIC is the creation of institutional
framework conditions for the avoidance of contradictory decisions and the develop-
ment of a uniform decision-making process in the settlement of investment disputes.
367This concern is understandable given the previous and at times remarkably
divergent interpretations of similar, if not identical investment protection standards.
One must, however, also acknowledge that in the current decentralised system of
investment arbitration, a high degree of convergence in the interpretation of invest-
ment protection standards has generally been achieved.
368Nevertheless, the sometimes fundamental differences in interpretation show that
there is a need for harmonisation, for instance with regard to the scope of the term
‘investment’ under Article 25 ICSID Convention,1 the applicability of Most-
Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses to jurisdictional and procedural matters2 as well
as the “importation” of protection standards,3 the scope of so-called umbrella
1See Manciaux (2008), p. 443; Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 128 et seq.; Reinisch (2010), p. 749;
Dupont (2011), p. 245; Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 44 et seq.
2Gaillard (2005), Douglas (2011), p. 97; Maupin (2011), p. 157; Paparinskis (2011), pp. 14–58;
Schill (2011), p. 353.
3So far, arbitral awards generally accept, that MFN clauses can help to “import” more preferable
protection standards of other agreements. Cf. e.g. Berschader v. Russian Federation, SCC Case
No. 080/2004, Award, 21.4.2006, para. 179: “[. . .] it is universally agreed that the very essence of
an MFN provision in a BIT is to afford to investors all material protection provided by subsequent
treaties [. . .].” See Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 211: “The weight of authority clearly supports the
view that an MFN rule grants a claimant the right to benefit from substantive guarantees contained
in third treaties.” CETA and other EU agreements exclude the application of MFN clauses on
procedural aspects and to substantial protection provisions of other agreements. Cf. Art. 8.7 para.
4 CETA: “For greater certainty, the “treatment” referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 does not include
procedures for the resolution of investment disputes between investors and states provided for in
other international investment treaties and other trade agreements. Substantive obligations in other
international investment treaties and other trade agreements do not in themselves constitute
© The Author(s) 2020
M. Bungenberg, A. Reinisch, From Bilateral Arbitral Tribunals and Investment
Courts to a Multilateral Investment Court, European Yearbook of International
Economic Law, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59732-3_5
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clauses,4 the scope of obligations of Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET),5 the
conditions for the application of a state of emergency6 etc.
369 In the context of the divergent interpretations of comparable investment protec-
tion standards, criticism expressed regarding an allegedly too investor-friendly
interpretation of investment protection standards by investment tribunals must be
considered.7 This would follow, inter alia, from an emphasis on a teleological
interpretation based on the object and purpose of an investment treaty, which in
IIAs are very often explicitly the increase of foreign direct investment and the
creation of an investor-friendly climate.8 Indeed, in light of the rather low success
“treatment”, and thus cannot give rise to a breach of this Article, absent measures adopted or
maintained by a Party pursuant to those obligations.”
4See Alexandrov (2004), p. 555; Schreuer (2004), p. 231; Sinclair (2004), p. 411; Wälde
(2005), p. 183.
5Cf. Kläger (2011), Yannaca-Small (2008), p. 112; Jacob and Schill (2015), p. 700; Tudor (2008).
6See Burke-White and von Staden (2007), p. 307; Reinisch (2007), p. 191; Schill (2007), p. 265;
Waibel (2007) p. 637; Bjorklund (2008), p. 495; Alvarez and Khamsi (2009), p. 379; Binder (2009),
p. 608; Bjorklund (2009), p. 479.
7Weeramantry (2012), p. 191; Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 30; Yen (2014), p. 91 et seq.:
“Interpreting general and vague treaty terms that can convey various meanings, tribunals have
sought guidance in the treaty title and preamble. On that basis, they have found the prominent
purpose of protecting and promoting investments to justify their pro-investment interpretations.
[. . .] A more serious problem arises where reliance on this means of interpretation is accompanied
with a disregard of other means under international rules on treaty interpretation.” See also the
critique of NGOs: Eberhardt and Olivet (2012), p. 16: “This report argues that the alleged fairness
and independence of investment arbitration is an illusion. The law and the consequential disputes
are largely shaped by law firms, arbitrators [. . .]. This industry is also responsible for growing its
own business with pro-investor interpretations of the treaties.” Cf. also Open Letter from Lawyers to
the Negotiators of the Trans-Pacific Partnership urging the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, 8.5.2012, https://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/: “Simultaneously, the substantive
rights granted by FTA investment chapters and BITs have also expanded significantly and awards
issued by international arbitrators against states have often incorporated overly expansive interpre-
tations of the new language in investment treaties. Some of these interpretations have prioritized the
protection of the property and economic interests of transnational corporations over the right of
states to regulate and the sovereign right of nations to govern their own affairs.”
8Cf. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29.1.2004, para. 116: “The object and purpose of the
BIT supports an effective interpretation of Article X(2).The BIT is a treaty for the promotion and
reciprocal protection of investments. According to the preamble it is intended “to create and
maintain favourable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory
of the other. It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection
of covered investments.”; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award,
12.10.2005, para. 52: “The object and purpose rule also supports such an interpretation. While it is
not permissible, as is too often done regarding BITs, to interpret clauses exclusively in favour of
investors, here such an interpretation is justified. Considering, as pointed out above, that any other
interpretation would deprive Art. II(2)(c) of practical content, reference has necessarily to be made
to the principle of effectiveness, also applied by other Tribunals in interpreting BIT provisions (see
SGS v. Philippines, para. 116 and Salini v. Jordan, para. 95).”
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rates of investor claims, a generally too investor-friendly interpretation does not
seem discernible.
370Although both problems can be addressed at the level of the applicable substan-
tive law and through institutional and procedural arrangements, a conceptual dis-
tinction has to be made between the uniformity of interpretation and the likelihood of
too state-friendly or too investor-friendly interpretations of investment protection
standards.
371These problems could be tackled, at least to a certain extent, by increasing the
degree of precision and by clarifying the scope of investment protection.
372However, the competence transferred by the Lisbon Treaty to the EU to conclude
IIAs regarding foreign direct investment has created a new and more fundamental
problem for the applicable substantive law. It follows from the established case law
of the CJEU, which emphasises its interpretative monopoly over EU Law, that the
EU’s participation in international dispute settlement systems is compatible with this
interpretative monopoly only insofar as the ultimate jurisdiction on matters of
validity and interpretation of EU Law is reserved for the CJEU. In the CETA-
Opinion 1/17, the CJEU has held that tribunals outside the EU judicial system cannot
have the power to interpret or apply provisions of the EU law other than those of the
international agreements or to make awards that might have the effect of preventing
the EU institutions from operating in accordance with the EU constitutional frame-
work.9 Therefore EU agreements cannot confer on the envisaged tribunals any
power to interpret or aply EU law other than the power to interpret or apply the
provisions of that agreement having regard to the rules and principles of international
law applicable between the parties and that these tribunals may issue awards which
have the effect of preventing the EU institutions from operating in accordance with
the EU constitutional framework.10
373Therefore, from an EU legal perspective, the interpretation and application of EU
Law as the substantive applicable law in investment disputes by an MIC will cause
problems, if the conditions set up by the CJEU are not taken into consideration. This
“EU internal” problem, which is not directly related to the other discussed issues
with regard to the establishment of an MIC, should therefore be considered initially.
5.1 Applicable Substantive Law
374In the field of investment law, there are two models for the determination of the
applicable substantive law: it can be determined by the rules of procedure of a
dispute settlement body or it can be contained in the applicable bilateral or multi-
lateral IIAs. In addition, it is possible that both regulatory regimes contain provisions
on the applicable substantive law.
9CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 118.
10CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 119.
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375 For example, the ICSID Convention provides that in light of the principle of party
autonomy, the parties to the dispute basically have the right to choose the applicable
substantive law. Otherwise, i.e. in the absence of a choice of law, the domestic law of
the host state and public international law shall apply.11
376 In the case of investment contracts between investors and states, the choice of law
is contained in a contractual clause. In the case of treaty-based investment dispute
settlement, which is much more common in practice, the choice of law is agreed by
the state parties to the treaties. Individual investors accept this “offer” of a choice of
law in the same manner as they accept the offer to arbitrate, namely by bringing a
request for arbitration.12
377 The “cumulative” application of the domestic law of the host state and of public
international law provided for in Art. 42 ICSID Convention has caused conceptual
problems. The original practice was based on a “complementary and corrective
function” of public international law, according to which the domestic law had to
be applied primarily; public international law was used only to fill gaps and correct
results incompatible with international law.13 However, it is nowadays accepted that
both legal systems play an equal role,14 the latter especially with regard to customary
rules on state responsibility, particularly regarding issues of attribution and the
circumstances precluding wrongfulness, the protection against denial of justice,
expropriation etc.15
378 Most bilateral and multilateral IIAs also contain a definition of the applicable
substantive law. As a rule, the substantive investment protection standards of the
respective IIAs should in many cases be applied in conjunction with general
international law. Furthermore, there are a number of treaties which in addition to
public international law also provide for the application of the domestic law of the
11Article 42 ICSID Convention: “The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules
of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply
the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and
such rules of international law as may be applicable.”
12Schreuer et al. (2009), Art. 42, para. 23.
13Cf. Amco v. Indonesia, Resubmitted Case: Award, 5.6.1990, para. 20, 1 ICSID Reports 580:
“This Tribunal notes that Article 42(1) refers to the application of host-state law and international
law. If there are no relevant host-state laws on a particular matter, a search must be made for the
relevant international laws. And, where there are applicable host-state laws, they must be checked
against international laws, which will prevail in case of conflict. Thus international law is fully
applicable and to classify its role as “only” “supplemental and corrective” seems a distinction
without a difference.” Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 292.
14Wena Hotels v. Egypt, Decision on Annulment, 5.2.2002, 6 ICSID Reports 129, para. 40: “What
is clear is that the sense and meaning of the negotiations leading to the second sentence of Article 42
(1) allowed for both legal orders to have a role. The law of the host State can indeed be applied in
conjunction with international law if this is justified. So too international law can be applied by itself
if the appropriate rule is found in this other ambit.” Gaillard and Banifatemi (2003), p. 377.
15Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 288.
120 5 Applicable Law
host state and specific investment contracts between investors and states.16 Con-
versely, some IIAs limit the applicable law to the respective substantive investment
protection treaty standards.17
379From the EU’s perspective, a treaty provision in an MIC Statute or in the
respective IIAs concluded by the EU which stipulates that the domestic law of the
host state shall be the applicable law would mean that EU Law would have to be
interpreted and applied by an MIC.
380While from a public international law perspective this would seem unproblematic
and might even have the advantage that an MIC could take EU Law directly into
account, from an EU legal perspective and especially in light of the CJEU’s
jurisprudence on safeguarding its interpretative monopoly, problems could arise
with regard to the conformity of such a choice of law with EU Law.
5.1.1 EU Law as Applicable Substantive Law?
381Within the EU, the question arises as to whether the application and interpretation of
EU Law by an MIC could jeopardise the ultimate jurisdiction of the CJEU over the
interpretation of EU Law.
382In principle, the CJEU does not regard the establishment of international courts
on the basis of international treaties as incompatible with the EU Treaties.18 Rather,
it has repeatedly held that binding international dispute settlement provisions are
compatible with EU Law in so far as they concern the application and interpretation
of treaties concluded by the Union.19 It has also considered international dispute
settlement systems as permissible under EU Law, provided that they do not affect the
competences of the Union and its institutions or the autonomy of the EU legal
order.20
16Cf. Article 10 para. 7 Argentina-Netherlands BIT: “The arbitration tribunal addressed in accor-
dance with paragraph (5) of this Article shall decide on the basis of the law of the Contracting Party
which is a party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of law), the provisions of the
present Agreement, special Agreements concluded in relation to the investment concerned as well
as such rules of international law as may be applicable.”
17Cf. Article 26 para. 6 ECT: “A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in
dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law.”
Article 1130 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Governing Law: “A Tribunal
established under this Subchapter shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this
Agreement and applicable rules of international law.”
18See CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 105 with further references.
19ECJ, Opinion 1/91, EEA I, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, para. 40: “An international agreement provid-
ing for such a system of courts is in principle compatible with Community law. The Community’s
competence in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international agree-
ments necessarily entails the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created or
designated by such an agreement as regards the interpretation and application of its provisions.”
20CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 105 et seqq.
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383 It follows that such courts are in conformity with EU Law, provided that they
confine themselves to the interpretation and application of the international agree-
ments in question and do not extend to the interpretation and application of EU Law,
which would have been the case with the draft for a “European and Community
Patents Court”which the CJEU has found to be incompatible with the EU Treaties.21
384 After the CJEU Opinion 1/1722 it now seems to having been clarified that also an
MIC should be compatible until EU law provided for that the conditions set up by the
CJEU in this Opinion 1/17 are fully taken into account when creating a statute for an
MIC, especially in regard to the applicable law23
385 Several investment tribunals have held that the interpretation of EU Law as
applicable law in investment disputes is unproblematic and considered it compatible
with the EU legal order in light of the acte claire doctrine.24 Arbitral decisions
concerning the ECT also did not find the overlap of interpretations to constitute a
curtailment of the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction, since assessments of measures
based on EU Law would never deal with the validity of European Law, a question
reserved for the competent EU institutions.25
21ECJ, Opinion 1/09, European Patents Court, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, para. 78: “By contrast, the
international court envisaged in this draft agreement is to be called upon to interpret and apply not
only the provisions of that agreement but also the future regulation on the Community patent and
other instruments of European Union law, in particular regulations and directives in conjunction
with which that regulation would, when necessary, have to be read, namely provisions relating to
other bodies of rules on intellectual property, and rules of the FEU Treaty concerning the internal
market and competition law. Likewise, the PC may be called upon to determine a dispute pending
before it in the light of the fundamental rights and general principles of European Union law, or
even to examine the validity of an act of the European Union.” Cf. further para. 89: “Consequently,
the envisaged agreement, by conferring on an international court which is outside the institutional
and judicial framework of the European Union an exclusive jurisdiction to hear a significant number
of actions brought by individuals in the field of the Community patent and to interpret and apply
European Union law in that field, would deprive courts of Member States of their powers in relation
to the interpretation and application of European Union law and the Court of its powers to reply, by
preliminary ruling, to questions referred by those courts and, consequently, would alter the essential
character of the powers which the Treaties confer on the institutions of the European Union and on
the Member States and which are indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of European
Union law.”
22CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341.
23CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 130 et seqq.
24Achmea B.V. (formerly Eureko B.V.) v. Slovak Republic [I], PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on
Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26.10.2010, para. 282 et seq.: “The argument that the
ECJ has an “interpretative monopoly” and that the Tribunal therefore cannot consider and apply EU
law, is incorrect. The ECJ has no such monopoly. Courts and arbitration tribunals throughout the
EU interpret and apply EU law daily. What the ECJ has is a monopoly on the final and authoritative
interpretation of EU law: but that is quite different. Moreover, even final courts are not obliged to
refer questions of the interpretation of EU law to the ECJ in all cases. The acte clair doctrine is well-
established in EU law.”
25Cf. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, Applicable Law and Liability, 30.11.2012, para. 4.197 et seq.: “The Tribunal recognises the
special status of EU law operating as a body of supranational law within the EU. It also recognises
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386Because of still existing uncertainty, it is understandable that the negotiators of
European investment treaties and chapters in comprehensive free trade agreements
are very cautious with regard to the application of EU Law. For example, Article
8.31 para. 2 CETA provides that an investment tribunal does not have jurisdiction to
determine the legality of a measure under domestic (including EU) law. Domestic
law may only be relevant as a question of fact and interpretations of domestic law by
investment tribunals have no binding effect on state courts and institutions of the
contracting party.26
387Accordingly, it seems appropriate to also include a provision on the applicable
substantive law in an MIC Statute, which essentially limits the standards of protec-
tion to those of the applicable treaties. Such a provision could also stipulate whether
and, if yes, under which circumstances an MIC can exercise jurisdiction over
breaches of investor-state contracts (see para. 214 et seq.).
5.1.2 Uniform Interpretation of Standards of Protection
388It is evident that a uniform interpretation of investment protection standards can best
be achieved on the basis of uniform treaty texts. Therefore, the optimal condition for
a homogeneous interpretation would be the existence of a single multilateral invest-
ment treaty. However, it is also clear from today’s perspective and after the expe-
rience with the failure of a multilateral investment agreement in the 1990s that a
multilateral investment treaty is currently politically impossible.27 Rather, the appli-
cation of the existing and future IIAs needs to be considered. According to estimates
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), there is a
the roles undertaken by the ECJ as the arbiter and gate-keeper of EU law comprising, in the words of
ECJ Opinion 1/09, “the fundamental elements of the legal order and judicial system of the EU”
(paragraph 54). However, these important features do not arise in the present case. [. . .] Although
the Tribunal is required in this arbitration to interpret the European Commission’s Final Decision of
4 June 2008, and in that sense, to apply EU law to the Parties’ dispute, the Tribunal is not required to
adjudicate here upon the validity of that decision [. . .]. That adjudication remains a decision for the
EU courts alone [. . .].”
26Article 8.31 para. 2 CETA: “The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of a
measure, alleged to constitute a breach of this Agreement, under the domestic law of a Party. For
greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a measure with this Agreement, the Tribunal
may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of a Party as a matter of fact. In doing so, the
Tribunal shall follow the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts or
authorities of that Party and any meaning given to domestic law by the Tribunal shall not be
binding upon the courts or the authorities of that Party.” On this point CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of
30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 131 et seqq.
27Zuleta (2015), p. 405; Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 10 et seq.; Salacuse (2013), p. 354.
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considerable legal body of approximately 3000 bilateral and multilateral treaties
(especially IIAs and trade agreements with investment chapters).28
389 Although these treaties contain to a large extent similar provisions on substantive
standards of protection,29 those provisions are often formulated in a significantly
more detailed manner in the more recent agreements compared to those in the first
generations of IIAs.30 In this context, we are faced with rather standardised pro-
visions on compensation for direct and indirect expropriations, FET, full protection
and security and non-discrimination in the “older” treaties from the 1960s to 1990s
and subsequently with a series of agreements that do not always consistently regulate
the various standards of protection in much greater detail.
390 This results in treaty-based limitations on a possible uniform interpretation of
investment protection standards. As far as the wording of applicable substantive
standards of protection clearly diverge, these textual differences must be taken into
account in accordance with the generally accepted principles of treaty interpretation
codified in the VCLT.31
391 Nevertheless, as evidenced by previous practice of investment arbitration, indi-
vidual arbitral tribunals are able and willing to interpret and harmonise divergent
provisions (see para. 394).
392 In addition, there are also procedural steps that contribute to a harmonious
interpretation and which could be incorporated in an MIC Statute. This would
primarily include the permanence of treaty interpreters (as opposed to ad-hoc
arbitrators) inherent in a permanent court as well as an explicit, harmonious inter-
pretation mandate.
5.1.2.1 Permanency of the Treaty Interpreters at the MIC
393 As the various interpretations of investment protection standards referred to above
are not only owed to the fact of ‘objectively’ diverse treaty wording, but can
sometimes also be attributed to the different treaty interpreters. A ‘standardisation’
among the treaty interpreters would be another important step towards the desired
result.32
394 Already in the previous practice of investment arbitration, similar rudimentary
steps were made; for example, by the formal consolidation of individual
282353 BITs in force and 313 agreements in force with investment provisions. Division on Investment
and Enterprise, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements.
29They are often based on comparable national standard investment protection contracts, that, in
turn, are based on OECD standards. Cf. Vandevelde (2010), p. 57; Brown (2015), p. 182; De
Brabandere (2014), p. 25.
30Brown (2015), p. 183.
31Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23.5.1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
32Marceddu (2016), p. 44.
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proceedings33 or by the appointment of the same arbitrators in different but related
proceedings34 in order to avoid divergences in interpretation as much as possible.
395In fact, the repeated reappointment of certain arbitrators in different arbitration
proceedings resulted in a certain permanence of adjudicators, which may have
contributed to a more uniform interpretation of treaty provisions.35 176 out of the
total of 361 existing arbitrator posts in proceedings between 1972 and 2006 were
occupied by the same 43 arbitrators.36 This trend has intensified in recent years and
led to the development of shared legal views, which has resulted in an increased
consistency of decisions.37
396This standardising function can undoubtedly be strengthened by the establish-
ment of an MIC, which would establish a single institution to decide on the
interpretation and application of treaty standards instead of different ad hoc arbitral
tribunals.38
33Cf. examples from the past “de facto consolidation”: Kurtz (2014), pp. 257, 271; Kaufmann-
Kohler et al. (2006), p. 74.
34Cf. e.g. the composition of the tribunals in Sempra and CMS (CMS Gas Transmission Company
v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12.5.2005): Francisco Orrego
Vicuna has served as President and Marc Lalonde as member of both tribunals. In general, the
decisions are identical, the tribunal in Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 28.9.2007, para. 346 finds that: “While two arbitrators sitting
in the present case were also members of the tribunal in the CMS case the matter has been examined
anew.” Cf. additionally more critical Burke-White (2010), p. 425 et seq.; Dugan et al. (2008), p. 89
et seq.
35Commission (2007), p. 136: “The question as to whether or not ad hoc tribunals with ever-
changing members can truly create precedent, and a distinct jurisprudence, is not a new one. As to
investment treaty decisions and awards emanating from ICSID tribunals, however, the tribunal
members are no longer ever-changing. Put simply, their backgrounds, qualifications, experiences in
international law and their regular interactions, both professionally and otherwise, have contributed
to the development of an esprit de corps amongst ICSID and other investment treaty arbitrators.”
Cf. regarding the previous common practice of numerous reappointments of certain arbitrators
Shihata and Parra (1999), p. 311.
36Commission (2007), p. 141; Fontoura Costa (2011), p. 11: “For instance, group of only 12 arbi-
trators (4.4%) of the ICSID population accounts for about a quarter of nominations [. . .] the
12 people (first quartile) who account for over a quarter of the ICSID nominations are present in
60% of the tribunals, i.e. in 158 out of 263 tribunals. In other words, the group of more frequent
arbitrators spreads their influence not only on a quarter of tribunals, but well over half of them.”
37Commission (2007), p. 141.
38Cf. the statements on the influence of the presence of permanent judges (as opposed to ad-hoc) on
harmonised decisions on the occasion of the establishment of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ), the predecessor of the International Court of Justice. Procès-Verbaux of
the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, Annex No. 1, 695 (1920): “In the Court of
Arbitration, there is no permanent tie between the sitting judges, and consequently, no esprit de
corps nor progressive continuity in jurisprudence; on the other hand, the Court of International
Justice, being composed of judges, permanently associated with each other in the same work, and,
except in rare cases, retaining their seats from one case to another, can develop a continuous
tradition, and assure the harmonious and logical development of International Law.”
5.1 Applicable Substantive Law 125
397 It can be expected that the interpretation of identical or similar investment
protection standards by the same group or a small group of persons who decide in
a similar composition will lead to a greater degree of consistency and coherence, as
should be the case with the proposed MIC.
5.1.2.2 Harmonising Interpretation Mandate
398 A further possibility to achieve a higher degree of uniformity in the interpretation of
identical or similar investment protection standards would be to emphasize the need
for the most uniform possible interpretation of the applicable provisions by the MIC.
399 Other dispute settlement systems also feature comparable “interpretation man-
dates” for treaty users and treaty interpreters. For example, the WTO DSU stipulates
that the WTO Dispute Settlement System is primarily intended to serve legal
certainty and predictability, and explicitly states that it should be oriented towards
the international customary principles of interpretation of international treaties and
must abstain from “legislative” interpretation.39 The background of the latter skep-
ticism towards overly activist interpretations by WTO Panels and the Appellate
Body has been a concern that Member States may have had in the often far-reaching
interpretative practice of GATT Panels.40 However, it seems essential that the WTO
Dispute Settlement System comprises a provision which contains a precise interpre-
tative directive.41
400 Similarly, it seems practical not only to instruct the MIC to observe international
customary principles of interpretation of international treaties, but also the most
harmonising possible interpretation of investment protection standards which are not
formulated in a completely identical manner. Such an interpretative mandate could,
for example, be achieved by an emphasis on the systematic interpretation already
mentioned in the VCLT and also known in investment arbitration practice in
accordance with Article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT.42 Alternatively, one could also
39Article 3.2 DSU: “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves
to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”
40Jackson (1998), p. 342.
41Van Damme (2010), p. 606 et seq.
42Article 31 VCLT: “(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose. [. . .] (3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context (a) any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties.” Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15.4.2009, para. 78: “It is evident to the Tribunal that the same holds true in
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choose a wording according to which the interpretation of the applicable investment
standards by the MIC would be oriented towards the principles of consistency and
coherence.
5.1.3 Ensuring a Neutral and Objective Interpretation
of Standards of Protection
401A separate problem of interpretation is the question as to how to prevent investment
treaty standards agreed upon by the parties from being interpreted as too investor- or
too state-friendly. The previous debate above was about the concern of a too
investor-friendly interpretation of the standards of protection contained in IIAs and
other treaties by investment arbitral tribunals which has given rise to various
considerations for a “change of course”.
402The proposals ranged from specifying and limiting investment standards to
establishing corrective measures by the parties to the treaties e.g. authentic treaty
interpretations or even proposals to establish an MIC to eliminate the influence of
arbitrators appointed by the investors.
403Similar to the issue of uniformity, in the interpretation of investment standards,
this is also a question of interpretation, but at the same time involves weighing
conflicting interests in interpretation.43 Therefore, it appears particularly necessary
to consider the integrity of the interpretation and decision-making process by
an MIC.
5.1.3.1 Clarification and Limitation of Investment Protection Standards
in Investment Agreements
404An unproblematic response to an interpretation practice of arbitral tribunals which is
perceived to be too investor-friendly would be the correction and revision of
investment protection standards in the applicable agreements. In fact, not only the
international investment law and that the ICSID Convention’s jurisdictional requirements – as well
as those of the BIT – cannot be read and interpreted in isolation from public international law, and
its general principles.”; Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16,
Award, 8.11.2010, para. 233: “The Tribunal will apply the provisions of the UABIT and interpret
the UABIT in a manner consistent with customary international law.” See for the systemic
interpretation also Hofmann and Tams (2011), p. 53; McLachlan (2005), p. 279.
43El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27.4.2006, para. 70:
“This Tribunal considers that a balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both State
sovereignty and the State’s responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the
development of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its
continuing flow.” Weeramantry (2012), p. 193.
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CETA and TTIP texts but also a number of other recent investment agreements have
clearly included provisions aimed at restricting investor rights.44
405 This can be well illustrated by the provisions on indirect expropriation. Whereas
in the original “first generation” IIAs, direct and indirect expropriations were
generally treated as equal and therefore in principle triggered an obligation to
provide compensation,45 in the practice of investment tribunals46 and at the same
time in the practice of treaty drafting, it has become accepted that non-discriminatory
state measures adopted for a public purpose, e.g. health or environmental protection
or for general public safety, cannot in principle be considered as measures tanta-
mount to expropriation.47
406 Comparable textual limitations48 of investor rights can also be found in other
standards of protection. For example, the CETA text provides for a far-reaching
curtailment of the standard of FET by defining only extreme violations of the
elements of FET identified in previous practice of investment tribunals as CETA
violations.49 Similarly, the CETA text adopts the standards of full protection and
44See on this also CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 155 et seqq.
45Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 101 et seq.; Vandevelde (2010), p. 285 et seq.: “Like the [first]
German BITs, the Abs-Shawcross Convention also explicitly recognized the distinction between a
direct and an indirect expropriation. [. . .] The concept of an indirect expropriation in these early
instruments quickly gained recognition in general BIT practice.” See e.g. Article 7 Switzerland-
Guinea BIT 1962: “Falls eine Vertragspartei Vermögenswerte, Rechte oder Interessen von
Staatsangehörigen [. . .] enteignet oder verstaatlicht oder gegen diese Staatsangehörigen, Stiftungen,
Vereinigungen oder Gesellschaften irgendeine andere Massnahme der direkten oder indirekten
Besitzentziehung ergreift.”Article 3 Netherlands-Tunisia BIT 1965: “Where one Party expropriates
or nationalizes property, rights or interests [. . .] or takes any measure which results directly or
indirectly in the dispossession of such nationals or corporations [. . .].” Similarly also Article
3 BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union)-Tunisia BIT 1964.
46Cf. Methanex v. USA, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3.8.2005, Part IV, D., para. 7: “[. . .]
as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which
is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or
investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been
given by the regulating government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment
that the government would refrain from such regulation.”; Saluka Investments BV (The Nether-
lands) v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17.3.2006, para. 262: “[. . .] the principle that a State
does not commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien
investor when it adopts general regulations that are “commonly accepted as within the police power
of States” forms part of customary international law today.”
47See e.g. Annex B(4) 2012 US Model BIT; Annex B.13(1) 2004 Canada Model FIPA; Annex 8-A
(3) CETA: “For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the impact of a measure or
series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive,
non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.”
48See on this also CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 156 et seqq.
49See e.g. Article 8.10 para. 2 CETA: “A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable
treatment referenced in paragraph 1 if a measure or series of measures constitutes: (a) denial of
justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; (b) fundamental breach of due process,
128 5 Applicable Law
security by being expressly restricted to protection against physical threats by third
parties.50
407As the wording of a provision is the starting point of treaty interpretation51 under
the VCLT rules,52 such prospective limitation of investors’ rights seems to be the
safest and least problematic way of preventing individual standards from being
interpreted in a too investor-friendly manner at the expense of host states. At most,
however, an excessive limitation53 could result in investors finding the protection
granted inadequate and they may therefore possibly turn to alternative methods of
dispute settlement.54 This could range from a reactivation of diplomatic protection
(which could be accompanied by a politicisation of the disputes),55 the increased
conclusion of investment contracts between investors and states including their own
separate arbitration clauses, to the strategic planning of investments via states that
have a higher level of protection due to existing IIAs.
408Such a redirecting effect would certainly be counterproductive with regard to the
objective of uniform and consistent interpretation of investment protection stan-
dards. However, insofar as the respective agreements find a balance between the
including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings;
(c) manifest arbitrariness; (d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as
gender, race or religious belief; (e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and
harassment; or (f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation
adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.”
50See e.g. Article 8.10 para. 5 CETA: “For greater certainty, “full protection and security” refers to
the Party’s obligations relating to the physical security of investors and covered investments.”
51Cf. the comments of the ILC to Article 31 VCLT, in ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties
with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, p. 220: “The
article as already indicated is based on the view that the text must be presumed to be the authentic
expression of the intentions of the parties; and that, in consequence, the starting point of interpre-
tation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of
the parties.” See also Methanex v. USA, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3.8.2005, Part II, B,
para. 22: “[. . .] the approach of the Vienna Convention is that the text of the treaty is deemed to be
the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties.” Wintershall v. Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/14, Award, 8.12.2008, para. 78: “The carefully-worded formulation in Article 31 is
based on the view that the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intention of
the parties. The starting point of all treaty-interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text,
not an independent investigation into the intention of the parties from other sources (such as by
reference to the travaux preparatoires, or any predilections based on presumed intention.”
52Article 31 para. 1 VCLT: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.”
53Newcombe (2013), p. 23; Alvarez (2011), p. 235; Tan and Bouchenaki (2015), p. 253 et seq.;
Levesque and Newcombe (2013), p. 40.
54Ryan (2008), p. 761: “That means that all participants will be required to adjust their expectations
if the system is to flourish. The United States is attempting to more clearly define the scope of
protections accorded to investors through changes to its Model BIT. In doing so, it has arguably
narrowed the scope of protections available to investors. Investors, in turn, may be required to adjust
their expectations in such a way that will allow them to operate in the changing legal environment.”
55Schreuer (2015), p. 881 et seq.
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legitimate interests of host states and investors, a clarification of the standards of
protection not only seems to be unproblematic, but even practical in order to provide
the treaty interpreter, i.e. a future MIC, with a more detailed decision-making basis.
5.1.3.2 Limiting the Mandate for Interpretation
409 It should also be considered whether the MIC should be instructed with specific
interpretative maxims. For example, it would be conceivable to clarify in the
respective text of the treaty, in the preamble or in the annexes, that the investment
protection standards are to be interpreted neutrally and objectively, or that specific
interpretative variants could be agreed as binding. The more recent practice of
interpreting the scope of the standard of FET and full protection and security or
clarification of what should not be regarded as indirect expropriation provides useful
examples (see para. 406). Since they are already provided for in the applicable
treaties, investors cannot claim being confronted with an unexpected interpretation.
410 As an alternative to incorporating them in the applicable IIAs, one could consider
whether comparable interpretation directives could be included in an instrument that
governs the functioning of an MIC.
411 In this case, it may be necessary to differentiate whether a particular interpretation
is within the scope of what the original text envisages or goes beyond it. This will be
the case if, for example, the clarification of the individual elements of the FET
standard contained in CETA is based on established principles of the previous
interpretation by investment tribunals56; however, with regard to the subsidiary
protection of legitimate expectations57 and the total lack of any stability and pre-
dictability, this may be considered questionable.58
412 More problematic than the clarification of the content of the investment protection
standards in the applicable IIAs or the establishment of certain interpretation maxims
therein (or in a general instrument for the functioning of the MIC) are two additional
methods of interpretation in the context of correcting an investor-friendly ruling:
56Cf. Article 8.10 para. 2 CETA: “A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment
referenced in paragraph 1 if a measure or series of measures constitutes: (a) denial of justice in
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; (b) fundamental breach of due process, including a
fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings; (c) manifest
arbitrariness; (d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or
religious belief; (e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or (f) a
breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation adopted by the Parties
in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.”
57Cf. Article 8.10 para. 4 CETA: “When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation,
the Tribunal may take into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to
induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor
relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that the Party subsequently
frustrated.”
58Cf. Kriebaum (2014), p. 482.
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so-called authentic interpretation by the parties to the agreement and the appoint-
ment of state-friendly judges as treaty-interpreters.
5.1.3.3 Authentic Interpretation by the Parties
413A number of IIAs already provide that the Contracting Parties should be able to
interpret individual treaty provisions as binding, in addition to the dispute settlement
institution designated for “routine” interpretation and application of such treaties.59
In other words, the MIC (superseding the previous arbitral tribunals) and the parties
to the IIA would in principle be entitled to interpret an IIA. The MIC Statute could
therefore clarify (within the provision on the applicable law) that the MIC must take
into account interpretative statements of the parties to the applicable IIA. However,
the Plenary Body of the MIC cannot be given jurisdiction for the interpretation of
bilateral IIAs, at best it could have jurisdiction for interpreting the MIC Statute.
414As the rare invocation of such interpretative competence has shown, it is espe-
cially used as a corrective measure against overly investment-friendly interpretations
by arbitral tribunals. A clear example is provided by the interpretation of FET by the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Free Trade Commission, which
stated that the FET standard provided for in Chapter 11 (the investment chapter of
the NAFTA) does not go beyond the minimum standard of treatment under custom-
ary international law.60
415To the extent that such interpretations are within the scope of the respective
investment protection standard and do not go beyond that,61 i.e. modify the treaty,
59Cf. Article 30 para. 3 USModel BIT 2012: “A joint decision of the Parties, each acting through its
representative designated for purposes of this Article, declaring their interpretation of a provision of
this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be
consistent with that joint decision.” Article 31 US Model BIT 2012: “Where a respondent asserts as
a defense that the measure alleged to be a breach is within the scope of an entry set out in Annex I,
II, or III, the tribunal shall, on request of the respondent, request the interpretation of the Parties on
the issue. [. . .] 2. A joint decision issued under paragraph 1 by the Parties, each acting through its
representative designated for purposes of this Article, shall be binding on the tribunal, and any
decision or award issued by the tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision. If the Parties fail
to issue such a decision within 90 days, the tribunal shall decide the issue.” Article 1131 para.
2 NAFTA: “An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding
on a Tribunal established under this Section.”
60NAFTA Free Trade Commission Clarifications Related to NAFTA Chapter 11, Decisions of
31.7.2001, www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/chap11interp.pdf: “B.1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of
treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 2. The concepts of “fair and
equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or
beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens.”
61Cf. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, 31.5.2002, para. 47: “[w]ere
the tribunal required to make a determination whether the commission’s action is an interpretation
or an amendment, it would choose the latter.”
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and to the extent that it is prospectively applicable, such “authentic” interpretations
by the contracting parties appear to be a legitimate instrument to help them assert
their will.62
416 However, it seems problematic to provide the contracting state parties with such
extensive interpretative competence that they could help their legal position to a
breakthrough in ongoing proceedings.63 This would not only be contrary to the
principle that no one may be a judge in his own case (in causa sua nemo iudex sit),
but also contrary to fundamental rule of law requirements for a fair trial.64 It would
therefore be particularly important to note that any “authentic” interpretation by the
parties to the agreement, even if made in response to an interpretation by the MIC or
another dispute settlement body, must not have an effect on any pending
proceedings.65
5.1.3.4 Composition of the MIC: Impartial and Independent Judges
417 Another means of ensuring neutral and independent interpretations of the investment
protection standards appears to be already implicitly included in the plans to
establish an MIC. The appointment of judges to an MIC is intended to prevent
arbitrators who are too investor-friendly from interpreting the standards of protection
in favour of the investors, not only in individual cases, but on a permanent basis.
418 In traditional arbitration, the influence of party-appointed arbitrators is
counterbalanced by the presiding third arbitrator.66 In addition, rules governing the
independence and impartiality of persons appointed as arbitrators should prevent an
62Roberts (2010), pp. 179–225; Ewing-Chow and Losari (2015), p. 103; Dolzer and Schreuer
(2012), p. 33.
63Kaufmann-Kohler (2011), pp. 181–183.
64Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8.2.2005, para. 149;
Ishikawa (2015), p. 141; UNCTAD (2011), p. 4.
65See in this regard CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 237.
A potential risk of breaching certain procedural minimum guarantees in the sense of due process
could be avoided, if there would be a mechanism of consultations in advance to a procedure. One
possibility would be the establishment of a state-to-state mechanism of consultations that would
enable an interpretative dialogue between the arise of a dispute and the beginning of the dispute
settlement procedure. Cf. Ishikawa (2015), p. 145.
66Carbonneau (2003), p. 1211: “The tradition in prior practice had been to require only that the
presiding arbitrator (the “neutral” arbitrator) be fully impartial. There was an expectation that party-
designated arbitrators would be sympathetic to the position of the appointing party and would favor
that position in the deliberations.”; Franck (2009), p. 443 et seq.: “All arbitrators are generally
required to be impartial and to contribute to the adjudicatory outcome. Nevertheless, the presiding
arbitrator performs a different role than the party-appointed arbitrator and his or her appointment is a
matter of vital importance. The presiding arbitrator can “influence the style of an international
arbitration” and make critical procedural decisions. Some suggest that presiding arbitrators resolve
disputes between party-appointed arbitrators and, in some cases, become the ultimate decision
makers.” Böckstiegel (2003), p. 371.
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undue influence of investors or states on the tribunal.67 As explained above (see para.
133 et seq.), this should be regulated primarily by a corresponding Code of Conduct
of an MIC, with the option of incorporating the already very nuanced and widely
used IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration.68
419If the judicial decision-makers are appointed solely by one or more state parties,
this could not only call the arbitral nature of this form of dispute settlement (see para.
518) into question, but also raise doubts about the independence and impartiality of
the judges appointed exclusively by the potential respondent states. Indeed, this
could be rebutted by the fact that states not only protect their own interests as
potential respondent host states against foreign investors, but at the same time
protect the interests of their investors abroad. Thus, they have an interest in a
balanced appointment of the members of the MIC. However, even these consider-
ations cannot change the fact that the selection of the MIC Members would lie
exclusively in the hands of the state parties.69
420Therefore, it would be important to minimise other factors beyond the appoint-
ment to the judicial office which could affect the impartiality of the individual
decision-makers as far as possible (for details on the impartiality and independence
of the judges, see para. 130 et seq.).
421As stated above, terms of office should be as long as possible and either no or only
a one-time re-election should be envisaged (see para. 155 et seq.). The exclusion or
restriction of re-election is often considered as the main instrument to prevent a
potential dependency of judicial decision-makers on the electing states. In addition,
the exclusion of persons who could have a close relationship to potential parties to
the dispute should also be considered. In specific terms, this could not only mean
excluding government officials and party representatives of investors, as stated in
CETA,70 but also persons who have held certain political or administrative offices in
states’ or EU institutions in the past.
67Cf. Article 6(7) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010: “independent and impartial arbitrator”;
Article 14 para. 1 ICSID Convention: “Persons [. . .] of high moral character and recognized
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise
independent judgment.” Article 18 para. 1 SCC Arbitration Rules 2017: “Every arbitrator must be
impartial and independent. [. . .].” Article 10.1 London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)
Arbitration Rules 2014: “The LCIA Court may revoke any arbitrator’s appointment upon its own
initiative, at the written request of all other members of the Arbitral Tribunal or upon a written
challenge by any party if: [. . .] (iii) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to that
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.” Article 10 para. 1 Singapore International Arbitration
Centre (SIAC) Investment Arbitration Rules 2017: “Any arbitrator appointed in an arbitration under
these Rules, whether or not nominated by the Parties, shall be and remain at all times independent
and impartial. [. . .].” Poudret and Besson (2007), p. 346 et seq.; Lawson (2005), p. 22;
Dimitropoulos (2016), p. 415 (proposed standards for the investment arbitration).
68IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Resolution of the Interna-
tional Bar Association Council of 23.10.2014. Wuschka (2016), p. 165.
69Sandrock (2015), p. 627.
70Article 8.30 para. 1 CETA: “The Members of the Tribunal shall be independent. They shall not be
affiliated with any government. They shall not take instructions from any organisation, or
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422 The current decentralised system of investment dispute settlement by ad hoc arbitral
tribunals based on IIAs generally provides for various alternatives. Thus, it is usually
at the investors’ discretion whether to initiate proceedings under the rules of the
ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (possibly administered by the PCA), or under the
arbitration rules of various institutions (such as International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), SCC, London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) etc.).
423 These arbitration rules mostly do not differ significantly with regard to the core
aspects of the proceeding. However, it should be noted that only the ICSID Arbi-
tration Rules and the ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules apply specifically
to investment arbitration proceedings, while the other arbitration rules—except for
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitra-
tion71—are also used in commercial arbitration.
424 Since in all these procedural rules the actual proceeding is regulated very
rudimentarily and informally, only small differences arise. The core of all these
arbitration rules is party autonomy and respect for the mutual right to be heard.72
government with regard to matters related to the dispute. They shall not participate in the consid-
eration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest. They shall comply
with the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitra-
tion or any supplemental rules adopted pursuant to Article 8.44.2. In addition, upon appointment,
they shall refrain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any pending or
new investment dispute under this or any other international agreement.” This so called “German
professors-clause” shall clarify that university professors, in countries where the universities are
state-financed, are not excluded. See on this also CJEU, Opinion 1/17 of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:
C:2019:341, para. 240.
71UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, in force since
1.4.2014.
72Article 17 para. 1 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: “Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal
may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are
treated with equality and that at an appropriate stage of the proceedings each party is given a
reasonable opportunity of presenting its case. The arbitral tribunal, in exercising its discretion, shall
conduct the proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary delay and expense and to provide a fair and
efficient process for resolving the parties’ dispute.” Article 22 ICC Arbitration Rules 2017: “(2) In
order to ensure effective case management, the arbitral tribunal, after consulting the parties, may
adopt such procedural measures as it considers appropriate, provided that they are not contrary to
any agreement of the parties. [. . .] (4) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall act fairly and impartially
and ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its case.” The right to be heard
before the court is also reflected in the following articles of the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006:
Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 987: “The principle that both sides must be heard on all issues affecting
their legal 305 position is one of the most basic concepts of fairness in adversarial proceedings. [. . .]
It is reflected throughout the ICSID Arbitration Rules (see esp. Rules 20, 21, 27, 31, 32, 37, 39, 40,
41, 42, 44, 49, 50, 54, 55).”; Petrochilos (2004), p. 254: “By ineluctable inference from the
reference in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention to ‘fundamental’ procedural rules, an ICSID
tribunal must respect the minimum standards of due process, namely the equality of the parties and
the right to be heard.” Cf. Blackaby et al. (2009), para. 6.11 et seq.; Wälde (2011).
134 5 Applicable Law
425Therefore, in practice, the choice between the various arbitration rules is primar-
ily based on the different enforcement mechanisms between the ICSID arbitral
awards that provide for a separate enforcement mechanism under the ICSID Con-
vention and arbitral awards under other procedural rules, which are generally
governed by the New York Convention (see para. 483). In addition, the special
rules on jurisdiction of the ICSID Convention73 and its annulment system74 also
influence the choice of procedure.75 Investors who have doubts as to whether their
investments comply with the so-called Salini criteria of “investment” developed in
ICSID arbitration practice or the nationality criteria set out in Article 25 ICSID
Convention, or investors wishing to avoid the potential procedural delay caused by
the possibility of annulment under the ICSID Convention may therefore rather opt
for UNICTRAL rules based arbitration or other non-ICSID arbitration proceedings.
426The fundamental question is primarily whether the current system of adopting
existing rules of procedure should be maintained or whether separate rules of
procedure should be provided for. The MIC Rules of Procedure could already be
directly integrated into the MIC Statute or adopted by the Plenary Body as secondary
rules specifying the MIC Statute (see para. 107).
427This fundamental question depends on several factors: enforceability of awards,
special procedural requirements such as transparency, efficiency (in particular cost
efficiency but also reduction of the length of proceedings etc.), avoidance of abusive
procedures etc.
428The realisation of these objectives should partly be achieved by adopting existing
rules of procedure and partly by creating own rules of procedure.
73Article 25 ICSID Convention: “(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When
the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. (2) “National of
another Contracting State” means: (a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting
State other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit
such dispute to conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered
pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any
person who on either date also had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute; and
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to
the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or
arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the
dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated
as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.”
74Article 52 para. 1 ICSID Convention: “Either party may request annulment of the award by an
application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its
powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been
a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the
reasons on which it is based.”
75Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 241.
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429 As will be explained in more detail below (see para. 484 et seq.), ICSID arbitral
awards are subject to a particularly efficient enforcement mechanism according to
which all (currently 163)76 parties to the ICSID Convention have in principle the
duty to enforce the awards as if it were a final judgment of their own national court,
whereby only the principles of state immunity in enforcement proceedings may
constitute an admissible objection. Similarly efficient is the enforcement of arbitral
awards governed by the New York Convention in all its (currently 160)77 members.
However, there are additional grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement of
awards under the New York Convention. A precondition for the applicability of the
enforcement mechanisms of increased effectiveness under the two named conven-
tions is that the resulting decisions can be regarded as ICSID arbitral awards or as
arbitral awards within the meaning of the New York Convention (see para. 480).
430 Whether decisions of the MIC can be regarded as ICSID arbitral awards or as
arbitral awards within the meaning of the New York Convention is not only
fundamentally problematic, but it also depends on the extent to which they are
based on a procedure consistent with the ICSID Rules of Procedure or rules of
procedure that satisfy the requirements of the New York Convention (see para. 480).
431 A series of measures/rules aimed at more efficient procedures which ultimately
move away from the principle of party autonomy prevailing in arbitration towards a
stronger concentration of the judicial process could run counter to this objective.
Nevertheless, these should be discussed in detail in the context of a comprehensive
reform of investment dispute settlement as is planned within the MIC.
5.2.1 Transparency
432 Principles of transparency have recently been the subject of various discussions and
reform plans within arbitration. Under the aspect of transparency, the issues of
publication of documents, the participation of third parties interested in the pro-
ceedings as well as public access to hearings are generally included. Transparency is
seen as an expression of fundamental rule of law requirements. In order to ensure the
simple application of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules without having to rene-
gotiate all existing investment agreements, the UN General Assembly adopted the
Mauritius Convention78 at the end of 2014.
76As of 01.08.2019.
77As of 01.08.2019.
78United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, A/RES/
69/116 of 10.12.2014.
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433Transparency is dealt with differently in the various investment dispute settlement
mechanisms: on the one hand, there are divergences regarding the definition of a
general obligation, either of confidentiality or transparency.79 On the other hand,
there are differences in the implementation of presumed transparency.80
434Using the transparency obligations enshrined in the 2013 UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency81 as a potential standard for an MIC is largely undisputed. As a result
of many years of negotiation, they constitute a stable set of rules and cater to the
specific needs of proceedings between states and investors as a tailored set of rules
which can significantly promote transparency in investment arbitration.82
435In the context of the MIC, it would therefore make sense to incorporate the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency into the constituent instrument following the
example of CETA.83 Above all, this would avoid the problem of application that
79Cf. Article 28 para. 3 Norway Model BIT 2007, Draft version 191207: “All awards and
substantive decisions of the Tribunal shall be made publicly available.”
80Cf. the opportunity not to publish decisions under ICSID and the Secretariat’s obligation to
publish excerpts of the legal reasoning of the tribunal: Article 48 para. 5 ICSID Convention: “The
Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties” and Article 48 para. 4 ICSID
Arbitration Rules: “The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. The
Centre shall, however, promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the
Tribunal” or the rules on transparency in Article 29 para. 1 US Model BIT 2012 concerning the
publication of process documents: “the respondent shall, after receiving the following documents,
promptly transmit them to the non-disputing Party and make them available to the public: (a) the
notice of intent; (b) the notice of arbitration; (c) pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the
tribunal by a disputing party and any written submissions submitted pursuant to Article 28
(2) [Non-Disputing Party submissions] and (3) [Amicus Submissions] and Article 33 [Consolida-
tion]; (d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where available; and (e) orders, awards,
and decisions of the tribunal”, as well as Article 29 para. 2 concerning the publicity of hearings:
“The tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public and shall determine, in consultation with the
disputing parties, the appropriate logistical arrangements. However, any disputing party that intends
to use information designated as protected information in a hearing shall so advise the tribunal. The
tribunal shall make appropriate arrangements to protect the information from disclosure.” Ortino
(2013), p. 121.
81United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauri-
tius Convention on Transparency), concluded the 10.12.2014 and entered into force the 18.10.2017.
82Loken (2013), pp. 1302–1303; Alvarado Garzón (2019), p. 491.
83Article 8.36 CETA: “(1) The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, as modified by this Chapter, shall
apply in connection with proceedings under this Section. (2) The request for consultations, the
notice requesting a determination of the respondent, the notice of determination of the respondent,
the agreement to mediate, the notice of intent to challenge a Member of the Tribunal, the decision on
challenge to a Member of the Tribunal and the request for consolidation shall be included in the list
of documents to be made available to the public under Article 3(1) of the UNCITRAL Transparency
Rules. (3) Exhibits shall be included in the list of documents to be made available to the public
under Article 3(2) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. (4) Notwithstanding Article 2 of the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, Canada or the European
Union as the case may be shall make publicly available in a timely manner relevant documents
pursuant to paragraph 2, subject to the redaction of confidential or protected information. Such
documents may be made publicly available by communication to the repository. (5) Hearings shall
be open to the public. The Tribunal shall determine, in consultation with the disputing parties, the
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arose with regard to IIAs concluded before 1 April 2014 in relation to the
UNCITRAL Rules. This issue had to be solved by a special multilateral instrument
(Mauritius Convention).84
436 Specifically, it has to be noted that the debate in the area of a transparent
investment dispute settlement system focuses on the following issues: access to
information concerning the initiation of proceedings, public access to hearings, the
possibility for third parties to participate in proceedings as well as the publication of
procedural documents, in particular of the final award.85
437 As already stated above, the statement of claim should be published on the MIC
website after the submission of a claim. The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules also
provide that all documents related to the dispute must be published. The entire award
and all relevant procedural documents such as the parties’ written pleadings, records
of hearings and decisions would have to be published according to the Mauritius
Convention (Article 3).
438 Under the aspect of transparency the participation of “interested third parties” has
often been discussed in the past.86 The guarantee of procedural participation rights of
interested parties also serves as “minority protection” in a broader sense; in any case,
those affected by a decision should also have a right to participate in the proceedings
leading to the decision in question. For example, according to the CETA guidelines,
amicus curiae briefs should generally be allowed. Pursuant to the UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules, the arbitral tribunal has the discretion to allow amicus curiae
briefs (Article 4). The participation of third parties has now also been comprehen-
sively regulated in the various transparency chapters.87
439 Pursuant to the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, oral hearings should also in
principle be public, unless that proves to be logistically impossible (Article 6).
440 In particular, transparency through the publication of documents and the conduct
of oral hearings open to the public should in principle be under the caveat that
business and trade secrets are treated in a confidential manner and that no respondent
should have to disclose information concerning its confidential interests (Article 7).
It should also be ensured that the “integrity” of the procedure is not impaired by
transparency, for example by impeding the taking of evidence, intimidating wit-
nesses, party representatives or arbitrators.
appropriate logistical arrangements to facilitate public access to such hearings. If the Tribunal
determines that there is a need to protect confidential or protected information, it shall make the
appropriate arrangements to hold in private that part of the hearing requiring such protection.
(6) Nothing in this Chapter requires a respondent to withhold from the public information required
to be disclosed by its laws. The respondent should apply those laws in a manner sensitive to
protecting from disclosure information that has been designated as confidential or protected
information.”
84Ortino (2013), p. 126.
85Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), p. 286.
86Cf. e.g. Böckstiegel et al. (2005), Brekoulakis (2010) and Ruthemeyer (2014).
87Cf. e.g. Article 4 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.
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5.2.2 Efficiency
441At present, arbitration proceedings last on an average for 3 years and 8 months.88 For
the effectiveness and acceptance of the new system, limitations should be provided
for the duration of the proceedings. Thus, in addition to being susceptible to soaring
costs, the existing system is often criticised for the excessive duration of the pro-
ceedings.89 A shortening of the length of the proceedings would automatically lead
to a reduction of the total costs.90
442In traditional arbitration, it is partly up to the arbitral tribunals to ensure the
efficient conduct of the proceedings; however, the concrete procedural organisation
remains mostly at the disposition of the parties. The time-efficient and cost-effective
completion of a procedure can thus be rendered more difficult by the obligation of
the tribunal to decide on all submissions of the parties as explicitly laid down in the
respective dispute settlement instruments.91
443In practice, it is above all the right to be heard that usually causes the arbitral
tribunal to admit submissions by the parties,92 even if they have a delaying effect on
the proceedings, since otherwise they are subject to the risk of annulment.93
444Here, a stronger conduct of proceedings by the MIC could provide a meaningful
remedy. Where appropriate, it should be noted that in terms of cost and time
efficiency, procedural decrees taken by the MIC are not, as a rule, to be considered
as limitations on the due process of law.
88European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (2014), p. 8; Hodgson (2014).
89Schill (2015), p. 3.
90Schill (2015), p. 9.
91Cf. Article 48 para. 3 ICSID Convention: “The award shall deal with every question submitted to
the Tribunal, and shall state the reasons upon which it is based.” Article 46 ICSID Convention:
“Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a party, determine any
incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the
dispute provided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within
the jurisdiction of the Centre.”
92Article 17 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: “The Arbitral Tribunal, in exercising its discretion,
shall conduct the proceedings so as to avoid unnecessary delay and expense and to provide a fair
and efficient process for resolving the parties’ dispute.”
93According to the grounds of rescission of Article 52 ICSID Convention, that is at most Article
52 para. 1 lit. d) ICSID Convention: “serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure”, the
right to be heard before the court can be asserted. Cf. Malicorp Limited v. The Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 3.7.2013, para.
36: “[. . .] the Parties agree on the substance of the principe du contradictoire and on the fact that it is
a rule of procedure that ensures equality of the parties in an adversarial proceeding. The Committee
further notes that this principle is closely related to the right to be heard. This right of parties to
present their case has been recognized as part of that “set of minimal standards” considered
fundamental for a fair hearing. The Committee thus concludes that the principe du contradictoire
is a fundamental rule of procedure.” But an award that does not deal with the pleadings can also be
contested under Article 52 para. 1 lit. b) ICSID Convention. See Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 816
et seq.: “An award that is not comprehensive and exhaustive of the parties’ questions amounts to an
excess of powers just like a decision on questions that have not been submitted to the tribunal.”
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445 It therefore seems advisable to set time frames for the length of proceedings for
the MIC using the example of the reformed WTO DSU or regional instruments such
as Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)94 or NAFTA.95 By virtue of
complying with the deadlines set by the WTO DSU, the issue of longstanding
disputes under the old GATT System has been resolved and it has helped the system
to be transformed into an efficient dispute settlement mechanism.96
446 For the entire procedure of the first instance, from the lodging of the statement of
claim to the decision, a maximum duration could be set from which it should be
possible to deviate only after a special statement of reasons by the chamber. The
investment dispute settlement mechanism in CETA and in the EU-Vietnam IPA
provides for a maximum duration of proceedings based on the WTO DSU, which
has so far not been found in investment arbitration. The first instance should last a
maximum of 18 months, the second instance a further 6 months (see also para. 354 et
seqq.).
447 Despite the generally accepted positive effects of fixed deadlines97 and defined
subject matters of the disputes on procedural and cost efficiency, there was also some
doubt in the context of the WTO Dispute Settlement System. In particular, it was
criticised that such arrangements may have a cost-saving effect in the short term, but
could have the opposite effect in the longer term,98 since the probability of several
“procedural stages” could increase.99
9460 days of mediation and consultation before the proceeding, 45 days for the establishment of the
panel, decision (report) within 60–70 days. See ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement
Mechanism.
95Article 1904 para. 14 NAFTA: “Chapter 19-decisions have to be made within 315 days”; see also
Rule 2 NAFTA Art. 1904 Panel Rules: “These rules are intended to give effect to the provisions of
Chapter Nineteen of the Agreement with respect to panel reviews conducted pursuant to Article
1904 of the Agreement and are designed to result in decisions of panels within 315 days after the
commencement of the panel review. The purpose of these rules is to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive review of final determinations in accordance with the objectives and provisions of
Article 1904.”
96Butler (2015), p. 356.
97Sevilla (1998).
98Moonhawk (2008), pp. 657–686: “For example, stricter time limits can increase time pressure on
bureaucracies. The possibility – in fact high likelihood – for review by the Appellate Body on issues
of law further increases and countries’ need for deeper expertise in the WTO law increases.”
99Busch and Reinhardt (2003), p. 467 et seq.: “To that end, we note that the legal reforms of the
DSU may actually raise the transaction costs inherent in settling disputes by affording opportunities
for longer delays, increasing incentives for foot-dragging in litigation, and motivating defendants to
delay concessions. Granted, each separate stage of the process now operates according to a tighter
timeline, but this fact is overwhelmed by the new possibility, indeed, the inevitability of successive
rounds of litigation in the same dispute, [. . .] Further, the added stages of litigation, tight enforce-
ment of terms of reference, the legal disincentives for disclosure, and the rules on standing, all serve
to put the onus on disputants and third parties to legally mobilize as soon as possible in order to
avoid losses on technicalities (i.e., having the panel or AB deem a certain argument outside its terms
of reference) later on.”
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448As a result, the MIC should in future be granted discretion to set the temporal
dimension of specific cases based on their complexity. It should therefore be possible
to extend the stipulated time frames in particularly complex cases or indeed if the
establishment of the facts raises specific challenges.
449For the MIC, it should be noted that already in the first instance, the judges should
in principle be full-time judges, unlike, for example, under the CETA mechanism or
the WTO DSU (which is known to appoint ad hoc arbitrators). Therefore, a shorter
maximum length of proceedings could be envisaged, which could only be extended
based on a statement of reasons, for instance due to the particular complexity of the
facts. In the case of full-time judges, a maximum length of proceedings of generally
6 months/180 days for the first instance is generally accepted, which could be
extended if, for example, comprehensive and lengthy fact finding is required or if
there are particular difficulties in the legal assessment or calculation of damages and
expert opinions have to be obtained. The procedural role of the MIC with full-time
judges, unlike the ad hoc arbitrators of WTO Panels, could prevent the parties from
lengthening proceedings and causing additional costs.
450In conjunction with the introduction of requirements for the length of proceed-
ings, the principle of celerity should apply. Hence, in all its work, the chamber
should be careful not to unreasonably impair the conduct of the proceeding. In that
regard, the chamber could be provided with means to expedite the implementation of
the procedure, such as having the ability to deny submissions for the admission of
evidence after a certain point in time, only providing for oral hearings or enforcing
strict duties for pleadings. At the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that a
balance should be struck between the interests of complete and comprehensive
establishment of the facts on the one hand and the interest of least possible impair-
ment to a potentially accelerated conduct of the proceedings on the other hand.
451From the moment a chamber gives reasons for an extension of the length of the
proceedings, this chamber should not be assigned new disputes until the decision has
been handed down. If all chambers are busy and an extension of the length of the
proceedings is requested on a regular basis, the President of the Court should
propose to the Plenary Body for the number of MIC judges to be increased (see
para. 86).
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5.2.3 Practice of Judicial Investigation and Limitation
of the Subject Matter of the Dispute
452 In German public law,100 European law101 and public international law102 proceed-
ings, the application of the practice of judicial investigation is widely accepted.103
There are no reasons why this should be deviated from in the case of the MIC, where
basically the behaviour of public authorities is examined for compatibility with
subjective legal positions. The MIC should therefore be allowed to establish the
facts of the dispute ex officio.
453 This means that, the court would not be bound by the submissions and motions by
the parties to take evidence.104 At the same time, however, it could be set forth that a
substantive examination can only be carried out to the extent that a reference to the
claimant’s arguments is clear. Furthermore, it should be considered whether a
determination/limitation of the subject matter of the dispute—as is the case in the
WTO DSU105 or also in the ICC Arbitration106—should take place, inter alia, by
100Cf. in Germany e.g. Article 86 VwGO (Code of Administrative Court Procedure); Article
26 BVerfGG (Act on the Federal Constitutional Court).
101Article 24 Protocol No. 3 CJEU Statue: “The Court of Justice may require the parties to produce
all documents and to supply all information which the Court considers desirable. Formal note shall
be taken of any refusal. The Court may also require the Member States and institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies not being parties to the case to supply all information which the Court
considers necessary for the proceedings.”
102E.g. Articles 49–51 ICJ Statute.
103Schill (2016), p. 118.
104Under German law, the principle of investigation applies in all proceedings whose subject
touches particularly public interests.
105Article 7 DSU: “1. Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the
dispute agree otherwise within 20 days from the establishment of the panel: “To examine, in the
light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the
dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document . . . and to make such
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for
in that/those agreement(s).” 2. Panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agree-
ment or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute. 3. In establishing a panel, the DSB may
authorize its Chairman to draw up the terms of reference of the panel in consultation with the parties
to the dispute, subject to the provisions of paragraph 1. The terms of reference thus drawn up shall
be circulated to all Members. If other than standard terms of reference are agreed upon, any Member
may raise any point relating thereto in the DSB.”
106Article 23 ICC Arbitration Rules: “As soon as it has received the file from the Secretariat, the
arbitral tribunal shall draw up, on the basis of documents or in the presence of the parties and in the
light of their most recent submissions, a document defining its Terms of Reference. This document
shall include the following particulars: (a) the names in full, description, address and other contact
details of each of the parties and of any person(s) representing a party in the arbitration; (b) the
addresses to which notifications and communications arising in the course of the arbitration may be
made; (c) a summary of the parties’ respective claims and of the relief sought by each party, together
with the amounts of any quantified claims and, to the extent possible, an estimate of the monetary
value of any other claims; (d) unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate, a list of issues to
be determined; (e) the names in full, address and other contact details of each of the arbitrators;
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establishing Terms of Reference. This could lead to a focus of the proceeding on the
actual points of contention. CETA has similar aims as it states that the claimant may
not present any measure in its claim that was not already presented in the request for
consultations.107
454The chamber should clarify the facts of the dispute to the extent that it deems
necessary for its decision. The principle of ex officio investigation or the principle of
judicial investigation is thus in proportion to the principle of party disposition on the
part of the applicants. Nevertheless, within the context of the scope of examination,
it should only be examined whether the claimant’s interests were damaged,
i.e. whether the rights of the claimant originating in the particular IIA were violated.
Therefore, such violations of an MIC Member that do not affect the applicant’s own
standards of protection should not be dealt with by the MIC.
455Contrary to the principle of legal representation and the principle of production of
evidence in civil procedural law, the chamber would itself under the principle of
judicial investigation determine the manner and extent of the investigations. Insofar
as the chamber sees further need for investigation, it should, in principle, exhaust all
reasonably available and legally admissible possibilities for clarifying the relevant
facts. In many cases, however, a chamber will only be able to confine itself to the
points raised by the claimant as well as to other manifest and serious infringements.
Further elaboration of the formalities regarding the taking of evidence should be
provided for in the procedural rules of the MIC, for example, that the court can
examine, take oath and, in the case of non-appearance, impose a fine on witnesses
and experts, or that the MIC in this respect also has a right to information towards its
members.108
456The obligation of the parties to advance the procedure should in principle interact
with the obligation of the chamber to find out the relevant facts ex officio. If a party to
the proceedings fails to perform his obligation to ensure smooth conduct, the MIC
chamber would consider it to the detriment of the non-compliant party. The duty to
investigate the matter and to establish the facts should rather only come into play in
case that the arguments of the parties (or the other facts), if considered reasonably,
provide a sufficient reason to do so. From the interaction between the principle of
judicial investigation and the principle of efficiency and the principle of celerity, it
(f) the place of the arbitration; and (g) particulars of the applicable procedural rules and, if such is
the case, reference to the power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal to act as amiable compositeur or
to decide ex aequo et bono.”
107Article 8.22 para. 1 lit. e) CETA.
108For legally relevant facts that can be proven, the plaintiff must designate the available evidence.
Concerning the fact-finding, the participants of the dispute have to be obliged to co-operation. The
participants must point out and clarify circumstances that lie in their sphere. This obligation to
co-operation serves the fact-finding. Therefore, in the case, that facts could be clarified by one
participant especially in his own favour, the chamber must not investigate all conceivable courses of
events. The plaintiff has to designate all legally relevant and provable facts as available evidences.
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follows that the procedure should be terminated if the claimant fails to perform its
obligations in a sufficiently swift manner.109
457 Without receiving a detailed statement of fact, the chamber should not be obliged
to investigate on its own. Conversely, it follows from this “interaction doctrine” that,
in case that the statement of facts by the parties or other facts give the supervisory
bodies sufficient grounds for examination, they should be obliged to conduct further
ex officio investigation and judicial review. The burden of proof for the legal facts
should be borne by the one who asserts a right.
458 In the procedure before the MIC, the principle of free evaluation of evidence
should apply, which results as a consequence of the principle of judicial investiga-
tion. The chamber should be bound to the rules of legal logic as well as to principles
derived from recognised empirical principles and methods of interpretation in
assessing the facts. In its assessment, the chamber can include in addition to the
results following the taking of evidence the statement of facts by the parties, the
knowledge of the administration, and as a whole, the overall impression of all
circumstances etc.
References
Alexandrov SA (2004) Breaches of contract and breaches of treaty – the jurisdiction of treaty-based
arbitration tribunals to decide breach of contract claims in SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Philip-
pines. J World Invest Trade 5:555–577
Alvarado Garzón AE (2019) Designing a multilateral investment court: blueprints for a new route in
investor-state dispute settlement. ZEuS 22:475–500
Alvarez JE (2011) The return of the state. Minn J Int Law 20:223–264
Alvarez JE, Khamsi K (2009) The Argentine crisis and foreign investors: a glimpse into the heart of
the investment regime. Yearb Int Law Policy 2008–2009:379–478
Binder C (2009) Changed circumstances in international investment law: interfaces between the law
of treaties and the law of state responsibility with a special focus on the Argentine crisis. In:
Binder C, Kriebaum U, Reinisch A, Wittich S (eds) International investment law in the 21st
century, essays in honour of Christoph Schreuer. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 608–630
Bjorklund AK (2008) Emergency exceptions: state of necessity and force majeure. In:
Muchlinski P, Ortino F, Schreuer C (eds) Oxford handbook of international investment law.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 459–523
Bjorklund AK (2009) Economic security defenses in international investment law. Yearb Int Invest
Law Policy 2008–2009:479–503
Blackaby N, Partasides C, Redfern A, Hunter M (2009) Redfern and Hunter on international
arbitration, 5th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
109Article 8.35 CETA: “If, following the submission of a claim under this Section, the investor fails
to take any steps in the proceeding during 180 consecutive days or such period as the disputing
parties may agree, the investor is deemed to have withdrawn its claim and to have discontinued the
proceeding. The Tribunal shall, at the request of the respondent, and after notice to the disputing
parties, in an order take note of the discontinuance. After the order has been rendered the authority
of the Tribunal shall lapse.”
144 5 Applicable Law
Böckstiegel KH (2003) The role of the arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration. In: van den Berg
AJ (ed) International commercial arbitration: important contemporary questions. Kluwer Law
International, The Hague, pp 366–375
Böckstiegel KH, Berger KP, Bredow J (2005) Die Beteiligung Dritter an Schiedsverfahren.
Heymann, Köln
Brekoulakis SL (2010) Third parties in international commercial arbitration. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
Brown C (2015) International investment agreements – history, approaches, schools. In:
Bungenberg M, Griebel J, Hobe S, Reinisch A (eds) International investment law, a handbook.
C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, München/Oxford/Baden-Baden, pp 153–360
Burke-White WW (2010) The Argentine financial crisis: state liability under BITs and the legiti-
macy of the ICSID system. In: Waibel W, Kaushal A, Chung KH, Balchin C (eds) The Backlash
against investment arbitration. Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 407–432
Burke-White WW, von Staden A (2007) Investment protection in extraordinary times: interpreting
non-precluded measures provisions. Va J Int Law 48:307–410
BuschML, Reinhardt E (2003) Transatlantic trade conflicts and GATT/WTO dispute settlement. In:
Petersmann EU, Pollack MA (eds) Transatlantic economic disputes: the EU, the US, and the
WTO. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 465–485
Butler N (2015) In search of a model for the reform of international investment dispute resolution:
an analysis of existing international and regional dispute settlement mechanisms. In: Kalicki JE,
Joubin-Bret A (eds) Reshaping the investor-state dispute settlement system. Brill Nijhoff,
Leiden, pp 353–380
Carbonneau TE (2003) The exercise of contract freedom in the making of arbitration agreements.
Vanderbilt J Transnatl Law 36:1189–1232
Commission JP (2007) Precedent in investment treaty arbitration: a citation analysis of a developing
jurisprudence. J Int Arbitr 24:129–158
De Brabandere E (2014) Investment treaty arbitration as public international law. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Dimitropoulos G (2016) Constructing the independence of international investment arbitrators:
past, present and future. Northwest J Int Law Bus 36:371–434
Dolzer R, Schreuer C (2012) Principles of international investment law, 2nd edn. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
Douglas Z (2011) The MFN clause in investment arbitration: treaty interpretation off the rails. J Int
Dispute Settlement 2:97–113
Dugan C, Wallace D, Rubins ND, Sabahi B (2008) Investor-state arbitration. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
Dupont PE (2011) The notion of ICSID investment: ongoing ‘confusion’ or ‘emerging synthesis. J
World Invest Trade 12:245–272
Eberhardt P, Olivet E (2012) Profiting from injustice: how law firms, arbitrators and financiers are
fuelling an investment arbitration boom. Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational
Institute, Brussels/Amsterdam
European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (2014) TTIP Consultation Submission
Ewing-ChowM, Losari JJ (2015)Which is to be the master? Extra-arbitral interpretative procedures
for IIAs. In: Kalicki JE, Joubin-Bret A (eds) Reshaping the investor-state dispute settlement
system. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 91–114
Fontoura Costa JA (2011) Comparing WTO panelists and ICSID arbitrators: the creation of
international legal fields, 1/4 Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1
Franck SD (2009) Development and outcomes of investment treaty arbitration. Harv Int Law J
50:435–489
Gaillard E (2005) Establishing jurisdiction through a most-favoured-nation clause. N Y Law J
233, No. 105 of 2.6.2005
References 145
Gaillard E, Banifatemi Y (2003) The meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), second sentence, of the
Washington Convention: the role of international law in the ICSID choice of law process. ICSID
Rev Foreign Invest Law J 18:375–411
Hodgson M (2014) Investment treaty arbitration: how much does it cost? How long does it take?
Allen Overy Publications of 18.2.2014
Hofmann R, Tams CJ (2011) International investment law and general international law – from
clinical isolation to systemic integration? Nomos, Baden-Baden
Ishikawa T (2015) Keeping interpretation in investment treaty arbitration on track: the role of state
parties. In: Kalicki JE, Joubin-Bret A (eds) Reshaping the investor-state dispute settlement
system. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 115–149
Jackson JH (1998) Dispute settlement and the WTO. J Int Econ Law 1:329–351
Jacob M, Schill S (2015) Fair and equitable treatment: content, practice, method. In:
Bungenberg M, Griebel J, Hobe S, Reinisch A (eds) International investment law. A handbook.
Hart, Oxford, pp 700–763
Kaufmann-Kohler G (2011) Interpretive powers of the free trade commission and the rule of law.
In: Bachand F (ed) Fifteen years of NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration. Juris, Huntington, pp
175–194
Kaufmann-Kohler G, Boisson de Chazournes L, Bonnin V, Mbengue MM (2006) Consolidation of
proceedings in investment arbitration: how can multiple proceedings arising from the same or
related situations be handled efficiently? Final Report on the Geneva Colloquium of 22.4.2006.
ICSID Rev Foreign Invest Law J 21:59–125
Kläger R (2011) “Fair and equitable treatment” in international investment law. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Kriebaum U (2014) FET and expropriation in the (invisible) EU model BIT. J World Invest Trade
15:454–483
Kurtz J (2014) Building legitimacy through interpretation in investor-state arbitration: on consis-
tency, coherence and the identification of applicable law. In: Douglas Z, Pauwelyn J, Vinuales
JE (eds) The foundations of international investment law, bringing theory into practice. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp 257–296
Lawson DA (2005) Impartiality and independence of international arbitrators. Swiss Arbitr Assoc
Bull 23:22–44
Levesque C, Newcombe A (2013) The evolution of IIA practice in Canada and the United States.
In: De Mestral A, Levesque C (eds) Improving international investment agreements. Routledge,
London, pp 25–41
Loken K (2013) Introductory note to UNCITRAL rules on transparency in treaty-based investor-
state arbitration. Int Leg Mater 52:1300–1308
Manciaux S (2008) The notion of investment: new controversies. J World Invest Trade 9:443–466
Marceddu ML (2016) The EU dispute settlement: towards legal certainty in an uneven international
investment system? Eur Invest Law Arbitr Rev 1:33–75
Maupin JA (2011) MFN-based jurisdiction in investor-state arbitration: is there any hope for a
consistent approach? J Int Econ Law 14:157–190
McLachlan C (2005) The principle of systemic integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention. Int Comp Law Q 54:279–319
Moonhawk K (2008) Costly procedures: divergent effects of legalization in the GATT/WTO
dispute settlement procedures. Int Stud Q 52:657–686
Newcombe A (2013) Developments in IIA treaty-making. In: De Mestral A, Levesque C (eds)
Improving international investment agreements. Routledge, London, pp 15–24
Ortino F (2013) Transparency of investment awards: external and internal dimensions. In:
Nakagawa J (ed) Transparency in international trade and investment dispute settlement.
Routledge, London, pp 119–158
Paparinskis M (2011) MFN clauses and international dispute settlement: moving beyond Maffezini
and Plama. ICSID Rev Foreign Invest Law J 26:14–58
Petrochilos G (2004) Procedural law in international arbitration. Oxford University Press, Oxford
146 5 Applicable Law
Poudret JF, Besson S (2007) Comparative law of international arbitration, 2nd edn. Sweet &
Maxwell, London
Reinisch A (2007) Necessity in international investment arbitration – an unnecessary split of
opinions in recent ICSID cases? J World Invest Trade 8:191–214
Reinisch A (2010) From the perennial issue of the notion of investment pursuant to Article
25 ICSID Convention and narrow dispute settlement provisions to further clarifications of
substantive standards of protection – ICSID arbitration in 2009. Global Community – Yearbook
of International Law and Jurisprudence, 749
Roberts A (2010) Power and persuasion in investment treaty interpretation: the dual role of states.
Am J Int Law 104:179–225
Ruthemeyer T (2014) Der amicus curiae brief im Internationalen Investitionsrecht. Nomos, Baden-
Baden
Ryan CM (2008) Meeting expectations: assessing the long-term legitimacy and stability of inter-
national investment law. Univ Pa J Int Law 29:725–762
Salacuse J (2013) The three laws of international investment. national, contractual, and international
frameworks for foreign capital. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Sandrock O (2015) Das Internationale Handelsgericht im TTIP: The Permanent International
Investment Tribunal. Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 61:625–640
Schill S (2007) International investment law and the host state’s power to handle economic crises. J
Int Arbitr 24:256–286
Schill S (2011) Allocating adjudicatory authority: most-favoured-nation clauses as a basis of
jurisdiction – a reply to Zachary Douglas. J Int Dispute Settlement 2:353–371
Schill S (2015) Reforming investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS): conceptual framework and
options for the way forward. E15 initiative
Schill S (2016) Sind Regelungen zur Investor-Staat-Streitbeilegung in EU-Freihandelsabkommen
sinnvoll? Kölner Schrift zum Wirtschaftsrecht 7:115–121
Schreuer CH (2004) Travelling the BIT route: of waiting periods, umbrella. Clauses and forks in the
road. J World Invest Trade 5:231–256
Schreuer CH (2015) Do we need investment arbitration? In: Kalicki JE, Joubin-Bret A (eds)
Reshaping the investor-state dispute settlement system. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 879–889
Schreuer CH, Malintoppi L, Reinisch A, Sinclair A (2009) The ICSID Convention. A commentary,
2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Sevilla CR (1998) Explaining patterns of GATT/WTO trade complaints. Working Paper 98-1
Shihata IF, Parra AR (1999) The experience of the international centre for settlement of investment
disputes. ICSID Rev 14:299–361
Sinclair AC (2004) The origins of the umbrella clause in the international law of investment
protection. Arbitr Int 20:411–434
Tan LY, Bouchenaki A (2015) Limiting investor access to investment arbitration. In: Kalicki JE,
Joubin-Bret A (eds) Reshaping the investor-state dispute settlement system. Brill Nijhoff,
Leiden, pp 250–309
Tudor I (2008) The fair and equitable treatment standard in the international law of foreign
investment. Oxford University Press, Oxford
UNCTAD (2011) Interpretation of IIAs: what states can do, IIA Issues Note December No. 3
Van Damme I (2010) Treaty interpretation by the WTO appellate body. Eur J Int Law 21:605–648
Vandevelde KJ (2010) Bilateral investment treaties. Oxford University Press, New York
Waibel M (2007) Two worlds of necessity in ICSID arbitration: CMS and LG&E. Leiden J Int Law
20:637–648
Wälde TW (2005) The “Umbrella” clause on investment arbitration – a comment on original
intentions and recent cases. J World Invest Trade 6:183–236
Wälde TW (2011) “Equality of arms” in investment arbitration: procedural challenges. Transnatl
Dispute Manage, 1
Weeramantry JR (2012) Treaty interpretation in investment arbitration. Oxford University Press,
Oxford
References 147
Wuschka S (2016) Ein Investitionsgerichtshof – Der große Wurf der EU-Kommission? Zeitschrift
für Europarechtliche Studien 19:153–176
Yannaca-Small K (2008) Fair and equitable treatment: recent developments. In: Reinisch A
(ed) Standards of investment protection. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 111–130
Yen TH (2014) The interpretation of investment treaties. Brill Nijhoff, Leiden
Zuleta E (2015) The challenges of creating a standing international investment court. In: Kalicki JE,
Joubin-Bret A (eds) Reshaping the investor-state dispute settlement system. Brill Nijhoff,
Leiden, pp 403–423
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if you modified the licensed material.
You do not have permission under this license to share adapted material derived from this chapter or
parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
148 5 Applicable Law
Chapter 6
The Pronouncement of Decisions and Its
Consequences
459It seems appropriate to start by considering the options of the effects and conse-
quences of the decisions of international dispute settlement bodies, in general, and of
investment arbitral tribunals, in particular, in order to make specific recommenda-
tions for the structuring of the decisions of an MIC.
6.1 Legal Effects of Decisions of International Dispute
Settlement Bodies
460In theory, a wide range of legal effects of decisions of international dispute settle-
ment bodies exists, from pure declaratory decisions without a strict obligation to
comply, to annulments with direct effect on the contested legal act, in the sense of
decisions modifying a legal right.
461In practice, however, there are usually hybrid forms, such as declaratory deci-
sions, advisory opinions or decisions that oblige a party to perform a certain act
which must be complied with in substance, or annulments that relate only to internal
acts of the organisation, the acting body of which is a dispute settlement body. A
genuine annulment of national rules by decisions of international courts and thereby
modifying a legal right is practically non-existent and would probably also be
contrary to the system.
462Typically, proceedings before international courts lead to a decision which has
declaratory effect but whose binding force for the parties to the dispute results in a
clear obligation to comply with the decision.1 That is, even if an international court
1Article 59 ICJ Statute in conjunction with Article 94 para. 1 UN Charter; Article 49 para. 1 ECHR;
Article 296 para. 1 UNCLOS concerning the binding nature of decisions for the parties; Harris et al.
(2009), p. 162 et seq.; Shaw (2014), p. 798.
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finds that a national legal act (law, administrative act, national judgment or other
acts) is unlawful under public international law, the former remains unaffected but
the responsible state has to ensure that the unlawfulness is abolished. For example, in
the case of decisions of the ICJ or the ECtHR, this may lead to an international
obligation to repeal the national legal act.2
463 The solution that states pay damages as an alternative to remove the international
injustice is not found in decisions of the ICJ, but in some cases before human rights
courts.3 This was also discussed in the early investment arbitration practice when, in
the course of the Libyan oil concession cases in the 1970s,4 some arbitral tribunals
permitted the expropriating state to elect for the option of compensation, even for
expropriations in violation of international law, which in principle require
restitution.5
464 If it is desirable from a policy perspective that the decisions of an MIC should also
not be subject to secondary obligations to repeal national legal acts, this should be
explicitly set down.6
465 For other international dispute settlement bodies, the legal effects of declaratory
decisions may be even weaker. For example, WTO Panels and the WTO Appellate
Body only have the power to find infringements, but not to order the removal of the
illegal acts or alternatively, the payment of damages.7 Rather, the power of the WTO
2See e.g. ICJ, Democratic Republic Congo v. Belgium, ICJ Reports, 2002, p. 31 et seq. The ICJ
finds the duty of Belgium to cancel a Belgian warrant of arrest instead of reversing the warrant as
direct consequence of the decision; ECtHR (GC), No. 32772/02, Verein gegen Tierfabriken (VgT)
v. Switzerland (No 2), para. 85 et seq.; IACHR, Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment, 10.9.1993,
IACHR (Ser. C) No. 15 (1993).
3See e.g. ECtHR, No. 27527/03, L. v. Lithuania, Judgment, 11.9.2007, para. 74, where the ECtHR
adjudicates the opportunity of compensation, if the required change in the law is not made within
3 months.
4Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v. Libya, Award, 12.4.1977, 62 ILR (1981) 140; British
Petroleum v. Libya, Award, 10.10.1973 and 1.8.1974, 53 ILR (1973) 297.
5See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. Libya, (1979)
53 ILR 389, para. 111, and Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case
No. ARB/95/3, Award, 10.2.1999, para. 136 et seq., where the tribunals awarded such an option
to be provided with mere financial compensation to the states.
6See e.g. Article 34 US Model BIT 2012: “1. Where a tribunal makes a final award against a
respondent, the tribunal may award, separately or in combination, only: (a) monetary damages and
any applicable interest; and (b) restitution of property, in which case the award shall provide that the
respondent may pay monetary damages and any applicable interest in lieu of restitution.”; Art. 1135
NAFTA: “1. Where a Tribunal makes a final award against a Party, the Tribunal may award,
separately or in combination, only: (a) monetary damages and any applicable interest; (b) restitution
of property, in which case the award shall provide that the disputing Party may pay monetary
damages and any applicable interest in lieu of restitution.”
7The WTO cannot adjudicate compensation, if the defendant party accepts this obligation volun-
tarily, cf. Article 22.2 DSU: “If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be
inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the
recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of time determined pursuant to para-
graph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the
reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute
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Dispute Settlement Body is limited to “recommending” the WTO Members a WTO
compliant behaviour going forward. Should the latter fail to comply with these
recommendations, only countermeasures (“trade retaliation”) of the affected WTO
Members can be approved, which allow them to compensate for the expected
economic damage resulting from non-compliance with WTO rules and
recommendations.
466Of course, the above-mentioned collateral legal consequences of purely declara-
tory decisions have a steering effect, urging the disputing parties to implement the
content of declaratory decisions to the extent that the unlawfulness is removed.
467Particularities of the effects of decisions arise in individual courts of regional
economic organisations. Of particular note in this context is the CJEU. Its decisions
in proceedings between Member States and in infringement proceedings brought by
the Commission against Member States for breaches of EU Law are declaratory;
however, the TFEU implies a clear obligation of states to remove the illegality found
therein.8 Far-reaching effects of judgments are found in the so-called actions for
annulment, which are, however, only directed against acts of Union institutions.
They lead to the repeal of secondary legislation of the Union.9 However, this is a
quasi-constitutional judicial control of the legal acts of the Union institutions. It is
significant that even the CJEU has no comparable jurisdiction with regard to
unlawful acts of the Member States.
468In summary, it can be said that general public international law does not foresee
decisions of international judicial institutions that have a direct effect over national
law. As a rule, there is only an obligation to remove any illegality of national legal
acts under public international law and to comply with international obligations.
This can also be mitigated by a mere liability for compensation.
6.2 Effects of Decisions of Investment Arbitral Tribunals
469The legal effects of the decisions of investment arbitral tribunals are generally not
expressly included in the respective investment protection treaties. Rather, they
result from the applicable rules of procedure or from the general public international
law principles of state responsibility.10
settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satis-
factory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable
period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authoriza-
tion from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements.” See Bronckers and van den Broak (2005), p. 101.
8Article 260 TFEU.
9Article 264 TFEU.
10The International Law Commission lists the possibilities of “restitution, compensation and
satisfaction” in Article 34 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. The consequences of a
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470 According to Article 53 ICSID Convention, ICSID arbitral awards are binding on
the parties to the dispute and are not subject to appeal (except for the possibilities of
annulment, interpretation and revision of errors in calculations provided for in the
Convention).11
471 According to Article 34 para. 2 of the UNCITRAL Rules,12 UNCITRAL awards
are also final and binding, and are therefore not subject to appeal or other legal
remedies in arbitration,13 and must be implemented by the parties immediately.14
472 In addition, the rules of the ICC,15 the LCIA,16 and the SCC17 contain provisions
that declare the arbitral awards rendered under the respective arbitration rules as final
and binding.
473 The same applies to some sectoral and regional treaties with investment protec-
tion chapters such as NAFTA18 and the ECT, which, while referring in principle to
various procedural rules, still specifically lay down the finality and binding force.19
474 This means, in practice, that arbitral tribunals can find violations of standards
contained in investment protection treaties and determine compensation for lawful
expropriations. For unlawful expropriations or other violations of investment protection
standards, it can award damages or grant a decision (or award) for specific performance.
475 Ordering the restoration of the situation before the treaty infringement by arbitral
tribunals would constitute an interference with the sovereignty of states. Therefore,
arbitral tribunals have so far refused to order changes in national legal orders.20 Even
“specific performance” are not explicitly stated by the ILC Articles. Gray (1999), p. 419 et seq.,
assumes that the ILC “specific performances” can be subsumed as “restitution”.
11Article 53 para. 1 ICSID Convention: “The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be
subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each
party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement
shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.”
12UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976, 15 ILM 701 (1976), www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitraltexts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as adopted in
2013), www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-
Rules-2013-e.pdf.
13The UNCITRAL Rules accept an interpretation and correction of misspellings or miscalculations.
The majority of all legal systems accept the opportunity of setting aside of an arbitral award for
special reasons, following the UNICTRALModel Law. Therefore, the finality of awards in national
law of the forum arbitri is not absolute. See Caron and Caplan (2013), p. 740.
14Article 34 para. 2 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: “All awards shall be made in writing and shall
be final and binding on the parties. The parties shall carry out all awards without delay.”
15Article 35 para. 6 ICC Arbitration Rules 2017.
16Article 26 para. 8 LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014.
17Article 46 SCC Rules 2017.
18Article 1136 NAFTA.
19Article 26 para. 8 ECT.
20Cf. de Brabandere (2014), p. 184 et seq.; LG&E v. Argentinia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Award, 25.6.2007, para. 87: “[. . .] the judicial restitution required in this case would imply
modification of the current legal situation by annulling or enacting legislative and administrative
measures that make over the effect of the legislation in breach. The Tribunal cannot compel
Argentina to do so without a sentiment of undue interference with its sovereignty.”
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if under general public international law, according to Article 34 of the ILC Articles
on State Responsibility,21 compensation is a secondary form of redress which should
only be effective in case of impossibility or inappropriateness of restoring the
situation before the treaty infringement,22 arbitral awards usually oblige states
exclusively to pay damages.23
476However, it is generally accepted that arbitral tribunals can also award
non-monetary remedies in arbitral awards.24 Opposite opinions in the literature
justify the refusal of non-monetary remedies in investment disputes primarily with
practical problems of the enforcement of such arbitral awards.25 Although the ICSID
Convention in Article 54 only regulates the enforceability of pecuniary obligations
resulting from arbitral awards, it cannot be concluded that non-monetary remedies,
such as a right to the fulfilment of treaty obligations, should not be granted by an
ICSID tribunal.26 Some ICSID tribunals27 and non-ICSID tribunals28 have seized
the opportunity to award non-monetary remedies.29 Since only financial compensa-
tion can be enforced through ICSID, an investor may need to have recourse to the
New York Convention for the enforcement of non-monetary claims.30
477Limiting the available remedies under international treaty law is legally possible.
A number of investment protection agreements have introduced such limitations on
damages in order to exclude non-monetary remedies.31
21Article 34 ILC Articles on State Responsibility: “Full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either
singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.”
22Permanent Court of International Justice, Factory at Chorzow, Judgment No. 13, 1927, p. 47; de
Brabandere (2014), p. 179 et seq.
23McLachlan et al. (2008), p. 341; Gray (1987), p. 11; Brower and Brueschke (1998), pp. 473, 477;
Toope (1990), pp. 165–167.
24McLachlan et al. (2008), p. 341; Schreuer (2004), p. 325; de Brabandere (2014), p. 187.
25See a summary of these critical opinions in Dermikol (2015), pp. 403, 408.
26Schreuer (2004), p. 325, bases his opinion on the travaux préparatoires and the international
practice of arbitral tribunals.
27Ioan Micula and others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/02, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 24.9.2008, para. 166-168; ATA Construction v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2,
Award, 18.5.2010; Franck Charles Arif v. Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award, 8.4.2013.
28Ioan Micula and others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/02, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, 24.9.2008, para. 166-168; ATA Construction v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2,
Award, 18.5.2010; Franck Charles Arif v. Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award, 8.4.2013.
29Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi, ISCID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award, 10.2.1999, para.
136 et seq. is an interesting case concerning the possibility of awarding non-monetary legal
remedies. As requested, the ICSID Tribunal awarded a two-tiered legal remedy: only if Burundi
will not have fulfilled his contractual obligation to perform within a fixed period of time, Burundi
would have to pay damages. Although there was an obligation for an act with legal consequences
directly to national law, it could only be enforced voluntarily. This solution enables the state to
decide autonomously, if a change in the law respectively performance of the contract or perfor-
mance of damages could better be implemented.
30Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1138 et seq.
31See e.g. Article 34 US Model BIT 2012; Article 1135 NAFTA; Article 26 para. 8 ECT.
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478 Decisions of the MIC should essentially be limited to finding violations of
investment protection standards and should have the power to award damages to
the prevailing party. In addition, the power to determine the existence of a generally
(not unlawful) indirect expropriation and to determine the amount of compensation
due, which is usually enshrined in the individual investment protection treaties,
should also be provided for.
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154 6 The Pronouncement of Decisions and Its Consequences
Chapter 7
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
479A key issue for any dispute resolution mechanism is the question of effectiveness of
decisions. This is ensured by the fact that these are not only final and binding (see
paras. 469 et seqq.), but also legally enforceable if necessary.
480The distinction between recognition and enforcement of decisions has little
practical relevance,1 especially because due to international enforcement mecha-
nisms such as the ICSID Convention2 or the New York Convention,3 no separate
recognition procedure (in the sense of a double exequatur) is required for
enforcement.
481This enforceability could theoretically be ensured by international institutions
(for example, measures of the UN Security Council for enforcing judgments of the
ICJ),4 but is usually guaranteed through the support of state courts.
482The prevailing model in investment arbitration is the recognition and enforcement
of awards through state courts in third countries according to the provisions of the
ICSID Convention or the New York Convention. Both conventions state that arbitral
awards are final and binding on the specific parties to the dispute and that they can be
recognised and enforced also in other states which are a party to the treaty, but were
not involved in the investment dispute.
483In practice, it often occurs that losing state parties do not comply with their
obligations resulting from awards; in such cases, the prevailing party often has the
only a chance to successfully enforce the award if the assets of the losing party are
1Toope (1990), pp. 102 et seq.; however, an important distinction is, that a decision, indeed, can be
accepted as res judicata, but, at the same time can be unenforceable e.g. due to state sovereignty.
2Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
of 18.3.1965, 575 UNTS 159; 4 ILM 532 (1965).
3Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, 330 UNTS 38;
7 ILM 1046 (1968).
4Article 94 para. 2 UN Charter provides powers for the UN Security Council to enforce ICJ
decisions.
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located in a third state and can be accessed there via an enforcement procedure.
Therefore, it would be useful for the MIC to have its own procedure permitting
enforcement in third countries as well as in other MIC states at least. In addition, it
must be examined whether the MIC can be designed in such a way that its decisions
are considered as arbitral awards within the meaning of the ICSID Convention or the
New York Convention. This would have the advantage that MIC decisions would be
directly enforceable in the already numerous state parties to the two conventions and
no separate or new enforcement mechanism would have to be created.
484 ICSID awards enjoy a particularly high level of enforceability. According to the
ICSID Convention, ICSID awards have to be recognised as binding and their
monetary content (namely compensation and damages) has to be enforced in a
manner equivalent to a last-instance decision of its own state courts by all (currently
1635) parties to the ICSID Convention.6 This means that a review as to whether the
content of the specific ICSID award is in accordance with the ordre public or similar
concepts has to be omitted. The only permissible restriction of enforceability is the
law of state immunity in enforcement proceedings.7
485 In contrast, non-ICSID awards are governed by the provisions of the New York
Convention (when enforcing it in one of the current 1608 parties to the Convention).
Non-ICSID awards include arbitral awards under the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules,9 via the UNCITRAL Rules, according to the Rules of the ICC,10 the SCC11
or the LCIA.12
486 Although investment arbitration awards are sometimes assumed to be “anational”
or “internationalised” awards which have not been necessarily made in the territory
of a party to the treaty, as non-domestic arbitral awards they are—according to
5As of 2.8.2019.
6Article 54 ICSID Convention: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant
to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within
its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. [. . .].”
7Article 55 ICSID Convention: “Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law
in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from
execution.”
8As of 2.8.2019.
9Schreuer et al. (2009), pp. 1120 et seq.; see also Article 3 Additional Facility Rules: “Since the
proceedings envisaged by Article 2 are outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, none of the provisions
of the Convention shall be applicable to them or to recommendations, awards, or reports which may
be rendered therein.”
10ICC Rules of Arbitration 2012, www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Buisness-Services/Dispute-
Resolution-Services/Mediation/Rules/2012-Arbitration-Rules-and-2014-Mediation-Rules-ENGLISH-
version/.
11Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2010,
www.sccinstitute.com/media/40120/arbitrationrules_eng_webbversion.pdf.
12LCIA, Arbitration Rules 1998, 37 ILM 669 (1998), www.lcia-arbitration.com; LCIA, Arbitration
Rules 2014 www.lcia.org/dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx.
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predominant opinion—13 at least subject to the New York Convention (see paras.
526 et seqq.).14
487Meanwhile, it is also largely agreed that investment arbitral awards, despite their
special character (which often includes a review of sovereign state activities), have to
be considered as “commercial” disputes for those states who have declared a
corresponding reservation (see paras. 530 et seqq.)15 to the New York Convention.16
In particular, some investment protection agreements explicitly state this
interpretation.17
488Furthermore, investment arbitration based on treaties, according to which there is
no written ex ante arbitration agreement between the parties to the dispute, but rather
arbitration based on a claim according to the provisions of the investment protection
treaty,18 is in practice not an obstacle to the requirement of a written agreement under
the New York Convention.19,20
13Article I para. 1 NYC: “This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of
such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It
shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought.”
14See Delaume (1993), pp. 48 et seq.; Delaume (1995), p. 170; Choi (1995–1996), pp. 190 et seq.
15Article I para. 3 NYC.
16See United Mexican States v. Metalclad, Canada, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2.5.2001,
[2001] BCSC 664, 5 ICSID Reports 236; United Mexican States v. Feldman Karpa, Canada,
Ontario Court of Appeal, 11.1.2005, 9 ICSID Reports 508, 516, para. 41; Czech Republic v. CME
Czech Republic BV, Sweden, Svea Court of Appeal, 15.5.2003, 9 ICSID Reports 439, 493.
17E.g. Article 1136 para. 7 NAFTA: “A claim that is submitted to arbitration shall be considered to
arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for purposes of Article I of the New York
Convention and Article I of the Inter-American Convention.” Article 26 para. 5 lit. b) ECT: “Any
arbitration under this Article shall at the request of any party to the dispute be held in a state that is a
party to the New York Convention. Claims submitted to arbitration hereunder shall be considered to
arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of Article I of that
Convention.”
18Cf. Paulsson (1995), p. 232.
19Article II para. 1 NYC: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”
20See Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company, England, Court of
Appeal, 9.9.2005, [2005] EWCA 1116, 12 ICSID Reports 129. Cf. Article 26 para. 5 lit. a) ECT:
“The consent given in paragraph (3) together with the written consent of the Investor given pursuant
to paragraph (4) shall be considered to satisfy the requirement for: [. . .] (ii) an “agreement in
writing” for purposes of article II of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958 [hereinafter referred
to as the New York Convention].” Cf. also Article 25 para. 2 lit. b) US Model BIT 2004; Article
28 para. 2 lit. b) Canadian Model BIT 2004.
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489 Similarly like the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention obliges all
parties to the agreement to recognise and enforce arbitral awards.21 Enforcement
may be rejected by the restrictions of sovereign immunity. In addition, Article V
NYC states more far-reaching exceptions, according to which a conflict with the
ordre public, the invalidity of the arbitration agreement (for instance due to legal
incapacity of the parties or another lack of will), a violation of the right to be heard,
lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal, a flawed constitution of the arbitral tribunal or a
lack of binding legal force and/or the annulment of the arbitral award according to
the lex arbitri or the law of the state of residence can lead to the refusal of
enforcement.22
490 Although enforcement under the ICSID Convention has the advantage that the
awards do not have to withstand a review by the executing State, the New York
Convention is considered as an effective and established enforcement mechanism
as well.
491 A substantive revision of the award is only permitted to a very limited extent in
both conventions and the successful claimant only has to have the award being
declared enforceable in the state of enforcement. Another advantage of the conven-
tions is that there is already plenty of court practice. The respective enforcement
courts could thus be guided by their experience and parties could to a certain extent
rely on past cases.
21Article III NYC: “Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under
the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to
which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic
arbitral awards.”
22Article V NYC: “1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in
article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The party against whom the award is
invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that
part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized
and enforced; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with
the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet become binding
on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which,
or under the law of which, that award was made. 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”
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492Accordingly, qualifying decisions of the MIC as arbitral awards within the
meaning of the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention would be useful
in terms of effective enforceability. That could have prompted the EU Commission
to describe the decisions of the permanent investment courts in CETA, the
EU-Vietnam IPA and the TTIP draft as arbitral awards within the meaning of the
ICSID Convention.
493In the following paragraphs, it will therefore be examined to what extent the
decisions of a permanent MIC can be qualified as arbitral awards in the sense of the
ICSID Convention or the New York Convention.
494However, it has to be pointed out at the outset, that in both the enforcement
regime of the ICSID Convention as well as the New York Convention, the national
courts having jurisdiction over enforcement are responsible for the interpretation and
application of the conventions. Most of the terms of the conventions are defined by
national law. Hence, there is no consistent interpretation and enforcement practice
worldwide. The national conflict-of-law rules and the lex arbitri may also have an
impact on the outcome of the application of the convention through the national
courts. For this reason, the following statements always have to be understood with
the proviso that an attempted enforcement of an MIC decision could be very
different, depending on the state in which it is handed down.
7.1 Decisions of the MIC as Arbitral Awards Within
the Meaning of the ICSID Convention
495The provisions of the ICSID Convention outlined above clearly refer to “arbitral
awards under this Convention”,23 i.e. in order to benefit from the particularly
effective enforcement regime of the ICSID Convention, it has to be an ICSID arbitral
award.
496It seems impossible that decisions of a permanent MIC could be considered as
ICSID arbitral awards. The ICSID Convention provides a specific method for
constituting the panels, certain rules of procedure, the exclusion of legal remedies
such as appeals and similarly only very limited review mechanisms in the form of
annulment procedures and interpretation and revision of arbitral awards.24 The
approaches discussed above of designing an MIC and its decisions contradict all
these conditions, which have to be fulfilled to qualify a decision as an ICSID award.
497However, it would be conceivable to consider the decisions of the MIC as an
ICSID award after inter se modification of the ICSID Convention, thus as a
modification only between those involved and not between all parties to the
23Article 54 ICSID Convention: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered
pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. [. . .].”
24Reinisch (2016), pp. 765 et seq.
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agreement. According to the principles codified in the VCLT, an inter se modifica-
tion of a multilateral treaty between various states which agree to do so, requires that
the other parties to the agreement are impaired neither in their rights nor in their
obligations and that the modification is not incompatible with the object and purpose
of the treaty as a whole.25
498 Regarding the ICSID Convention, a modification would probably not affect the
rights and obligations of other ICSID States, such that the assessment of the
permissibility of the modification depends on what the exact object and purpose of
the ICSID Convention is. If the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention is to
provide a dispute settlement mechanism between investors and states, which can be
inferred from Article 1 para. 2 ICSID Convention and not the specific form of
dispute resolution in force, a modification for MIC decisions is likely to be
allowed.26 However, this is not undisputed27; but even if an inter se modification
of the ICSID Convention would be considered admissible, the resulting decisions
could not be qualified as ICSID awards, rather at best as arbitral awards for the
modifying parties; only they would be obliged to enforce it.
499 Therefore, it would be better to consider a general revision of the ICSID Con-
vention in order to achieve a far-reaching enforceability of MIC decisions as ICSID
arbitral awards. The ICSID Convention requires the consent of all parties for a
revision of the Convention. For practical reasons, this consensus is very difficult to
achieve.28 Hence, it makes sense to examine the alternative of whether decisions of
an MIC can be considered as arbitral awards within the meaning of the New York
Convention and thus are subject to its recognition and enforcement regime.
25Cf. Article 41 VCLT.
26A modification of the ICSID Convention between states consenting hereto, requires that the
remaining Member States neither are affected in their rights nor in their obligations, and that the
modification is not contradictory with the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole (as stated
in Article 41 VCLT and, even though not undisputed, provided in customary law). Since a
modification most probably would not affect the rights and obligations of other ICSID Member
States, the admissibility of the modification depends on the object and purpose of the ICSID
Convention. If the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention would be a dispute settlement
mechanism between investors and states, in reference to Article 1 para. 2 ICSID Convention, and
the concrete design of this dispute settlement would not belong to the object and purpose, a
modification for MIC decisions would presumably be admissible. For a closer analysis of this
topic, see Reinisch (2016), p. 761.
27Calamita (2017).
28Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1265.
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7.2 Decisions of the MIC as Arbitral Awards Within
the Meaning of the New York Convention
500The decisions of the MIC would have to be arbitral awards under Article I NYC29 in
order to fall within the material scope of application of the New York Convention.30
There is no single definition of the term “arbitral award”. Neither the New York
Convention, nor the UNCITRAL Model Law31 contain a legal definition. The
characterisation of a decision as an arbitral award thus falls within the competence
of the courts having jurisdiction over enforcement or the respective national legal
systems.32
501However, some similarities can be inferred from literature and court decisions on
the definition of arbitral awards. In any case, the principle of “substance over form”
prevails: the mere designation of a decision as such does not automatically make it
an arbitral award.33
502The four constituent elements of an arbitral award are: (1) a voluntary submission
of the parties (2) to a legally binding final dispute settlement (3) by a non-state
decision-maker (4) which is constituted by arbitrators selected by the parties. The
importance of this last element is considered diversely.34 As the question whether a
29Article I NYC: “(1) This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of
such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It
shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought. (2) The term “arbitral awards” shall include not only
awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral
bodies to which the parties have submitted.”
30See on the contrary Petrochilos (2004), p. 378, para. 8.100, who considers that the classification of
a decision as arbitral award by a legal order is no ratione materiae requirement for the applicability
of the NYC; he disagrees expressly with Sanders by arguing that the NYC uses the term “awards” in
a “rudimentary legal manner”: “to refer to what is commonly known as ‘award’ and ‘arbitration’
[. . .] it uses autonomous terms, without reference to any law, to refer to the intrinsic characteristics
of as type of proceedings.” According to Petrochilos, the NYC should clarify explicitly, that
“awards” are defined pursuant to a certain legal order like in other provisions of the NYC
(e.g. Art. V NYC).
31Article 31 UNCITRAL Model Law regulates only “form and content of award”. Herefrom it can
be concluded that the awards are made by “arbitrators” of an “arbitral tribunal”.
32Ehle (2012), pp. 32–34, concluding that from national laws and decisions no uniform or only
predominant practice can be derived about whether the lex fori, the lex arbitri, a combination of
both or an autonomous interpretation of the NYC is decisive for the characterisation of awards.
Bermann (2014), pp. 13 et seq., concludes from a comparative law perspective that a considerable
number of legal orders do not state a significant definition of awards, neither by law, nor by case
law; in and about the same number of legal orders have a very broad definition of awards and a
smaller group requires the finality and the legally binding effect of the decision for the definition of
awards by copying Art. 31 UNCITRAL Model Law. Born (2014), pp. 246 et seqq.
33Ehle (2012), p. 35.
34Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), para. 86; see Born (2014), p. 240, remarking on the
prerequisites of “due process”; Ehle (2012), pp. 34–36, identifying two characteristics of all awards:
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decision is an arbitral award under the New York Convention ultimately remains
within the competence of the respective national courts having jurisdiction over
enforcement, the possible enforceability of an MIC decision can only be tentatively
assessed here.
7.2.1 Voluntary Submission by the Parties
503 Article I para. 2 NYC states that decisions which are enforceable under the
New York Convention include those “to which the parties have submitted”. This
voluntary submission is considered to be a significant difference between arbitration
and compulsory court jurisdiction.35
504 Party autonomy in arbitration proceedings, which manifests itself in a voluntary
declaration of submission, proves to be a particularly important element of an arbitral
award. Whether it is sufficient for such a declaration of submission that the parties
fall within the scope of application of an international investment agreement, which
compulsorily provides an arbitral tribunal for the purposes of dispute settlement, is
controversial. An MIC would constitute such a compulsory dispute resolution
system; investors, who fall within the scope of application of the respective agree-
ment which provides for the dispute settlement jurisdiction of the MIC, could file
claims against states only under the MIC system, without the individual investors
having ever agreed to the MIC’s authority.36 Whether an MIC decision derives from
they are made by a tribunal and are final and legally binding. This opinion focuses on the definition
of the term “arbitral tribunal”, which corresponds to the above mentioned “awards”: “a private panel
of one or more arbitrators appointed to resolve a dispute by way of arbitration instead of state court
proceedings, deriving its authority and jurisdiction from an agreement between the parties.” Ehle
considers the compliance with principles of fair trial as a characteristic of arbitral tribunals.
Additionally, the attribute, that tribunals are ad hoc institutions is repeatedly mentioned. However,
in the context of the enforcement of MIC decisions through the New York Convention this
characteristic does not have to be addressed, since Article I para. 2 NYC explicitly declares awards
of permanent arbitral institutions as enforceable.
35See e.g. Altain Khuder LLC v. IMC Mining Inc, Victoria State Court, 2011, para. 295: “unlike
court proceedings, arbitration proceedings are consensual”; Born (2014), pp. 249–251.
36A similar constellation is explicitly provided in Article 26 para. 5 ECT. This provision states that
the consent of all parties to the ECT regarding the submission to arbitral tribunals is to be considered
compliant with the ICSID Convention and New York Convention enforcement requirements.
Article 26 para. 5 ECT: “(5) (a) The consent given in paragraph (3) together with the written
consent of the Investor given pursuant to paragraph (4) shall be considered to satisfy the require-
ment for: (i) written consent of the parties to a dispute for purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID
Convention and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules; (ii) an “agreement in writing” for
purposes of article II of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the
“New York Convention”); and (iii) “the parties to a contract [to] have agreed in writing” for the
purposes of article 1 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. (b) Any arbitration under this Article
shall at the request of any party to the dispute be held in a state that is a party to the New York
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the voluntary submission of the parties would thus be one of the key points for the
issue of enforceability under the New York Convention.
505It is indisputable that the conclusion of an IIA which includes a general, com-
pulsory dispute settlement system fulfils the requirement of voluntary submission in
regard to the state party.37 If an investor would like to file a claim against the state on
the basis of an IIA and not under national law, the investor submits itself to one of the
proposed dispute resolution mechanisms by bringing the dispute to arbitration. If this
dispute settlement mechanism is the ICSID Convention, the resulting award can,
according to prevailing opinion, also be enforced through the New York Convention
and not just through the ICSID Convention.38
506However, it is considered controversial in the context of the IUSCT whether an
investor voluntarily submits itself as soon as it assigns the case to an arbitration
tribunal and thus whether the submission element of an arbitration award according
to the New York Convention is fulfilled. Since US or Iranian investors in investment
disputes against Iran or the US may bring a case only before the IUSCT and not
before domestic courts of the two states respectively, both literature39 and courts40
have considered that the lack of alternative dispute resolution options could under-
mine the voluntary nature of the submission.
507However, in the few cases in which the New York Convention was used for the
enforcement of awards of the IUSCT and the characterisation of the decision as an
arbitral award was discussed,41 the courts in general came to the conclusion that the
submission of individual investors can be replaced through the consent of the
Convention. Claims submitted to arbitration hereunder shall be considered to arise out of a
commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of article I of that Convention.” See also
Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company, England, Court of
Appeal, 9.9.2005, [2005] EWCA 1116, 12 ICSID Reports 129; cf. also Article 25 para. 2 lit. b)
US Model BIT 2004; Article 28 para. 2 lit. b) Canadian Model BIT 2004; Article 1136 para.
6 NAFTA.
37Paulsson (1995), p. 233; van Harten and Loughlin (2006), pp. 128 et seq.
38Van den Berg (1981), p. 99; Cane (2004), pp. 444 et seq.; Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1119; Tawil
(2009), p. 335, fn. 42; Lew et al. (2003), p. 801; Verhoosel (2009), pp. 310 et seq.
39Ehle (2012), pp. 54 et seq. takes the view that IUSCT cannot make awards in the sense of the
New York Convention, since the Algiers Accords was made admissible based on public interna-
tional law treaties and not based on private law declarations; hence, the element of voluntary
submission, according to Ehle, is missing. Ehle concludes that arbitral tribunals established by law
can never make arbitral awards in the sense of the NYC, based partly on the text of the convention,
partly on the travaux préparatoires. Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), pp. 38 et seq., identify
this point as the main problem of possible enforceability of arbitral awards of a permanent
international arbitral tribunal under the NYC.
40See Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc. et al., US Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, Nos. 88-5879 and 88-5881, 1989, France No. 33; Abrahim Rahman Golshani
v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bureau for International Legal Services, Cour
d’Appel (Court of Appeal), 28.6.2001.
41In other cases, the characterisation of IUSCT decisions as awards in the sense of the New York
Convention was not mentioned.
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respective government to settle disputes through the IUSCT42 or that bringing the
case before the IUSCT by the investor is a voluntary submission.43
508 One opinion in the literature suggests that the voluntary nature of submission
should be sufficient for enforcement under the New York Convention as long as
investors still have the choice between settling disputes through an international
arbitral tribunal or national courts.44 This opinion can be justified by the fact that the
submission of investors under ICSID proceedings is considered to be sufficiently
voluntary for the characterisation as an arbitral award under the New York
Convention.
509 Therefore, it would be more likely that national courts consider the element of
voluntary submission to be fulfilled if the MIC should leave domestic jurisdiction
accessible to investors.
7.2.2 Final and Binding Dispute Resolution
510 The fact that an arbitral award under the New York Convention must result in a final
and binding resolution of the dispute does not present any problems in the case of
MIC decisions.45 Arbitration is a genuine alternative to national jurisdiction. In
arbitration, the parties expect a binding decision by a third, neutral party in a
court-like procedure.46 In contrast to this are, for example, mediation procedures
or simple arbitration reports, which do not lead to arbitral awards and therefore
would not be enforceable under the New York Convention.
42In Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, the court held that the President
can replace a voluntary submission for arbitral awards under the New York Convention (according
to Article I para. 2 as permanent arbitral award) with an Executive Order submitting US citizens to
the jurisdiction of the IUSCT. Alternatively, the circumstance, that Gould had brought the case
before the IUSCT voluntarily, would constitute a ratification of the submission by the President. In
the cases, Iran Aircraft Industries v. AVCO and Flatow v. Iran, the courts had decided correspond-
ingly. In France, the court had equally decided in Golshani v. Iran, that Golshani could not argue,
that no declaration of submission existed, since he had voluntarily brought the case before the
IUSCT.
43In 1985, the English High Court had made an obiter dictum in Dallal v. Bank Mellat, that the
NYC would not be applicable for the enforcement of the IUSCT in England. The High Court had
not held the decision as an award under the NYC, since according to the lex arbitri (according to the
High Court Dutch law), an award would require a declaration of submission in writing and signed
by both parties. However, the High Court in Dallal had solely to decide on the admissibility of the
IUSCT and not on the question whether the NYC would be applicable to IUSCT decisions. The
High Court had decided that Dallal had submitted himself voluntarily to the IUSCT by bringing the
case before the tribunal and, therefore, at least had established the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In any
case, according to the High Court, the prerequisites of a voluntary submission were fulfilled.
44Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), para. 88.
45Ehle (2012), p. 37, para. 32.
46Ehle (2012), p. 37.
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511In any case, an MIC, which should undoubtedly have court-like features, would
fulfil the requirement that a third, neutral party renders a final resolution of a given
dispute in a court-like procedure.
7.2.3 Non-State Decision-Makers
512Both national court decisions and prevailing opinion in the literature agree that an
essential characteristic of arbitral tribunals is their private, non-governmental nature,
which distinguishes them from courts or governmental institutions.47
513This raises the question of whether the MIC should be considered as a public or
private entity. Some authors draw parallels to the ICJ and ECtHR to show that while
a permanent investment tribunal would not be an institution of state justice, it would
certainly not be a “private” entity.48 Others refer to the IUSCT as an institution sui
generis.49
514A solution would be to give the MIC sufficient “private” elements to classify it as
an arbitral tribunal under the New York Convention. For example, a permanent
judiciary might conflict with the characterisation as a private entity. However, a list
of specific candidates used in the election procedure of the judicial bench could solve
this problem.50 Here, this element of arbitration overlaps with the fourth element—
the arbitrators selected by the parties—which will be discussed below (see paras.
517 et seqq.).
515The MIC is not likely to be a less private entity than the IUSCT, whose nature as a
state or private institution has not been addressed during enforcement procedures
under the New York Convention.51 In states which enforce decisions of the IUSCT
as arbitral awards according to the New York Convention, this element should
therefore not be a problem. In general, this third element cannot be evaluated
independently, but rather can only be clarified from the overlap and elaboration of
the other elements.
47Born (2014), pp. 255–258 accepts the difference between arbitration and choice of jurisdiction
clauses in court proceedings: in the case of arbitral proceedings, a dispute is transferred to another,
non-state level and will not be decided by state officials, whereas, in the case of choice of
jurisdiction clauses, only a specific national court was chosen by the parties. Additionally, in the
case of choice of jurisdiction clauses, the parties do not choose the individuals who take the
decision, but the judges out of an existing judiciary, that are chosen by the court, independent
from the parties’ wishes.
48Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), pp. 36 et seq.
49Toope (1990), p. 284.
50Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), pp. 36 et seq.
51Neither Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Flatow v. Iran nor Dallal
v. Bank Mellat discuss this aspect.
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7.2.4 Arbitrator Selection by the Parties
516 The last element of arbitral awards is not consistently given the same degree of
attention within the literature.52
517 If the MIC were to be permanently established and regulated by the member
states only and if these states elected the judges exclusively, while investors had no
impact on that process, one could doubt the private nature of such an institution. This
is also a significant difference to ICSID procedures, whose decision-makers are at
least private: both parties to the dispute, the respondent state and the investor, have
the same influence on the constitution of the arbitrator’s bench.
518 Again, an examination of the IUSCT can be useful here. Iran, the US and the state-
appointed arbitrators each select one third of the nine arbitrators.53 Consequently,
only the states, but not the investors, have an influence on the decision-makers in the
IUSCT. In the rulings on the enforcement of IUSCT awards through the New York
Convention, this arrangement of the arbitrator’s bench was not problematic.54
519 It is also frequently argued that a modern definition of arbitration does not require
the arbitrators being elected by the parties, since the focus would lie on the voluntary
submission of the parties, as has already been confirmed by some arbitral tribunals.55
520 One possibility of making the MIC more tribunal-like would be to use ad hoc
judges appointed by the investors in each case in addition to the permanent judges
appointed by the states (see para. 174). This arrangement would create space for party
autonomy and might bring the character of the MIC closer to that of arbitral tribunals.
7.2.5 Foreign, Non-Domestic and Anational Awards
521 The definition of another element of Article I para. 1 NYC is relevant to the question
of whether decisions by the MIC would be enforceable under the New York
Convention: only awards “rendered in the territory of another State” (“foreign”)
and those “not considered as domestic” (“non-domestic”) fall within the scope of
application of the New York Convention.
522 Foreign arbitral awards follow the principle of territoriality: an arbitral award is
foreign, as long as it has not been rendered in the territory of the state of enforcement; if
the state of enforcement has not declared the reservation of reciprocity in accordance
with Article I para. 3 NYC, the New York Convention is applicable universally,
52Ehle (2012), for example, does not mention this element at all; however, Kaufmann-Kohler and
Potestà (2016), p. 37, discuss the choice of arbitrators by the parties as a controversial potential
feature of arbitral awards.
53Brower and Brueschke (1998), p. 10.
54Neither Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Flatow v. Iran nor Dallal
v. Bank Mellat discuss this aspect.
55Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), see the sources in para. 96.
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irrespective of the state of origin of the arbitral award or of the parties.56 According to
the prevailing view, an arbitral award is “made” in the state of the seat of the tribunal.57
523Thus, the question arises as to whether a decision by the MIC would be foreign in
the case where the host state of the MIC is not the state of enforcement at the same
time. In the context of the principle of territoriality, which only deals with the
statutory geographical position of the tribunal,58 such an interpretation may well
be conceivable.59
524Arbitral awards are non-domestic if they were rendered according to the principle
of territoriality in the state of enforcement, but national law was not applied.
However, the definition of that term, which falls in the competence of the national
courts, does not seem to be of much importance for the enforcement of MIC
decisions in light of the existing jurisprudence—relevant cases that may be
non-domestic are usually referred to as “anational” or “delocalised”. The examina-
tion of jurisprudence and literature reveals that the question of whether or not the
decision was rendered under domestic or foreign law would not be problematic for
the enforcement of MIC decisions, but rather whether the decision was based on any
national law and whether basing the decision on national law would be necessary.60
525Some authors,61 and judges especially in France62 and the US,63 claim that
IUSCT-awards are enforceable as anational awards under the New York
56Ehle (2012), pp. 56 and 59. Petrochilos (2004), p. 352, para. 8.35 concludes that it is both
sufficient and necessary, if the award was made in another state than the enforcement forum, for
applying the NYC.
57Ehle (2012), p. 57, para. 99.
58Ehle (2012), p. 56, para. 95. Ehle (2012), p. 60, considers an absolute geographical interpretation
as inappropriate, since the focus should be on the word “made”—an award would not be made
where it is signed, but at the legal formal seat of the tribunal.
59Additionally, Petrochilos (2004), p. 357 concludes that it is sufficient and necessary, if an arbitral
award was made in another state than the enforcement forum, for applying the NYC.
60Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 57 define anational/delocalized awards as “awards not
made under domestic law” and point out how much attention the possible enforcement of such
awards under the NYC has gained recently.
61According to Ehle (2012), pp. 60 et seq., the majority opinion favours the idea that arbitration
should or must be established, especially by the agreed seat-state and/or the lex arbitri. Ehle argues
this with the following reasoning: a subsumption is neither under the term foreign, nor under the
term non-domestic possible; a historical interpretation of anational awards under the NYC is also
not possible, since a national awards were not a topic discussed within the NYC negotiations.
Petrochilos (2004), p. 371 instead concludes that there is no proof that the NYC could not be applied
to awards, which have been rendered under merely international law. Toope (1990), pp. 127–129
does as well conclude that a-national awards do exist and can be enforced under the NYC. The
UNCITRAL Guide on the NYC, para. 63, however, assumes that the text of Article 1 para. 1 NYC
permits the enforcement of a national awards, so that the domestic or a national nature of the awards
would be without effect on the applicability of the NYC.
62Cour de Cassation, Les Cahiers de l’Arbitrage 2007, 44 ¼ 25(4) ASA Bull. 829 (2007) ¼ XXXII
Y.B. Com. Arb. 299 (2007).
63See Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc. et al., Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, 23.10.1989, 887 F.2d 1357, the court denied that there was a condition under the
NYC, that the award had to be rendered under domestic law. The reasons for refusal of an
enforcement were stated explicitly in the NYC. None of these reasons required the award to be
rendered under domestic law (1364–5).
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Convention.64 In any event, as discussed above, ICSID awards (as a sort of a
national arbitration awards) may be enforced through the New York Convention.65
Within the literature, it is therefore argued that there is no reason why the arbitral
awards of an international arbitral tribunal should not be enforceable under the
New York Convention.66
526 Another way of reading the New York Convention would be that the grounds for
refusal of enforcement are listed in one article only: Article V NYC. It explicitly
states according to which legal system the individual exclusion criteria should be
assessed. Article V NYC furthermore recognises the distinction between the law “of
the country in which, or under the law of which [the arbitration award was ren-
dered]”,67 which could be taken as an indication that an arbitral award does not
necessarily have to be made under the law of a particular country. With that
argument, the US court in the Gould case came to the conclusion that the
New York Convention ratione materiae is also applicable to anational arbitration
awards, since in Art. V NYC, and also in Article I NYC, it does not presuppose a
national nature of the arbitration award.
7.2.6 Litigation Between Natural or Legal Persons
527 There is consensus (also confirmed by the travaux preparatoires and court deci-
sions) that the term “legal person” in Article I para. 1 NYC also includes legal
persons of public law, for example states and international organisations.68 The
interpretation of this term should therefore not be a problem in the context of the
enforcement of MIC decisions.69
64Cases regarding the enforcement of awards SEEE v. Yugoslavia (26.10.1973, Hoge Raad) and
SEEE v. Yugoslavia (13.11.1984, Cour d’appel de Rouen); Götaverken v. France, LIAMCO and
Gould are commonly been referred to as proofs of judicial practice regarding the enforcement
possibility of anational awards under the NYC.
65Schreuer et al. (2009), pp. 1122 et seq. explain that an enforcement of ICSID awards under the
NYC will probably not come up in the future, but such a case would need to be handled in a manner
similar to the enforcement of ICSID additional facility awards. Additional facility awards should be
enforced under the NYC, since a majority of legal scholars and some court decisions assumed as
well that “international, a-national and denationalized awards” fall within the scope of the NYC.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 58 therefore saw in their legal opinion no reason why an
award of another international arbitral tribunal should not be enforced under the NYC.
66Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 58.
67Article V para. 1 lit. e) NYC: “of the country in which, or under the law of which”.
68Ehle (2012), p. 69.
69According to the travaux préparatoires, the majority of states did not want to implement such
rules into the NYC, since they considered it redundant. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) and Czechoslovakia, who wanted to make the awards rendered by their arbitral institutions
enforceable under the NYC, were finally able to gain acceptance for their proposal. It can be
extracted from the travaux that the supreme topic of negotiations regarding Article I para. 2 was the
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7.2.7 MIC as a “Permanent Arbitral Body” Under Article
I Para. 2 NYC
528Article I para. 2 NYC explicitly states that “not only awards made by arbitrators
appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which
the parties have submitted” are enforceable under the New York Convention.
529Arbitral institutions such as the ICC,70 the Arbitration Institute of the Finnish
Central Chamber of Commerce71 and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(SIAC),72 have already been subsumed under Article I para. 2 NYC as permanent
arbitral bodies.73 In the Gould case the IUSCT was regarded as a permanent
arbitration tribunal under Article I para. 2 NYC. In any event, Article I para.
2 NYC makes it clear that the permanent existence of the MIC does not pose a
problem for the enforceability of a decision according to the New York Convention.
7.2.8 Reservation on “Commercial Matters” Under Article
I Para. 3 NYC
530Under Article I para 3, the New York Convention explicitly provides two reserva-
tions that states may declare.74 Many Member States have declared, by accession to
the New York Convention, through a reservation under Article I para. 3 NYC, that
they only enforce arbitral awards arising out of disputes over commercial matters
voluntary submission to these permanent arbitral bodies. The majority of the states were of the
opinion that awards from permanent arbitral tribunals would also fall into the scope of Article I para.
1 NYC, as long their jurisdiction was not compulsory. The free choice of arbitrators was e.g. not
discussed in the negotiations. A German court followed this strong focus on voluntary submission
and denied the enforcement of a Polish tribunal’s decision under the NYC, since the jurisdiction of
the tribunal was compulsory. Kammergericht Berlin (Court of Appeal), decision of 7.3.1995—14 U
2979/93; see as well BGH (Federal Supreme Court), decision of 20.1.1994—III ZR 143/92, BGHZ
125, 7.
70FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Supreme Court of New South
Wales, 1.11.2010.
71Brandenburgisches Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court of Brandenburg), decision ren-
dered on 13.6.2002—8 Sch 02/01.
72Transpac Capital Pte Ltd v. Buntoro, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 7.7.2008, [2008]
NSWSC 671.
73Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc. et al., Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 23.10.1989, 887 F.2d 1357.
74Article I para 3 NYC: “When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying
extension under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply
the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising
out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the
national law of the State making such declaration.”
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under the New York Convention.75 For this reason, it is equally relevant to the
practical enforceability of MIC decisions under the New York Convention to
identify which cases are considered to concern “commercial matters”. In concreto,
the question arises as to whether “commercial matters” can be construed as including
investment disputes between states and investors or only matters of international
commercial law between private individuals.
531 According to Article I para. 3 NYC, the definition of “commercial matters”
depends on the national law of the reserving state. Thus, until now, reservations
on commercial matters have been interpreted widely by national courts; legal
disputes between states and investors under an investment agreement have been
subject to the same criteria for the classification as commercial matters as those
between private individuals.76 For example, the US has declared a reservation for
commercial matters.77 However, in cases concerning the enforcement of decisions
by the IUSCT under the New York Convention in the US, this reservation has not
been addressed. Therefore, it can be assumed that investment disputes between states
and investors are also covered by the term “commercial matters”.78
532 In any event, Canadian courts have acknowledged NAFTA investment awards
under Chapter 11 NAFTA as awards concerning “commercial matters” as defined by
the UNCITRAL Model Law.79 Furthermore, the Swedish Svea Court of Appeal has
75In 2012, out of the 147 state parties of the NYC, 46 had applied reservations for commercial
matters.
76According to Ehle (2012), pp. 81 et seq. the interpretation of “commercial matters” has not so far
created problems in practice, since the states interpret the term widely. Also, he concludes that
courts have a tendency to interpret “commercial matters” as broadly as envisaged in the
UNCITRAL Model Law (footnote 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law defines “commercial” as
“[. . .] Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following trans-
actions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution
agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; con-
sulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement
or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods
or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.”); Born (2014), pp. 302 et seq., defines “commercial matters”
as “relationship involving an economic exchange where one (or both) parties contemplate realizing
a profit or other benefit.” This definition would also be consistent with the tenor of national court
decisions regarding the NYC.
77See U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. § 201; according to § 202 the NYC applies
“only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are
considered as commercial under the national law of the United States.”
78However, Born (2014), pp. 300 et seq. shows that in the context of state immunity, space for
different interpretation is given. In cases of public law, such as trusts law, concession and other
contracts which are based on national sovereignty, doubts concerning the interpretation of the term
“commercial matters” seem to be significant. According to Born, the parties of concession con-
tracts, however, intend arbitration clauses in a way that they constitute commercial matters in the
sense of the NYC, since effective enforcement would be one of the fundamental goals of interna-
tional arbitration treaties.
79United Mexican States v. Metalclad, Canada, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2.5.2001,
[2001] BCSC 664, 5 ICSID Reports 236; United Mexican States v. Feldman Karpa, Canada,
Ontario Court of Appeal, 11.1.2005, 9 ICSID Reports 508, 516, para. 41.
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recognised the award in the case CME v. Czech Republic80 as “international com-
mercial arbitration”.81
533A possible reservation on commercial matters would therefore presumably not
per se preclude enforcement of an MIC decision under the New York Convention.
7.3 Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions of the MIC
534It follows from the preceding analysis that the enforcement of MIC decisions in third
countries would not be possible through the ICSID Convention since its decisions do
not constitute ICSID arbitration awards, due to the fact that the MIC and its pro-
cedures are designed in a manner differing from the ICSID Convention.
535An enforcement according to the New York Convention would be legally
conceivable; nevertheless, successful enforcement depends on the perspective of
the specific national court having jurisdiction over enforcement. This can lead to
divergent results, depending on the legal system. The main difficulties in recognition
and enforcement of MIC decisions as arbitral awards could be the issue of “voluntary
submission” to the MIC by both parties and the controversial enforceability of
“anational decisions”.
536Due to the legal uncertainty as to whether MIC decisions can be qualified as
arbitral awards—whether according to the ICSID Convention or under the
New York Convention—the best solution seems to be the imposition of an obliga-
tion to enforce within the MIC Statute, analogous to the provisions of the ICSID
Convention. For the moment, this would mean that only the parties to the agreement
would be bound by the MIC Statute. However, later on, with a wider acceptance of
the MIC, this solution should be legally unequivocal.
537Besides, a fund system could be set up in addition to an autonomous enforcement
mechanism provided for in the MIC Statute. The IUSCT followed an interesting
approach to ensure the enforcement of decisions of this tribunal. After the conclusion
of the Algiers-Agreement, US$1 billion of Iranian assets in US bank accounts at the
time of the hostage crisis after the storming of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979
was paid into a “security account” as a fund for the satisfaction of US claims
resulting from IUSCT decisions.82 In addition, Iran has been obliged to make
additional payments to this account, so that the account balance never falls below
US$500 million. Iran itself has had no access to this security account and therefore
had to go through regular enforcement channels; however, Iran has so rarely been
awarded damages that the bias of the IUSCT enforcement mechanism can be
80CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13.9.2001,
9 ICSID Reports 121.
81Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic BV, Sweden, Svea Court of Appeal, 15.5.2003, 9 ICSID
Reports 439, 493.
82See Brower and Brueschke (1998), p. 8.
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neglected.83 Nevertheless, this enforcement mechanism has proven to be very
efficient, which also explains the rarity of execution attempts under the New York
Convention.84 Certainly, it would not be easy to set up a comparable instrument for
the MIC. Nevertheless, it would be worth considering the extent to which it would be
possible to set up a fund for the settlement of claims for compensation arising from
MIC decisions.
538 In this respect, one way of ensuring the prompt and effective enforcement of MIC
judgments would be that the MIC members make a deposit into a fund. It should be
determined whether the amount of the payment should be based on the member’s
economic situation or whether all members should make equal payments. One
argument against the latter alternative is that countries with higher economic output
may benefit more from an MIC, since in absolute terms higher investments are likely
to be made by investors in these countries. However, it cannot be assumed that the
volume of foreign investments is directly proportional to the number of investment
cases. Moreover, since the possible amount of damages for an MIC decision is not
based on the economic strength of the respective state, economic performance as a
basis for the financing of the fund does not seem to be an appropriate criterion.
539 The compensation of damages up to a certain maximum amount could immedi-
ately be paid from this fund to the winning investor. In that regard, a cap on the
payout sum could be stipulated. In any case, the fund volume should never fall below
a certain minimum sum; with 40 or more members, a sum in the single-digit millions
of each member should be sufficient to keep the fund operational. At least, such a
fund system could be used by SMEs as a special system of enforcement, so that their
claims can be satisfied as soon as possible. The claim from the MIC judgment
against the MIC member would then be transferred to the MIC itself.
540 Enforcement in the MIC system and the fund system should not be mutually
exclusive. However, it could be considered that recourse to the fund system would
only be possible if other forms of enforcement prove to be difficult.
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Possibilities for the Establishment of an
MIC and a Possible Connection to Existing
Institutions and System Conformity
541In light of the statements above and the very specific requirements that should be put
on the MIC, acceptance of MIC judgments as arbitral awards in the meaning of the
New York Convention in states where enforcement is sought, seems questionable. It
follows that the best option for an effective MIC would be to establish it as an
independent multilateral court, which should provide for its own procedural rules as
well as enforcement provisions or even an own independent fund system.1
542This would not only ensure a largely consistent application of the investment
standards, but also an effective enforcement of MIC judgments. Such a multilateral
court should be open for accession to other states and Regional Economic Integra-
tion Organisations (REIOs).
8.1 Practical Implementation of the Establishment
of an MIC
543The establishment of an international dispute settlement institution is usually accom-
plished by means of a treaty or other international agreement. For that, there are
different basic models available.
544Dispute resolution institutions are often designed as organs of international
organisations, as independent international organisations themselves or also as
mere bodies for the implementation or application of the treaty.2 In this way, the
1For a similar recommendation see European Union (2019), para. 31.
2Giorgetti (2016), p. 890.
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ICJ is a main organ of the UN,3 the CJEU is an EU institution4 and both the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda
(ICTR) are subsidiary organs of the United Nations Security Council.5 On the
other hand, many international courts, such as the International Criminal Court,
are designed as separate international organisations.6 In addition, some international
treaties foresee the establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms that are either
established as permanent courts (ITLOS for the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea,7 ECtHR for the ECHR8) or mere bodies for the application of the treaty (such as
the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR)).9
545 In the field of investment dispute resolution, two institutions, although they do not
exercise any dispute resolution function, but rather mere administrative bodies
supporting activities for arbitral tribunals, are considered to be international organi-
sations. This is clearly the case with ICSID, which was established by the
Washington Convention of 1965 as an international organisation with explicit
international legal personality.10 The PCA is also an international organisation,
3Article 7 para. 1 UN Charter: “There are established as principal organs of the United Nations: a
General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an
International Court of Justice and a Secretariat.” Article 1 ICJ Statute: “The International Court of
Justice established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present
Statute.”
4Article 13 para. 1 TEU: “[. . .] The Union’s institutions shall be: the European Parliament, the
European Council, the Council, the European Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the Com-
mission”), the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the Court of
Auditors.”
5Giorgetti (2016), p. 892.
6Article 4 para. 1 ICC Statute: “The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also
have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its
purposes.” Schabas (2010), p. 94.
7United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UN Doc A/CONF 62/122
(1982), www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf; Boisson de
Chazournes (2012), p. 111.
8Article 19 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, restructuring the Control Machinery established thereby: “To ensure the observance of
the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the protocols
thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as the Court.
It shall function on a permanent basis.”
9Amerasinghe (1996), pp. 160 et seq.
10Article 18 ICSID Convention: “The Centre shall have full international legal personality.”
Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 59: “Despite close legal ties between the Centre and the World Bank,
the Centre is an autonomous international organization, enjoying its own international legal
personality.”
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founded by the Hague Convention in 1899.11 Both international organisations are
based on treaties, have states as members and are open to further parties.
546For the establishment of the MIC, the creation of an independent international
organisation by means of an international treaty (MIC Statute) would be the most
appropriate option (see paras. 548 et seqq.).12 The creation of an international
organisation would ensure the essential points for the functioning of an independent
court, such as functional immunity for the judges, equal financial treatment for the
parties to the agreement, the conclusion of seat and immunity agreements etc.
8.2 Structuring the MIC as an International Organisation
547The legal situation of the MIC would be determined in the national legal arena by
privileges and immunities. Immunity guarantees would secure its functionality. As
an international organisation, the MIC would enjoy legal personality under interna-
tional and national law. This would ensure that the MIC could conclude international
treaties such as a seat agreement establishing the necessary privileges and immuni-
ties. At the same time, it could conclude contracts under national law, acquire assets
and rent facilities etc. The latter aspect of a legal personality under national law is
usually achieved by provisions, according to which an international organisation
explicitly has the right to conclude private law contracts, to acquire assets and to
initiate proceedings before state courts.13 In numerous recent treaties that establish
international organisations, international legal personality is also expressly fore-
seen.14 The MIC should also follow this example.
548Central to the effective implementation of judicial independence would be a
functional immunity from jurisdiction for the judges as seen in all international
courts and quasi-judicial dispute resolution organs.15 At the same time, the MIC, to
111899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 29 July 1899, https://pca-
cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/1899-Convention-for-the-Pacific-Settlement-of-
International-Disputes.pdf; Daly (2012), p. 38.
12For a similar reference by the European Union which presumes the use of an instrument to
establish the standing mechanism (the term used for the new investment court), see European Union
(2019), paras. 27, 31, 35.
13Cf. Article 18 sentence 2 ICSID Convention: “The legal capacity of the Centre shall include the
capacity: (a) to contract; (b) to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property; (c) to
institute legal proceedings.”
14Cf. Article 18 sentence 1 ICSID Convention; Article VIII:1 WTO Agreement; Article 47 TEU;
Article 4 ICC Statute.
15Cf. Article 21 ICSID Convention: “The Chairman, the members of the Administrative Council,
persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators or members of a Committee appointed pursuant to
paragraph (3) of Article 52, and the officers and employees of the Secretariat (a) shall enjoy
immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in the exercise of their
functions, except when the Centre waives this immunity; [. . .].” Article VIII WTO Agreement:
“(3) The officials of the WTO and the representatives of the Members shall similarly be accorded by
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whom decisions could be attributed to, should enjoy immunity from national court
jurisdiction,16 in order to avoid any interference with the independence of the MIC in
its decision-making process through complaints before national courts.
549 Furthermore, it would be important to grant the other usual privileges and
immunities to the MIC as well as the judges and other staff of the organisation.
These include the right of free movement and residence, customs relief, exemptions
from social security contributions etc.17
550 These also include tax exemptions, which should not be misunderstood as
personal privileges of the judges and other staff of the MIC, but rather reflect the
principle of equal treatment of MIC Member States.18 Only an exemption from
income taxation by the host state would ensure that the salaries of the judges and
other staff of the MIC funded by the Member States would not disproportionally
benefit the host state.
551 These privileges and immunities could already be stated in the basic treaty, in a
separate privileges and immunities protocol or in a seat agreement. The United
Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities serves as a model for many
other immunity agreements.19 In particular, with regard to safeguarding judicial
immunity, it would make sense to provide for this in a multilateral instrument (and
not a mere bilateral seat agreement).
552 In principle, international organisations have a permanent seat.20 This distin-
guishes them, inter alia, from arbitral tribunals. The seat of the MIC should be at
the place where the Secretariat works and the Plenary Body meets.21 In any case, in
each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of
their functions in connection with the WTO. (4) The privileges and immunities to be accorded by a
Member to the WTO, its officials, and the representatives of its Members shall be similar to the
privileges and immunities stipulated in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 November
1947.” Article 19 ICJ Statute: “The members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the
Court, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.” Article 51 ECHR: “The judges shall be
entitled, during the exercise of their functions, to the privileges and immunities provided for in
Article 40 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and in the agreements made thereunder.”
16Cf. Article 20 ICSID Convention “The Centre, its property and assets shall enjoy immunity from
all legal process, except when the Centre waives this immunity.”
17See in this respect the detailed explanations of Reinisch (2016a).
18Kunz (1947), pp. 860 et seq.; Martha (2016), pp. 219 et seqq. An exemption from taxes was also
proposed for the judges of the Arab Investment Court under Art. 28(4) of the Unified Agreement for
the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States, 1980.
19Ruffert and Walter (2015), para. 184; Reinisch (2016b), pp. 1048–1068.
20Article 3 para. 1 ICC Statute: “The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague in the
Netherlands (‘the host State’).” Article 22 para. 1 ICJ Statute: “The seat of the Court shall be
established at The Hague. This, however, shall not prevent the Court from sitting and exercising its
functions elsewhere whenever the Court considers it desirable.” Article 28 para. 5 Arab Investment
Court Agreement: “The seat of the Court shall be at the permanent headquarters of the League of
Arab States and shall not be transferred unless the Court takes a substantiated decision to convene
its sessions or undertake its functions in another location.”
21Ruffert and Walter (2015), para. 189.
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the interest of better international acceptance of the MIC, the option of providing for
several seats could also be considered. If necessary, organs of the MIC could be
connected to the existing infrastructure of other international organisations and
courts (see para. 560 et seqq.). A seat for the Plenary Body could be located in
Geneva, as the representatives of the Members of the General Council of the WTO,
which are likely to be identical with the representatives of the Members of the MIC
Plenary Body, are already present there. In addition, it should be discussed whether,
with a large number of member states from all continents, several locations for the
conducting of negotiations on all continents should be considered.
553The relationship of the MIC with the host state should be regulated in a seat
agreement, in which the balance between the MIC’s interest in effective work as well
as the economic and security concerns of the host state can be found.22 The MIC
Statute, which could already incorporate immunity rules, should therefore be
supplemented with further seat and immunity agreements concluded with, inter
alia, the host state of the MIC. These contain rules on:
– the protection of the facilities of the MIC; protection of the MIC staff, including
their immunity;
– a guarantee of the free movement of persons of judges and other staff;
– dispute settlement in connection with the seat agreement; and
– questions of tax exemption.
554It would also be possible to conclude a main seat agreement and to regulate the
details regarding e.g. the meetings of the Plenary Body, or to regulate the establish-
ment of the negotiation venues in an open or undefined way so that further concret-
ization of it is possible through secondary law.
555Furthermore, it could also be determined with regard to the seat that for instance
the President of the Court must also live at the seat of the MIC.23
8.3 Connection to Existing Institutions
556The model examined here of a two-tiered MIC is in principle difficult to integrate
into the structure of existing models. In addition to the establishment of an indepen-
dent international organisation, the connection to existing institutions would also
come into question.
557In the CETA/TTIP discussion on the establishment of bilateral permanent judicial
institutions to settle investment disputes, a preference for the integration in the
ICSID system is shown. This is reflected, in particular, in the idea that the decisions
of the planned “courts” can be considered as ICSID arbitral awards. However, as has
22Ruffert and Walter (2015), para. 193.
23Cf. e.g. Article 22 para. 2 ICJ Statute: “The President and the Registrar shall reside at the seat of
the Court.”
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already been pointed out (see para. 498), even if such an inter se modification of the
ICSID Convention would be allowed, such modified arbitral awards would only be
seen as ICSID awards by the modifying parties. Therefore, the essential advantage of
the ICSID Convention, namely automatic enforceability in all member states, would
be lost. The parties to the ICSID Convention that do not participate in the modifi-
cation are not obliged to enforce such modified arbitral awards from a CETA or
TTIP court. Therefore, a direct institutional connection between the MIC and ICSID
does not seem practical. Moreover, an amendment of the ICSID Convention that
requires unanimity seems rather unrealistic,24 especially because some states that
explicitly oppose the MIC System are unlikely to agree on an amendment of the
ICSID Convention.25
558 It has also been suggested that an investment court should be integrated into the
WTO Dispute Settlement System. However, this would require a fundamental
change of the DSU. The WTO Dispute Settlement System is open to its members
only, never to private persons, i.e. investors.26 In addition, in the past, a substantive
extension of WTO Law to allow access and protection of foreign investments has
repeatedly failed, as it happened during the Uruguay Round27 with one of the
so-called Singapore Issues.28 An integration into the WTO System thus also appears
to be unrealistic at the present time.29
559 The same applies to a connection of the MIC with the ICJ because, in addition to
an extensive change of jurisdiction of the ICJ, access to the Court would have to be
made possible for natural and legal persons, i.e. the ICJ Statute would have to be
extensively amended.30
560 This does not preclude, however, making use of the institutional expertise of
ICSID and its facilities etc. That would of course be possible for the MIC as an
independent international organisation. So far, the ICSID Secretariat has offered its
support in non-ICSID arbitration procedures and has provided administrative sup-
port in procedures under UNCITRAL and other arbitration rules.31
24Article 66 para. 1 ICSID Convention: “If the Administrative Council shall so decide by a majority
of two-thirds of its members, the proposed amendment shall be circulated to all Contracting States
for ratification, acceptance or approval. Each amendment shall enter into force 30 days after
dispatch by the depositary of this Convention of a notification to Contracting States that all
Contracting States have ratified, accepted or approved the amendment.”
25American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), p. 120.
26Cf. Article 1.1 DSU: “[. . .] the settlement of disputes between Members [. . .].” A change
therefore would only be possible according to Art. X of the WTO Agreement.
27Herrmann et al. (2007), para. 790.
28Compare—decision of the General Council regarding the work program of the Doha agenda of
1.8.2004 (July package), WT/L/579.
29See in this respect as well American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), p. 129.
30American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), p. 120.
31The Secretariat of the ICSID has been designated as the Secretariat for the Investment Tribunal
and the Appeal Tribunal under Art. 3.09(16) and 3.10(14) EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature),
Art. 3.38(18) and 3.39(18) EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) and Art. 11(17) and Art. 12
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561Similarly, in an agreement between the MIC and ICSID or also the PCA or other
arbitral institutions, logistical and staff support could be obtained. The MIC could
therefore share infrastructure with other organisations that do not fully use their
infrastructure either at an initial phase of the MIC or even in the long term.32 In
particular, during an initial phase when the amount of cases is not yet foreseeable, it
could be beneficial to use hearing facilities and secretarial support from such existing
institutions, to avoid setting up expensive court infrastructure. After the initial phase,
the average number of procedures could be more easily estimated and the judicial
bench could potentially be expanded (see paras. 111 et seqq.). During an expansion
phase, the court could acquire its own premises once the longer-term sharing of
infrastructure with other institutions or organisations no longer seems possible.
562Here, in addition to ICSID in Washington, the ITLOS in Hamburg or the PCA
with its various locations could be considered.33 It would certainly also be necessary
to decide whether to have the seat of the MIC in a state that is unlikely to show any
interest in membership in the near future. In any case, as far as infrastructure is
concerned, a considerable amount of money could be saved or infrastructure of other
organisations and institutions could be used more effectively. The money saved in
(15) EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on February, 2019; The ICSID Secre-
tariat has also been recommended as an option by Katz (2016), p. 180; See also ICSID website,
Case Administration for Non-ICSID cases, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/Process/Non-
ICSID-Arbitration.aspx: “In addition to administering proceedings under the ICSID rules, the
Centre is also available to administer arbitration cases under other rules, such as the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules and ad hoc investor-State and State-State cases. These non-ICSID cases are
submitted to ICSID by agreement of the parties either prior to the constitution of the Tribunal or
once the Tribunal is constituted. On occasion, the Secretary-General of ICSID also serves as
appointing authority of an arbitrator. The services rendered by the Centre in non-ICSID cases
may range from limited assistance with the organization of hearings and management of the case
finances to full secretariat services in the administration of the case concerned. Parties and Tribunals
are free to elect the extent of the services desired.” For further discussion on the use of the ICSID
Secretariat to support an Investment Court System, See, European Commission (2017), p. 36.
32For a similar suggestion, See, European Commission (2017), p. 49.
33Cf. www.nienstedten.de/Burgerverein/Seegericht/body_seegericht.html: “The building [. . .] had
been constructed in the years 1997 to 2000 [. . .]. The construction costs amounted to 123 million
DM (80% were covered by the Federal Republic of Germany, 20% by the City of Hamburg, the
operating costs are covered by the United Nations). [. . .] The main building consists of 3 court-
rooms, 25 offices for judges, 11 conference rooms, and 74 office rooms. Additionally lobby, library,
study, catalogue room, storage room, a flat for the facility manager and a grand entrance hall. All
rooms are electronically surveilled; the security department is staffed at all times. The used parts of
the building cover 4755 m2. In the center of the building in between the two main wings, the main
round hall for court session is located, including a bench for the 21 judges. There are two minor
halls, which can be connected with the main hall, so that a number of 240 persons in total can be
seated. The latest technology, being able to include amendments, without any constructional
changes, including four cameras and a media wall. Sound and image can be transported outside
of the main hall. A room for video conferences allows hearings of witnesses from remote locations.
Translation booths allow simultaneous translations in the six work languages of the UN, if
necessary also other languages. A large conference room for the judges is also considered a “safe
room” in case of crises. Besides there are two smaller conference rooms and rooms for the parties to
the disputes and witnesses and a communications center.”
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this way could be invested in first-class staffing: full-time judges, a Secretariat and an
Advisory Centre.
563 It has also been proposed34 that the project of judicial multilateralisation of an
investment dispute settlement system should be promoted with support of
UNCITRAL,35 OECD and UNCTAD,36 since these organisations are very inter-
ested in reforming ISDS and are already active in the area of ISDS investment
protection. As mentioned above and is well known UNCITRAL mandated its
Working Group III in 2017 to discuss a reform of investment arbitration. Working
Group III is now working on relevant solutions to be recommended to the
UNCITRAL Commission.37 Especially a structural reform with an MIC is now
“on the table”. UNCTAD could bring development perspectives into the discus-
sion.38 In addition, the ILC could be involved in the work. Likewise, cooperation of
the proposed MIC Advisory Center, particularly with the UNCTAD could be
considered.
8.4 Entry into Force of the MIC Statute Only
with a Minimum Number of Members
564 Like with the International Criminal Court, for instance, it might make sense that the
MIC Statute only enters into force after a certain number of ratifications.39 If only a
small number of states are on board for the MIC project, just another ISDS system
would emerge alongside the existing ones. Therefore, it should be determined that a
certain number of states must ratify an MIC Statute before it can enter into force.
565 Aminimum number of 40 members should be foreseen. In addition to the EU and
its 28 Member States, eleven more states would have to be convinced of joining the
MIC. The EU is already negotiating or is about to start negotiations for a large
number of agreements, all of which should also include investment protection
(China, Myanmar, Japan, Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines).40 The agreements
34American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), pp. 120 et seq.
35See especially UNCITRAL (2017).
36See reference to work by UNCTAD in UNCITRAL (2018), paras. 23 et seqq.
37See UNCITRAL (2019).
38American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), p. 121.
39Cf. e.g. Article 126 para. 1 Rome Statute: “This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the
month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”
40See in this respect Overview of FTA and other Trade Negotiations, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf; European Commission (2015), pp. 32 et seqq.
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with Vietnam, Mexico, Canada and Singapore have already included a commitment
to a multilateral approach.41
566In the future, therefore, the EU should, in its negotiations of trade, general
economic and association agreements, urge its partners to actively participate in
the establishment of the MIC and thus strive for their membership thereto. In
particular, investment chapters in such agreements or pure investment agreements
could provide for (exclusive) jurisdiction of the MIC where appropriate and motivate
the respective party to the agreement to join the MIC.
567At the same time, the EU can invite its Member States and, as at least parts of the
IIAs of the Member States concern exclusive Union competences, also authorise
them42 to agree on the MIC in new negotiations or renegotiations of their investment
agreements as the court having jurisdiction over future disputes.43 Here, the Com-
mission’s Impact Assessment Study has already indicated that, if the MIC would
have jurisdiction for all EU and EU Member States agreements, already half of the
existing international investment agreements worldwide would be covered.44
8.5 Establishment of MIC Jurisdiction by Explicit
Modification of Existing and Future IIAs
568The considerations above are based on the assumption that the existing IIAs will
remain largely in force, i.e. existing IIAs will be modernised and Member State
agreements will gradually be replaced with EU agreements. It should therefore be
shown how this particular substantive network could be linked to a two-tiered MIC
at dispute resolution level. To clarify once more: the substantive protection standards
would not be found in the MIC Statute, but would in principle continue to be present
in other international treaties and obligations. The immediate use of the existing
IIA-network has the advantage that in the case of existing agreements, no negotia-
tions on protection standards need to take place.
41Art. 3.41, EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019; Art. 14, Section – Resolution
of Investment Disputes, EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019;
Art. 8.29, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, OJ L 11, 14.1.2017, p. 23; Art. 3.12,
EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature) as on 2 April, 2019.
42Cf. Article 2 para. 1 TFEU: “When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a
specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being
able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union
acts.”
43The Netherlands has already included a reference to the Multilateral Investment Court in Art.
15 of its Draft BIT, 2018.
44European Commission (2016a, b).
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8.5.1 Conclusion of New IIAs and FTAs with Investment
Chapters
569 Firstly, the establishment of MIC jurisdiction should take place through express
determination of its jurisdiction in new agreements of the EU and of other states who
wish to promote this new system. The EU negotiates free trade and/or investment
protection agreements or prepares negotiations with a large number of states.45 First
of all, it should be determined in the MIC Statute that, in the future, all newly
concluded agreements of the MIC Members in the area of investment protection
should foresee the exclusive possibility of dispute resolution by the MIC. As a result,
in their international treaty negotiations, all Members should endeavour to promote
the extension of the MIC membership in the future (by way of a memorandum of
understanding).
570 In this context, it could be explicitly stated in future agreements concluded by the
EU that, after its establishment, the MIC alone has jurisdiction to settle claims of
investors.46 In addition, the investment court system foreseen in the previous
agreements could automatically lose its jurisdiction or its jurisdiction could pass
on to the MIC as soon as it has been established. Transitional provisions should also
be foreseen, as it is likely that the EU will negotiate further agreements, until the
MIC is established and operational.
571 In addition, the agreements should stipulate that the parties to the agreement
would actively participate in the negotiations on the establishment of a MIC and
become members too. Furthermore, in new EU free trade and/or investment protec-
tion agreements, it should be provided for that in the future both parties to the
agreement would actively participate in the promotion of a multilateral investment
protection system and thus make the MIC the subject of negotiations with third
countries (“snowball system”).
45See in this respect recently European Commission (2015), pp. 32 et seqq.
46For a subsequent discussion on the need to promote the ability of the MIC to deal with disputes
based on existing and future agreements, See, European Union (2019), para. 35.
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8.5.2 Renegotiation and Reform of Existing EU Economic
Agreements
572Secondly, existing trade agreements of the EU (association agreements, framework
agreements,47 pure FTAs,48 partnership agreements49) are constantly reformed and
renegotiated. In the event that investment protection is agreed with the respective
partners, the respective party to the agreement should be requested to join the MIC.50
For example, the agreement with Mexico has now been complemented with an
investment protection chapter with reference to a Multilateral Dispute Settlement
Mechanism.51 This could then also establish the jurisdiction of the MIC for invest-
ment protection matters.
8.5.3 Inclusion of “IIA Networks” of the Member States
in the Establishment of MIC Jurisdiction
573Thirdly, in the renegotiations of their BITs, Member States should be obliged by the
EU (based on its competence by virtue of Article 207 TFEU) to replace the existing
ISDS systems contained therein with a reference to the jurisdiction of the MIC. This
could be practical once there are more precise ideas about the design of the MIC, in
particular once the requirements for its jurisdiction are determined. It could then
come to an instrumentalisation of the IIAs of the Member States; the Member States
could each use their bargaining power to reform long-term agreements with their
treaty partners and encourage them to include the MIC.
574In the future, after the establishment of the MIC, a clause could be included in the
modified IIAs of the Member States to the effect that only the MIC (upon its
establishment) has jurisdiction to decide investment disputes based on the IIAs of
the Member States.
47Cf. e.g. Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between the
European Union and its Member States, of the one Part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of
the other Part, OJ L 329 of 3.12.2016, p. 8.
48Cf. e.g. Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one
part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ L 127 of 14.5.2011, p. 6.
49Cf. e.g. Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of
the one part, and Canada, of the other part, OJ L 329 of 3.12.2016, p. 45; Council Decision
(EU) 2016/1850 of 21 November 2008 on the signature and provisional application of the stepping
stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Ghana, of the one part, and the European
Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L 287 of 26.10.2016, p. 3.
50A discussion on insertion of relevant clauses during the process of re-negotiation can be seen in
European Commission (2017), pp. 50 et seqq.
51Cf. European Commission (2015), pp. 35 and 37. The draft of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement
released on 21 April, 2018 contains a reference to a Tribunal along with an obligation on the parties
to support the establishment of a Multilateral Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
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575 In addition, it could be provided in the renegotiations that both parties to the
respective agreement, if they have not yet done so, commit to join the MIC and, in
agreements with other states, advocate for an exclusive establishment of MIC
jurisdiction (“snowball system”).
576 The aim here could be to link at least part of the approximately 1400 EUMember
State IIAs to the MIC dispute settlement system and thus thereby contribute to the
gradual increase of MIC membership.52
8.6 The MIC Statute as Opt-In Convention
for the Modification of Existing IIAs
577 As stated above, the MIC should preferably be established as a separate international
organisation. This requires the conclusion of an international treaty, the MIC Statute.
The MIC Statute could be designed as an opt-in convention. With each accession,
the MIC would at least supplement other dispute settlement mechanisms. The text of
the existing IIAs between MIC Members would then not have to be modified or
renegotiated. The MIC’s jurisdiction could be justified by means of an opt-in
convention similar to the Mauritius Convention,53 whereby States could be obliged
by the MIC Statute to offer dispute resolution by the MIC, at least additionally for
52List of the bilateral investment agreements referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1219/
2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries OJ C
149 of 27.4.2016, p. 1 according to which the United Kingdom currently has concluded 94 bilateral
investment agreements.
53United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauri-
tius Convention on Transparency), signed on 10.12.2014, entered into force on 18.10.2017. The
Mauritius Convention allows the application of the new UNCITRAL transparency rules in investor
state arbitration proceedings also in cases of IIAs, which have been concluded in the past. The
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency will always apply, for example, in arbitration proceedings to
which Germany is one of the parties (after the Mauritius Convention has been ratified by Germany),
if the other contracting parties of the respective IIAs did as well ratify the Convention or if the
claimant investor suing the Federal Republic of Germany agrees to the application of the Conven-
tion. Necessary condition for the application of the transparency rules in investor state arbitration
proceedings is either that both parties to the respective IIAs have ratified the Mauritius Convention
or that the defending state has ratified the Convention and the investor agreed on the application of
the transparency rules. Cf. Article 2 Mauritius Convention: “The UNCITRAL Rules on Transpar-
ency shall apply to any investor-State arbitration, whether or not initiated under the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, in which the respondent is a Party that has not made a relevant reservation under
article 3(1)(a) or (b), and the claimant is of a State that is a Party that has not made a relevant
reservation under article 3(1)(a).” “Where the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency do not apply
pursuant to paragraph 1, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency shall apply to an investor-State
arbitration, whether or not initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in which the respon-
dent is a Party that has not made a reservation relevant to that investor-State arbitration under article
3(1), and the claimant agrees to the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency.”
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future disputes.54 The MIC Statute and the accession thereto could thus already give
the MIC jurisdiction to resolve investment disputes.55
578One directly related question is whether joining the MIC Statute would also
constitute an opt-out of ISDS options that were previously provided for in IIAs.
This would depend in principle on whether only one or all the parties to the
agreement of the respective IIAs join the MIC. In the event that not all parties to
an IIA join the MIC Statute, the use of the MIC by investors could only be foreseen
as an additional option, meaning that an opt-in would not directly result in an
opt-out. If all parties to an IIA join the MIC, a corresponding amendment of the
IIA could follow if this opt-out option is provided for in the MIC Statute. Possibly
the MIC Statute could also foresee an optional clause allowing for Member States to
opt out of dispute resolution, meaning that each individual Member of the MIC
could decide whether to accept the MIC as exclusive or additional dispute resolution
option for its IIAs.56
579Indeed, it would be desirable to design the jurisdiction of the MIC as compre-
hensively as possible and to prescribe an opt-out of other ISDS as a consequence of
an opt-in. The financing of the MIC among other aspects would also benefit from the
above—once the MIC is established, its Members should not be sued before another
forum and additional legal costs should not incur there. The possibility to specify
negative admissibility requirements in the MIC statute should be considered since
legal protection cannot be provided in certain cases. The members of the MIC and at
the same time the parties to the IIAs in question would agree that legal protection
should not necessarily exist in every case. An opt-in should therefore in practice lead
to an opt-out.
8.6.1 The Standard Case: Consensus on the Establishment
of MIC Jurisdiction
580Under the MIC Statute (as an opt-in convention), the MIC should have jurisdiction
over actions brought against the EU or its Member States (assuming that the EU and
its Member States are parties to the MIC Statute) if the third state where the plaintiff
investor comes from (and the investor bases his claim on an IIA of his home country
with the EU or (one of) its Member States) is also a party to the MIC.57 In any event,
54A discussion on the possibility of use of an Opt-in Convention was also made in European
Commission (2017), p. 50.
55An option similar to the Opt-in for future disputes for the MIC was proposed in Art. 30, Unified
Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States, 1980, through which jurisdiction
of the Arab Investment Court could extend to any agreement related to an investment within the
League of Arab states subject to the agreement of the parties.
56For a discussion by the Commission on the issue see European Commission (2017), p. 51.
57A similar view has been expressed in European Commission (2017), p. 50; European Union
(2019), para. 35.
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in this case, the MIC should be added as a further dispute settlement option without
any problem.
581 Regarding agreements already concluded in the past, dispute settlement by an
MIC is obviously not foreseen, even though about 90%58 of IIAs in force contain an
ISDS mechanism. However, with the MIC Statute, jurisdiction of the MIC could be
extended to existing investment protection agreements and dispute resolution sys-
tems that exist pursuant to them.59 The precondition should be that the respondent is
an MIC Member and the investor comes from a state who is party to the MIC. In this
case, a consensual amendment (of a bilateral treaty through a multilateral treaty)
would be presumed.60
582 It must at least be discussed whether or not, due to the frequently used sunset
clauses in IIAs,61 the possibility to fall back on traditional ad hoc arbitration (as has
generally been provided for in IIAs up until now) can be ruled out.62 According to
Article 30 para. 3 VCLT, states are allowed to modify treaties that have been
concluded between them. In this respect, multilateral treaties can also amend bilat-
eral treaties if both parties to the bilateral treaty are also parties to the multilateral
treaty.63 Sunset clauses should not be an obstacle.64 These are of limited use as by
virtue of their wording, classification and purpose, they normally refer to the
unilateral termination of agreements by one party, not to the consensual modification
of the content of the treaty.65
583 As was the case in the Mauritius Convention, it should be stipulated that an
establishment of MIC jurisdiction through MFN clauses is precluded.66 The absence
of such provisions would lead to significant legal uncertainty, as discussions on the
58Gaukrodger and Gordon (2012), p. 10.
59This view is also supported by European Commission (2017), p. 50; European Union (2019),
para. 35.
60Cf. Article 39 VCLT: “A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid
down in Part II apply to such an agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.”
61Article 13 para. 3 German Model Treaty 2009: “In respect of investments made prior to the date of
termination of this Treaty, the provisions of Articles 1 to 12 above shall continue to be effective for
a further period of twenty years from the date of termination of this Treaty.” See as well Article 30.9
para. 2 sentence 1 CETA: “Notwithstanding paragraph 1, in the event that this Agreement is
terminated, the provisions of Chapter Eight (Investment) shall continue to be effective for a period
of 20 years after the date of termination of this Agreement in respect of investments made before
that date.”
62Nowrot (2016), pp. 227 et seqq.; Voon et al. (2014), pp. 451 et seqq.; Binder (2016), pp. 976 et
seqq.; Wackernagel (2016), pp. 11 et seqq.
63OECD (2015), p. 31.
64States have tried to work around the problem through means such as amending the treaty to delete
the sunset clause and then terminating the treaty. On this, See, Busse and Lange (2018), p. 335.
65Cf. as well Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 82.
66Article 2 para. 5 Mauritius-Convention: “The Parties to this Convention agree that a claimant may
not invoke a most favoured nation provision to seek to apply, or avoid the application of, the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency under this Convention.”
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scope of MFN clauses have been going on for a long time and67 judicial interpre-
tation is not uniform.68
584In addition, those joining the MIC should keep registers at the MIC Secretariat,
which should also be published and include of every concluded treaty that shall be
covered by the jurisdiction of the MIC.
8.6.2 Exceptional Cases: Jurisdiction of the MIC Even if
the Home State of the Investor Is Not an MIC Member?
585Jurisdiction could also exist simply by means of MIC membership of the respondent
state, once the possibility of unilateral consent to dispute settlement is expressly
foreseen in the MIC Statute (see paras. 201 et seqq.).
586The inclusion of an option to bring a claim and thus establish jurisdiction in the
opt-in convention in the case of non-membership of the respondent state ad hoc
should be rejected in principle, but is possible.
587If neither the home state of the investor, nor the host state of the investment were
members of the MIC, it would also be possible to use an ad hoc agreement to
establish jurisdiction. However, this is to be rejected in principle.69
588If one decides to follow the above mentioned possibilities despite the concerns
expressed, the MIC Statute should at least provide for the possibility of the jurisdic-
tion of the MIC through an ad hoc compromis. Here, special rules on cost allocation
should be provided for. This scenario could also lead to problems with the enforce-
ment of decisions under the system set out in the MIC Statute; use of the proposed
67The discussion concerns on the one hand the question if an investor may claim a more favourable
dispute settlement clause in a BIT of the host state with a third state or if the possibility to bring a
claim in this respect does only apply to material protection standards. On the other hand, especially
the EU is of the opinion that MFN clauses should generally not offer the possibility to “import”
better standards from third state treaties, but need to be restricted to prohibit factual unequal
treatment of third state nationals. A broad interpretation of the MFN clause would lead to investors
claiming the most favourable dispute settlement clause within a BIT of the host state with a third
state. See in this respect, among others, Waldermann (2015), pp. 75 et seqq.
68The possibility of investors to refer to MFN clauses, agreeing: ICSID, Case No. ARB/97/7,
Maffezini v. Spain, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 25.1.2000, para. 64;
ICSID, Case No. ARB/03/10, Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, Decision of the
Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction of. 17.6.2005, para. 31; rejecting this possibility:
ICSID, Case No. ARB/03/24, Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction of
8.2.2005, paras. 183 et seqq.; ICSID, Case No. ARB/02/13, Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade
S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Decision on Jurisdiction of 9.11.2004, paras. 113 et
seqq. In detail in this respect e.g. Stompfe (2016), pp. 273 et seqq.; Chalamish (2009), pp. 323 et
seqq.; European Union (2017), para. 23.
69A discussion for use of the MIC through ad hoc procedures is seen in European Commission
(2017), p. 51.
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fund system to settle awards in cases brought under ad hoc proceedings should be
ruled out in any case.
8.6.3 Jurisdiction of the MIC in Case of Multilateral IIAs
589 The MIC Statute could also apply to further multilateral treaties, such as the ECT.70
If possible, it should be adopted in the future as an exclusive dispute settlement
option in the field of investment protection.
590 However, this would require that all Energy Charter Member States join the MIC.
These include the EU itself and most of its Member States, as well as third states. It
should also be possible for individual Member States of the ECT to unilaterally
recognise the jurisdiction of the MIC for proceedings based on the ECT
against them.
8.6.4 Summary of the Establishment of MIC Jurisdiction
591 The MIC should determine that there is jurisdiction under the MIC Statute,
(a) if, in the future, i.e. following the entry into force of the MIC Statute and
accession thereto, an IIA has been concluded between those MIC Members71;
(b) if an IIA has been concluded in the past between two MIC parties (consensual
jurisdiction for existing treaties; a list of these treaties should also be sent to the
MIC Secretariat for reasons of legal certainty; this does not mean this list should
be exhaustive);
(c) if an MIC Member State has named an IIA in its list (unilateral establishment of
jurisdiction for existing treaties)72; and
(d) if an IIA has not been named in the list of an MIC Member State, but is
acknowledged as an ad hoc ground for jurisdiction by the respondent.73
592 For the future, it could also be considered that a ground for jurisdiction can exist
(e) if jurisdiction over an Investor State Contract is recognised in the ICS and the
involved state is an MIC Member, or
(f) if jurisdiction over an ICS, although not recognised in the ICS, is subsequently
recognised by a compromis and the involved state is an MIC Member.
70The European Commission has also considered the possibility of including the ECT within the
ICS system, on this see, European Commission (2017), p. 27.
71As explained in paras. 247 et seqq., in such a case another ISDS-possibility might be excluded by
the later amending treaty.
72As explained in paras. 579 et seqq. The MIC is in principle only one of several ISDS-possibilities.
73These alternatives could as well be covered by the before mentioned alternatives.
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8.7 Transitional Provisions and System Conformity
of the MIC
593As stated earlier, existing IIAs should largely remain in force, i.e. existing IIAs
should be revised and modernised, and agreements of the Member States should be
gradually replaced by EU agreements. The MIC would be added to the system as an
alternative or new and exclusive dispute settlement option, or could replace it
entirely, but it should not establish substantive protection standards.
594The MIC Statute could also be seen as an amendment to the EU-Vietnam IPA and
CETA (see para. 247), or as a subsequent multilateral agreement, amending bilateral
agreements between certain parties to the agreement (see also to that extent Articles
30 paras. 3 and 41 VCLT). In any case, in future EU agreements, it should already be
stipulated that the respective foreseen bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms cease
to be in force and are replaced by MIC jurisdiction once the MIC Statute enters into
force and the respective party to the agreement, in addition to the EU, has joined the
MIC.74 At the same time, transitional provisions should already be made in future
EU agreements in case the MIC takes over elements of its work in the future. In the
case of the transfer of jurisdiction from bilateral ICS in EU agreements; the MIC
Statute could also function as an amendment treaty of that EU agreement if the
respective partners of the EU also become MIC Members. Corresponding detailed
amendments to existing bilateral treaties could be set out in protocols and declara-
tions to the MIC Statute.
595In that regard, it could be foreseen that dispute settlement procedures that have
already been initiated are completed by the respective bilateral dispute resolution
system in the respective instance, but that a legal remedy would only be possible
before the appellate instance of the MIC. Future EU agreements may already foresee
explicit transitional provisions in the text of the agreement.
596Transitional provisions are also necessary for judges that have already been
appointed based on bilateral agreements—if the ICS foreseen in these agreements
are replaced by the MIC. These provisions should be adopted on a case-by-case
basis, depending on the agreement. In the remuneration system for CETA-ICS-
judges,75 which is to be adopted by the mixed CETA Committee, it should already
be stipulated that from the moment that the MIC is established or the bilateral ICS
loses its jurisdiction, no new complaints can be initiated and no further retainer
payments will be made.
597When new members join the MIC Statute, the financing scheme must be adjusted
accordingly. Representation in the Plenary Body is also immediately possible. Since
accession does not involve market access obligations, as in WTO Law, but only the
recognition of the MIC as (exclusive) permanent court for clearly defined types of
disputes, the respective MIC accessions should be unproblematic to negotiate.
74A similar view has been expressed by the Commission in European Commission (2017), p. 58.
75Cf. Article 8.27 para. 12 CETA: “In order to ensure their availability, the Members of the Tribunal
shall be paid a monthly retainer fee to be determined by the CETA Joint Committee.”
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598 An expansion of the MIC jurisdiction to investment disputes under the ECT is
currently only partially possible because it is a multilateral agreement with 53 mem-
bers at this point in time. At best, a supplementary jurisdiction of the MIC could be
accepted if both the respondent MIC Member as well as the host state of the
complaining investor are members of the MIC (in the meaning of Article 41 para.
1 lit. b VCLT). Specific difficulties could arise here if there is an intra-EU dispute,
but this is not considered at this point.
599 Mediation procedures in existing IIAs should remain untouched, i.e. mediation
based on existing IIAs is still possible.76 However, it could be provided that the MIC
also offers a mediation procedure, including the appointment of mediators. In this
respect, a mediation center could be set up as sub-unit of the MIC which would then
only have subsidiary jurisdiction in cases where no provisions on this topic exist in
the bilateral IIAs.
600 The MIC could also provide in its Statute that its jurisdiction is extended to
investor-state contracts, insofar as these name the MIC as a dispute settlement forum
(and if the respondent state is a member of the MIC).77 This study does not assume,
however, that investor-state contracts are part of the applicable law of the MIC.
601 The multilateralisation of dispute settlement mechanisms could be complemented
in the future by a multilateral convention that provides for protection standards, but at
the same time also emphasises the stronger and more explicit balancing of investor
interests and regulatory interests of investors and states, as is already the case in recent
IIAs, and foresees the MIC as a forum with jurisdiction regarding dispute settlement.
Such a convention could be open to future accession of more and more members.
8.8 Working Language and Language of Proceedings at
the MIC
602 For financial reasons, provisions on the working languages and languages of pro-
ceedings of the MIC should be established. An excessive number of working
languages and languages of proceedings would considerably increase the respective
procedural costs in individual cases, as translation for judges etc. would then have to
be provided. Usually, English is the official and working language of most interna-
tional organisations. Furthermore, the vast body of literature on public international
law as well as international investment protection is written in English. Alterna-
tively, it is possible that the MIC Statute allows the parties to the dispute to determine
the language of the proceedings, in agreement with the deciding Chamber, and that
the MIC Statute only specifies the working language of the Secretariat and the
Plenary Body.
76The need for support for dispute avoidance mechanisms such as mediation is also seen in
European Union (2019), para. 12.
77A view supporting such a proposal can be seen in European Union (2019), para. 35.
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8.9 Cost Distribution in the New System
603The financing of the expected permanent costs of the MIC should be regulated, i.e.
the costs of the employees of the Secretariat, the judges as well as the necessary
infrastructure in form of buildings, equipment etc. From an economic perspective,
the MIC only makes sense for a critical mass of Member States, if they divided the
costs of such a permanent court among each other. The annual costs for the
International Criminal Court are estimated at approximately EUR 130 million,78
for the WTO Secretariat with more than 600 employees at approximately CHF
198 million.79 The CJEU and the General Court (GC), with 75 judges, 11 advo-
cates-general and some 2170 additional employees, needs up to EUR 380 million
and the ITLOS costs approximately EUR 20 million for a period of 2 years. For the
MIC, an amount in the low double-digit millions should also initially be estimated.80
604Although these court costs are not to be considered insignificant, the MIC will
certainly be able to reduce the average cost per dispute resolution procedure. For
example, costs caused by the large number of judges in bilateral investment courts,
could be saved as well as those costs incurred by the international community
through other arbitration fees.81 In light of the fact that average administrative
costs (tribunal fees and secretary fees) are currently estimated at EUR 750,000,82
an MIC with a minimum number of members should in any case not lead to
additional costs within the current system. On the contrary, if it were possible to
increase efficiency through the acceleration of proceedings, this would also lead to a
decrease in other costs (mostly counsel fees), which are currently estimated at
approx. EUR 4 million per party involved in the dispute.83 Irrespective of the fact
that a sufficient amount of states in reality would incur only limited additional costs,
the MIC would not only offer a possibility to compensate for the shortcomings of the
ISDS system, but also to counter balance deficits of the ICS as it is foreseen under
CETA, and thus win acceptance of international jurisdiction over investment
disputes.
605The MIC should be financed primarily, just like other international organisations,
through contributions of its members, i.e. the parties to the agreement.84 Expenditure
78Resolution on the Programme budget for 2015, the Working Capital Fund for 2015, scale of
assessments for the apportionment of expenses of the International Criminal Court, financing
appropriations for 2015 and the Contingency Fund, ICC-ASP/13/Res.1 of 17.12.2014;
Jakobsson (2015).
79WTO, Secretariat and budget, www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep16_chap9_e.
pdf.
80The EU Commission opines that the cost for a MIC would be close to EUR 10 million per year.
On this see European Commission (2017), p. 112.
81Hodgson (2014a), p. 3 assumes arbitration tribunal costs of about US$373.200 per proceeding
and party.
82Hodgson (2014b), p. 1; Hodgson (2014a), Table 2.
83Commission (2016).
84The allocation of costs among members has also been supported by the EU Commission in
European Commission (2017), pp. 54 et seqq. See also Garcia-Bolivar (2015), p. 398.
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would determine the necessary amount which should be collected proportionally
from the members. Similar to the WTO,85 the proportion that MIC Members have to
bear could be calculated by taking the proportion of foreign direct investment of a
state in relation to the total investment volume of all MIC Members. In order to
determine the respective numbers, it is possible to make use of surveys made by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF),86 World Bank87 or UNCTAD.88 Proposals to
impose or transfer the entire court costs to the parties to the dispute should be
rejected. However, the parties should certainly be involved in financing by virtue
of paying court fees, which are of course dependent on inter alia the amount
involved in the dispute, as is also determined by a large number of national court
cost rules.89 The members, however, should provide the basic funding.
8.10 Overview of the Necessary Agreements and Secondary
Instruments
606 Overall, among others, the following agreements and secondary legislation appear
necessary for the establishment of an MIC:
– Statute of a Multilateral Investment Court, including a Code of Conduct (MIC
Statute);
– Immunity agreements between the Member States of the MIC (Agreement on
Privileges and Immunities of the MIC);
– Seat agreement between the MIC, with its own legal personality, and the host
state;
– Procedural rules for the first and second instance;
– Rules of procedure, including rules of conduct, for the Secretariat;
– Guidelines for the necessary contents of a statement of claim;
– Guidelines for the conduct of oral proceedings;
– Guidelines on the court costs;
– Guidelines on security deposits;
– Retirement and pension provisions for the staff of the MIC.
85Cf. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib_e.htm.




89Cf. e.g. Article 3 para. 1 Gerichtskostengesetz (Court Fees Act): “Die Gebühren richten sich nach
dem Wert des Streitgegenstands (Streitwert), soweit nichts anderes bestimmt ist.” [Unofficial
English translation: “The fees are calculated according to the value of the subject matter of the
dispute (value of the dispute), if not foreseen otherwise.”].
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607A purely multilateral Appellate Body was recently proposed as an alternative to the
two-tiered court model—a MIAM.1 In this variant, the first phase of ad hoc
arbitration as practiced so far, be it an ICSID, UNCITRAL or SCC procedure,
should be retained.2 Nevertheless, a uniform multilateral judicial Appellate Body
or quasi-judicial Appellate Body should be added. However, in contrast to the
proposals, in particular those made in the context of ICSID in 2004 and 2005 as
well as approaches in other recent US IIAs, this should be characterised by tighter
organisational structures and a panel of judges appointed for a longer period of time.
This is to achieve more consistency in decision-making practice.
608This variant of the structure of a multilateral appeal mechanism is very much
oriented at the WTO Dispute Settlement Model.3 In addition to creating a rule based
regime,4 one of the main innovations of the reform of the dispute settlement system
with the establishment of the WTO was an institutional enlargement with the
addition of a permanent Appellate Body. The purpose of creating the Appellate
Body was in particular to ensure consistency and stability of decision-making by
seven permanent members of the Appellate Body.
1A similar appellate body has been discussed inter alia in European Commission (2017), p. 28;
UNCITRAL (2018), para. 42. A discussion on appeals proposals is also seen in Bottini (2015),
pp. 455 et seqq.
2A similar recommendation has been made in UNCITRAL (2018), para. 42.
3A discussion on use of a model similar to the WTO Appellate Body can also be seen in McRae
(2010), pp. 382 et seqq.; Lee (2015), pp. 480 et seqq.
4Cf. among others Cass (2001), p. 50.
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9.1 Organisational Structure of the MIAM
609 The Members of the MIAM should be the same as those of the MIC (see paras.
77 et seq.).
610 Like the MIC, a permanent appellate mechanism should be established with a
Plenary Body, Judges and a Secretariat.
611 The Plenary Body (see paras. 80 et seqq.) should represent the members of a
MIAM. Its main task would be the election of judges and the adoption of procedural
rules as secondary law.
612 For the judges of an Appellate Mechanism, there should be no other requirements
in terms of qualification than those which have been already set out for the two-tiered
solution (see paras. 124 seqq.). The same applies to the independence of the judges
and the ethical standards to be observed (see paras. 130 et seqq.). They should be
permanently available, which means that they are comparable to judges of other
international courts and can only engage in secondary employment that over time
does not prevent them from exercising their judicial activity and that does not
jeopardise their independence.5
613 The judge’s election/appointment by the Plenary Body should also be the main
factor for the future acceptance of this mechanism.6 The considerations applicable
for the selection of judges for the MIC could also be applicable here (see paras.
84 seqq.). The judges should reflect the traditions of the various legal systems.
Therefore, a sufficiently large number of judges should be appointed. Since up to
nine appeals judges are already designated for the EU’s bilateral agreements, a total
of nine judges should be considered for the MIAM, while the composition could be
geared towards that of the ICJ.7
614 An Appellate Mechanism should also be supported by a Secretariat. However, the
Secretariat should be configured in a manner that it is correspondingly smaller (see
paras. 177 et seqq.).
615 The establishment of an International Investment Law Advisory Centre only for
the appeals instance, is only recommended to a limited extent. This is because the
main work related to the case has already been done during the ad hoc arbitration.
Furthermore, representatives for the parties who have familiarised themselves with
5The need for permanent employment and availability of adjudicators has also been recommended
in European Union (2019), para. 16; European Commission (2017), p. 42. The members of the
Appeals Tribunal in the EU-Vietnam IPA (Art. 3.39(13)) (draft for signature), EU-Singapore IPA
(Art. 3.10(10)) (draft for signature) and EU-Mexico Global Agreement (Art. 12(11)) (draft for
signature) as on February, 2019, are also required to be available at all times and are paid a monthly
retainer fee for the purpose.
6A discussion on the procedure for election of judges based on the proposal and agreement of the
contracting parties is seen in European Union (2019), para. 22. On the other hand European
Commission (2017), pp. 46 et seq. prescribed appointment of judges through an independent body.
7The European Union also prescribes geographical and gender diversity in the standing mechanism
for dispute settlement, European Union (2019), para. 21. Diversity in the MIC has also been
considered as an essential part for impartiality in a future MIC by Gomez (2018).
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the case and acted on behalf of the parties, should in most cases, for substantive, and
financial reasons, also be entrusted with representing their client in the appellate
instance.
9.2 General Procedure of the MIAM
616The appeals procedure against investor-state arbitration decisions should begin with
the filing of the appeal against the arbitral decision by one or both of the parties of the
first-instance arbitration.
617An appeal through the MIAM should temporarily suspend the validity of the
arbitral award or the first instance decision of an investment court system (e.g. CETA
or EU-Vietnam IPA).8 At the same time, it should also eliminate the possibility of an
appeal against the arbitral decision before national courts, for example in the process
of recognition and enforcement.9 An arbitral tribunal under the ICSID Convention
would have to decline jurisdiction in case there is a consensual amendment of the IIA
excluding ICSID arbitration.
618However, proceedings under other arbitration rules would still be possible and
desirable. Of course, such decisions would continue to be enforceable in third
countries that are members of the New York Convention but not of the MIAM.
Nonetheless, it could be problematic that first-instance arbitral awards could con-
tinue to be enforced in non-MIAM Member States. They can, thus, undermine the
appeal possibilities of a respondent MIAM state in the MIAM. This could be ruled
out in cases where the home state of the investor as well as the respondent are
members of the MIAM. The MIAM Statute could stipulate that enforcement of an
arbitral award under the New York Convention in third countries would only be
possible after the appeal period has expired. It would thereby lead to an amendment
of the IIA underlying the dispute. Amendment of the IIA between two MIAM
Members by the MIAM Statute as a subsequent treaty between the two states,
could require first-instance tribunals to state in their arbitral awards that they are
provisional and not enforceable under the New York Convention (see Article V para.
1 lit. e NYC). The awards would become final only after (a) the expiration of the
Appeal Deadline under the MIAM or (b) an arbitral tribunal after a final decision
taking into account MIAM’s legal interpretation, declares it to be a final and
enforceable decision within the meaning of New York Convention.10 However, it
8The CETA (art. 8.28(9)), EU-Vietnam IPA (Art. 3.54(1)) (draft for signature), EU-Singapore IPA
(Art. 3.19(1)) (draft for signature) and EU-Mexico Global Agreement (Art. 29(8)) (draft for
signature) as on February, 2019, provide for a provisional award which becomes final after a
definite time period (90 days) if it is not appealed in the Appeals Tribunal.
9Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), pp. 71 et seq.
10A clear statement that an award of the investment tribunal will not become enforceable until the
appeals procedure is completed is seen in the CETA (Art. 8.28(9)(c)), EU-Singapore IPA (Art. 3.22
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cannot be ruled out that non-member state countries will consider the arbitral award
as final and allow it to be enforced.
619 In order for the suspensory effect to occur during the enforcement process, the
IIAs serving as the basis of arbitration would have to be supplemented accordingly;
and this could also be provided for in the MIAM Statute (see para. 247). Security
may also be sought from the claimant.11 The right of intervention of third parties
must be clarified (see para. 346).12 Non-involved third parties could have the option
to comment or submit their opinion, in line with the general principles of transpar-
ency (see paras. 326 et seqq.). However, since third party opinions are likely to lead
to delays, caution should be exercised here, especially in cases where such a
possibility as mentioned above was not provided for. Given that in principle there
should be awareness about ongoing arbitration proceedings, short time limits could
be stipulated in case (there is possibility to submit a comment or opinion), as well as
limitations on the scope of this possibility.
620 Any jurisdiction of the MIAM in an arbitration which has already been initiated at
the time of its establishment should be possible only by consensus of the claimant
investor and the respondent (then MIAM Member).
621 MIAM appeals procedures do not seem possible in the case of ICSID proceed-
ings. They are in contradiction to Articles 53 and 54 ICSID Convention.13 An
amendment to the ICSID Convention through the MIAM Statute should be rejected,
as the inclusion of an appeal body in ICSID proceedings would contradict the aim
and purpose of the ICSID Convention, i.e. to bring about immediate enforcement
without further review of the content of the judgment.14 The MIAM Statute could
therefore at most provide that ICSID arbitration proceedings in actions against a
MIAM Member by claimants from other MIAM Member States would no longer be
possible.
622 Appeals against decisions in arbitration proceedings under other arbitration rules
except the ICSID Convention should only be possible within a short time limit. If no
legal appeal is filed within this period, the judgment will become final. Here, a
1-month appeal period could be set, with the option of an additional 1-month
(1)) (draft for signature) and EU-Mexico Global Agreement (Art. 31(1)) (draft for signature) as on
February, 2019.
11Article 29 para. 4 section 3 Investment Chapter TTIP draft: “A disputing party lodging an appeal
shall provide security for the costs of appeal and for the amount provided for in the provisional
award.” Similar provisions are seen in Art. 3.19(5) EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature), Art.
3.54(6) EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) and Art. 30(4) EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft
for signature) as on February, 2019.
12Third party submissions have been permitted under the provisions of the treaty under Art. 3.19
(6) EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature), Art. 3.54(7) EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) and
Art. 30(5) EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on February, 2019.
13Similar views have been expressed by Tams (2006), p. 12; Schreuer (2018), p. 156.
14According to this Calamita (2017), pp. 585 et seqq.
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deadline for the declaration of grounds of appeal.15 To prevent abuse, a Court
(misuse)16 fee could be considered for abusing the possibility of appeal (see para.
306). However, in case of abuse, the necessary expenses incurred by the opposing
side for the purpose of legal defense should be reimbursed.
623The grounds of appeal should indicate the scope of the appeals as well as the
appellant’s allegations of infringement and the grounds on which the appellant bases
its view.
624The MIAM should decide by judgment.
625The MIAM should be able to confirm, modify or reverse the decisions of the
initial main proceedings.17 It is questionable whether the Appellate Body could also
be given the opportunity to remand cases back to the tribunal for the purpose of
modifying the decision18 with the obligation to reassess the case taking into account
the legal interpretation of the MIAM.19 However, as already stated (see para. 351),
the introduction of a possibility to remand back a case is to be viewed critically,
particularly because the overall duration of the proceedings would be extended.
Additionally, where required, an arbitral tribunal outside the new multilateral
appeals body would be required to make a (second) decision “taking into account
the MIAM legal opinion”.
626However, a remanding of cases could also have advantages. A decision made by
an arbitral tribunal which when reconsidering the case, has possibly taken the legal
interpretation of the MIAM into account, would then be available. An execution of
such a decision under the New York Convention could be possible. However there
would be no possibility for enforcement under the ICSID Convention in this scenario
(see paras. 496 et seqq.).
627The MIAM should be given extensive investigative powers to enable full auton-
omous decision-making as an authority empowered with jurisdiction for establish-
ment of facts. This is even more necessary if no power to remand the case is provided
to the MIAM.
628The appeal proceedings should be divided into a written and an oral procedure.
Facts and evidence already submitted in the earlier initial arbitral proceedings
15Similar as well in WTO-DSU, cf. Working procedures for appellate review, Rule 20. A 90 day
period for appeal has been prescribed under the CETA, EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature),
EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) and EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on
February, 2019.
16Foreseen like this in Article 32 BVerfGG (Act on the Federal Constitutional Court); if the there
mentioned misuse fee amounting up to €202,600 is enough, must be left open.
17Article 8.28 para. 2 CETA: “The Appellate Tribunal may uphold, modify or reverse a Tribunal’s
award based on: [. . .]”. Similar provisions are seen in Art. 3.19(3) EU-Singapore IPA (draft for
signature), Art. 3.54(3) EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) and Art. 30(2) EU-Mexico Global
Agreement (draft for signature) as on February, 2019.
18Compare Article 8.28 para. 7 lit. b) and para. 9 lit. c) sublit. iii) CETA.
19An explicit possibility for referral back to the initial tribunal for re-consideration based on the
Appeals Tribunal’s decision is seen in Art. 3.55(4) EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature), Art. 3.19
(3) EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature) as on February, 2019.
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should, in principle, be taken into account. It is up for discussion whether statements
and evidence that were not introduced in the initial arbitration proceedings could be
introduced now. From the point of view of process efficiency, this would not be
preferable.
629 There should be the opportunity to withdraw the appeal at any time. However, a
decision on costs should also be possible at the request of the appellant. The
withdrawal of the appeal should result in the discontinuation of the suspensive effect
of the appeal and, at the same time, the loss of the right to a new appeal.
9.3 Specific Issues
9.3.1 Duration of Proceedings
630 The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure provides for a maximum of 60 days for an
appeal proceeding but in no case should it take longer than 90 days.20 The duration
for a MIAM appeals procedure duration should also be kept short as it is staffed with
full-time judges.21 In any case, the principle of accelerated proceedings should
apply. In individual cases, however, the respective chamber should be free to extend
the duration of the appeals procedure for important reasons.
631 Should it come to repetitive procedural extensions due to an overburdening of the
appeal mechanism, this would be an indication for the Plenary Body to increase the
number of judges of the MIAM.
9.3.2 Scope of Examination and Investigative Jurisdiction
632 In the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body is
limited to the legal issues dealt with in the panel report and the corresponding
interpretation of the law by the Panel.22 The appeal procedure primarily serves the
20Article 17 para. 5 DSU: “As a general rule, the proceedings shall not exceed 60 days from the date
a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body
circulates its report. In fixing its timetable the Appellate Body shall take into account the provisions
of paragraph 9 of Article 4, if relevant. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its
report within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an
estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed
90 days.”
21An 180 day time period for completion of appeals proceedings is seen in in Art. 3.19
(4) EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature), Art. 3.54(5) EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature)
and Art. 30(3) EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on February, 2019.
22Article 17 para. 6 DSU: “An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the panel.”
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objective of legal control. The ICSID Secretariat proposals of 2004 stated that there
should be a possibility to appeal against decisions based on the reasons given in
Article 52 ICSID Convention as well as for a “clear error of law” or “serious error of
fact”.23 In addition to the reasons set out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention,24 an
appeal “due to errors in the application or interpretation of the applicable law, due to
manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of relevant
domestic law” is provided for in CETA.25 In WTO Law, very serious errors can lead
to the annulment of a panel report.26 Here it is criticised that two different con-
cepts—annulment and appeal—would be mixed together.27 However, it is not clear
why an appeal panel should not be allowed to deal with both these concepts.
633The applicable law in MIAM appeals also includes procedural law, which means
that there should be a possibility for review of compliance with the procedural
principles by the arbitral tribunal in the first instance proceedings. The question of
whether fact-finding was properly carried out in the first instance should also be
considered as a question of law, namely whether an “objective appreciation of the
facts” has been carried out.28 Additionally, a review of whether there were “serious
errors of fact” should be specifically made.
634In principle, it should be clarified whether a reference to Article 52 ICSID
Convention should be made—and if so, whether the interpretation of this provision
by ICSID arbitral tribunals should be given greater consideration. Alternatively, it
must be clarified whether the reasons of annulment listed in Article 52 ICSID
Convention and not included in the MIAM Statute should be included (see paras.
557 et seqq.). The jurisdiction of the MIAM should in principle be limited to arbitral
decisions. It must be clarified whether the MIAM should also be given jurisdiction to
annul the arbitral decision. In situations of bias of individual arbitrators in the initial
arbitral proceedings, a distinction should be made between requests for suspension
in an ongoing procedure and subsequent annulment (see para. 347).
635As stated, the determination of the applicable substantive law can either be at the
level of the Rules of Procedure of a Dispute Settlement Body or may be governed by
23ICSID Secretariat (2004), Annex, p. 4.
24Article 52 para. 1 ICSID Convention: “Either party may request annulment of the award by an
application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its
powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been
a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the
reasons on which it is based.”
25Article 8.28 para. 2 CETA: “The Appellate Tribunal may uphold, modify or reverse a Tribunal’s
award based on: (a) errors in the application or interpretation of applicable law; (b) manifest errors
in the appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of relevant domestic law; (c) the grounds
set out in Article 52(1)(a) through (e) of the ICSID Convention, in so far as they are not covered by
paragraphs (a) and (b).”
26Ohlhoff (2003), C.I.2., para. 106.
27EFILA (2016), pp. 29 et seq.; American Bar Association Section on International Law
(2016), p. 78.
28According to Ohlhoff (2003), C.I.2., para. 106.
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the applicable bilateral and multilateral investment protection treaties. In this respect,
the applicable law in the case of the MIAM should primarily be determined by the
law already applied by the arbitral tribunal. However, it should also be possible to
assess, within the scope of MIAM’s jurisdiction of review, whether the Arbitral
Tribunal has applied the “right” substantive law in a justifiable manner.
9.3.3 Chamber and Plenary Decisions
636 The MIAM should be able to form chambers. Only “for good reason” should one of
the disputing parties be able to request a plenary decision. Plenary decisions are of
significant importance and prevent substantive differences in divergent decisions of
different chambers.
637 The ICSID proposal provided for an appeal panel of 15 judges of different
nationalities.29 The WTO Appellate Body, however, has only seven members who
decide in each case in chambers of three judges.30 This relatively small number of
appellate body members appears to have had no negative impact on the acceptance
of the WTO DSU system so far. Based on this, it was also determined in CETA that
decisions will be made in the Appellate Body in divisions of three.31 In certain
situations, chambers of 5, 7 or 9 judges could be formed. In case of the EU-Vietnam
IPA, the EU-Singapore IPA and the EU-Mexico Global Agreement, the number of
members of the appellate tribunal has been fixed at 6 with the possibility for
formation of divisions consisting of 3 members.32 If chambers are introduced, an
obligation requiring exchange of views between all judges of the MIAM could be
stipulated, as is the case with the WTO Appellate Body.33
29ICSID Secretariat (2004), Annex, p. 3: “Such a set of ICSID Appeals Facility Rules could provide
for the establishment of an Appeals Panel composed of 15 persons elected by the Administrative
Council of ICSID on the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Centre. The terms of the Panel
members would be staggered. Eight of the first 15 would serve for three years; all others would be
elected for six year terms. Each member would be from a different country. They would all have to
be persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international investment
and investment treaties.”
30Article 17 para. 1 sentence 3 DSU: “It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall
serve on any one case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation.”
31Article 8.28 para. 5 CETA: “The division of the Appellate Tribunal constituted to hear the appeal
shall consist of three randomly appointed Members of the Appellate Tribunal.”
32See, Art. 3.10 EU-Singapore IPA (draft for signature), Art. 3.39 EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for
signature) and Art. 12 EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on February, 2019.
33Working procedures for appellate review, Rule 4.3: “In accordance with the objectives set out in
paragraph 1, the division responsible for deciding each appeal shall exchange views with the other
Members before the division finalizes the appellate report for circulation to the WTO Members.
[. . .].” In this sense, Alvarado Garzón (2019), p. 491.
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9.3.4 Decision on the Bias of Arbitrators in the Initial Arbitral
Proceedings and MIAM
638The judges of the MIAM could be given the power to decide on the bias of
arbitrators in the initial arbitral proceedings. The content of the IIAs and the
arbitration rules underlying the first instance proceedings could be modified by the
MIAM Statute if the home state of the claimant investor and the respondent state are
both MIAMMembers. If only the respondent state is a member, this jurisdiction will
not be applicable (for the inter se amendment of multilateral treaties, see para. 498).
639The potential bias of judges of the MIAM should be decided by a third party, such
as the ICJ.34 Alternatively, test for bias could be delegated to another MIAM
chamber or to the MIAM judge’s plenary.35 For the latter option, it is an additional
advantage that a solution is found “within the system”, but at the same time, this
could also lead to lower objectivity in the decisions.
9.3.5 Precedence Created by Second-Instance Judgments?
640In principle, a precedent of MIAM judgments should only be accepted with regard to
the interpretation of specific provisions of the agreement on which a specific
decision was taken. In addition, such a binding effect could probably only be
accepted for the MIAM, but not for future arbitration based on IIAs. However, it
could be assumed that a MIAM can definitely contribute more to the formation of
principles in investment protection law and, to that extent, to greater consistency in
this area of law.36
34Cf. as well American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), Executive Summary
& Conclusions and Recommendations, p. 14. Cf. Article 8.30 para. 2 CETA: “If a disputing party
considers that a Member of the Tribunal has a conflict of interest, it shall send to the President of the
International Court of Justice a notice of challenge to the appointment. The notice of challenge shall
be sent within 15 days of the date on which the composition of the division of the Tribunal has been
communicated to the disputing party, or within 15 days of the date on which the relevant facts came
to its knowledge, if they could not have reasonably been known at the time of composition of the
division. The notice of challenge shall state the grounds for the challenge.”
35The EU-Singapore IPA (Art. 3.11) (draft for signature), EU-Vietnam IPA (Art. 3.40) (draft for
signature) and EU-Mexico Global Agreement (Art. 13) (draft for signature) as on February, 2019
provide that challenges based on conflict of interest against a Member of a Tribunal or Appeal
Tribunal will be heard by the President of the Tribunal or Appeal tribunal respectively. Challenges
against the President of each tribunal is heard by the President of the other tribunal (Tribunal and
Appeal Tribunal).
36See in this respect as well Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 69; Sauvant (2016), p. 29;
Howard (2017), pp. 47 et seq.; UNCITRAL (2018), paras. 36 et seqq.; Li (2018), p. 948.
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9.4 Decisions Rendered by the MIAM
641 Judgments of MIAM should have no direct effect on national law. As a rule,
international courts and arbitral tribunals merely have an obligation to eliminate
any identified international law infringements of national legal acts. This can also be
mitigated by a mere obligation to indemnify, as is generally the case in investment
protection law. In addition, the power to determine the existence of (unlawful)
indirect expropriation and to determine the due amount of compensation should be
stated in the individual investment protection agreements.
9.5 Enforcement of MIAM Decisions
642 The possibility for enforcement of decisions of a standalone appellate authority
instead of an MIC would be difficult to estimate because it depends on the config-
uration of this appellate authority.
643 Judgments of the MIAM, in line with the criteria already set out for the MIC will
not, be considered to be enforceable under the ICSID Convention. Enforcement of
decisions under the ICSID Convention will continue to be subject to the above-
mentioned obstacles: the ICSID Convention does not provide for an appeal and the
decision of such an authority cannot in any case constitute an ICSID arbitration
award. A modification of this provision between two states would be conceivable
(see para. 498).
644 Whether an option for enforcement under the New York Convention is available
is subject to great legal uncertainty and depends on the perspective of the specific
national court.37 If it concerns an appeal against arbitral awards rendered by ordinary
arbitral tribunals, the condition of a voluntary submission of the parties could be
fulfilled as the jurisdiction of the tribunals deciding in the first instance would be
based on an established basis.
645 It is questionable whether, if the MIAM modifies or confirms the first-instance
award, is it still an arbitral award that is enforceable under the New York Convention
(see paras. 500 et seqq.). The conditions for the election of judges should certainly be
also crucial for the qualification of an arbitral award in the sense of the New York
Convention or as a judgment of an international court. If this is done by a plenary
body and if the judges are full-time judges, it seems difficult for the decision to
qualify as an enforceable award under the New York Convention (see paras. 516 et
seqq.).38
646 However, the situation may be different if the case would be remanded to the
original arbitral tribunal for a “reassessment taking into account the legal interpre-
tation of MIAM”, after being decided by the mechanism. In this case, it could be an
37For further discussion on status of appellate awards see, Potesta (2018), pp. 176 et seqq.
38Regarding this problem, see Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 70.
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arbitral award within the meaning of the New York Convention, since ultimately in
this situation an arbitral tribunal will make the final decision in every case.
647Amere multilateral appeal would not pose any particular challenges to the finality
and binding nature of decisions. Enforcement of an award under the New York
Convention would only be possible if the decision is final, after the Appellate Body
has finally ruled or when the time limit for appealing the first-instance award has
expired.
648If a defeated MIAMMember appeals an arbitral award rendered under the ICSID
Convention or the New York Convention, this may result in a decision which would
no longer be enforceable under the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention
and therefore fall outside the scope of application of those enforcement instruments,
even if the appeal procedure is successful. Considering this situation an effective
enforcement system should also be created in the MIAM Statute, so that a MIAM
Member could not ultimately defend enforcement by a mere appeal to an arbitral
award in the sense of the ICSID Convention or the New York Convention. The
establishment of a stand-alone system comparable to the ICSID Convention or the
New York Convention would therefore make sense for the MIAM due to the
uncertainties mentioned. For this, however, a new convention for the recognition
and enforcement of decisions of the MIAM would have to be developed. The
ratification of such a separate recognition and enforcement convention by
non-MIAM Member States would, however, be unlikely. Hence, an enforcement
system under the MIAM Statute should be considered, but only the parties to this
agreement would be bound.
649The enforcement fund appears to be a good way to offset this disadvantage. As an
alternative, securities should be provided before an appeal, equal to the amount of
the sum awarded in the arbitral award, plus legal costs.39
650The enforcement fund proposed above in the sense of a “security account” for the
settlement of claims for damages arising from MIC decisions must therefore also be
examined for the MIAM (see para. 539).
9.6 Possibilities for Setting Up a MIAM
9.6.1 Establishment as an Independent International
Organisation
651An acceptance of MIAM decisions as arbitral awards within the meaning of the
New York Convention seems quite questionable, as already discussed for the MIC
alternative. As with the MIC, specific requirements should be laid down for the
39The EU-Vietnam IPA (Art. 3.54(6)) (draft for signature) states that the Appellate Tribunal may
determine the amount of security required to be posted based on the circumstances of the case.
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appointment of judges and to support the proceedings before a MIAM, a Secretariat
should be established.
652 The best option for an effective MIAM would be to establish it as an independent
multilateral court of appeal in the sense of an independent international organisation.
As an international organisation, a MIAM would enjoy legal personality under
international and national law.40 The MIAM Statute as a treaty should provide for
both its own procedural law and its own enforcement provisions. The establishment
of an international organisation would ensure the essential requirements for the
functioning of an independent tribunal, such as functional immunity for judges,
financially equal treatment of the state parties, the conclusion of a seat and immunity
agreement and the like (see para. 547).
653 A connection to existing institutions is not desirable. Changes to the ICSID
Convention to include this system in the ICSID framework would require unanimity,
therefore such an option seems unrealistic,41 especially as states that explicitly
oppose the MIAM system are unlikely to agree to an amendment of the ICSID
Convention.42 Integration into the WTO system also appears to be unrealistic at the
present time (see paras. 558 et seqq.).
654 However, an agreement between the MIAM and ICSID or the PCA or other
arbitration institutions regarding support in terms of logistics and personnel could be
envisaged. For example, a separate Secretariat of the MIAM could be dispensed with
and the MIAM Secretariat tasks could be dealt with externally.43 Hearing facilities
and Secretariat support from existing institutions, such as the ITLOS, could be used.
655 Additionally, the project of judicial multilateralisation of an investment dispute
settlement system with the support of OECD, UNCITRAL and UNCTAD should be
promoted (see para. 563).44
40Cf. Article 18 sentence 1 ICSID Convention; Article VIII:1 WTO Agreement, Article 47 TEU,
Article 4 Rome Statute.
41Article 66 para. 1 ICSID Convention: “If the Administrative Council shall so decide by a majority
of two-thirds of its members, the proposed amendment shall be circulated to all Contracting States
for ratification, acceptance or approval. Each amendment shall enter into force 30 days after
dispatch by the depositary of this Convention of a notification to Contracting States that all
Contracting States have ratified, accepted or approved the amendment.”
42American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), p. 120.
43For example, the Secretariat of the ICSID has been designated as the Secretariat for the Invest-
ment Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal under Art. 3.09(16) and 3.10(14) EU-Singapore IPA (draft
for signature), Art. 3.38(18) and 3.39(18) EU-Vietnam IPA (draft for signature) and Art. 11(17) and
Art. 12(15) EU-Mexico Global Agreement (draft for signature) as on February, 2019.
44American Bar Association Section on International Law (2016), pp. 120 et seq.
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9.6.2 Necessity of a Minimum Number of Members
656Amultilateral court of appeal should be open to accession by other states and REIOs.
The MIAM Statute should only come into effect after a certain number of ratifica-
tions, for reasons of composition of the panel and greater acceptance of MIAM
judgments. Such a step will also create guidance for subsequent arbitration practice,
cost distribution etc.
657A MIAM makes sense for the EU even with only a minimum number of states.
The new generation of agreements, such as the CETA and the EU-Vietnam IPA
already contain an investment Court system which would then be replaced by
the MIAM.
658From an EU perspective, all new agreements could provide MIAM jurisdiction. If
the MIC system cannot be realised, it would need to be discussed whether the MIAM
should still be set up. In their negotiations and renegotiations of trade, general
economic, investment protection and association agreements, the EU and its Mem-
ber States should ask the other parties to actively participate in the establishment of a
MIAM. The EU and its Member States should seek the membership of the third
states in a MIAM.
9.6.3 Establishment of MIAM Jurisdiction
9.6.3.1 Establishment of MIAM Jurisdiction by Explicit Amendment
of Existing Treaties and Through IIAs Concluded in the Future
659The foregoing considerations are based on the premise that existing EU member
state IIAs remain largely in force, which means that these existing IIAs will be
modernised and Member State agreements will gradually be replaced by EU agree-
ments. It is therefore necessary to show how this particular substantive network can
be linked to a purely multilateral appeal system at the dispute settlement level. The
immediate use of the existing IIA network has the advantage that the negotiating
parties and the parties to the agreements of the EU and its Member States can be
invited to join the MIAM through negotiations.
660An establishment of MIAM jurisdiction should be made by expressly declaring
its jurisdiction in new agreements of the EU with other states that want to promote
this new system. For this purpose, the MIAM Statute should stipulate that in future,
all newly concluded agreements of the MIAM Members will provide for the
possibility of appeal against the initial arbitral tribunal decisions at the MIAM.
MIAMMembers will endeavour in their treaty negotiations to promote the extension
of the MIAM Member circle (in the sense of a declaration of intent).
661In that regard, it should be explicitly stated in agreements to be concluded by the
EU that, after the establishment of a MIAM, that it alone will have jurisdiction over
appeals against arbitral decisions and first-instance decisions of the ICS and that it,
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consequently, constitutes the ICS Court of Appeal.45 Provisions should be made for
the second instance of the ICS established in the bilateral EU Agreements to give up
their respective jurisdiction and to transfer jurisdiction to a MIAM as soon as it is
established and operational. Corresponding transitional rules are not provided for in
either CETA or in the EU-Vietnam IPA—so far—but they should be included. The
MIAM Statute would also be able to act as an amendment treaty to the EU
agreements with non-member states regarding the transfer of jurisdiction of the
second instance of the bilateral ICS in the agreements involving the EU to the
MIAM, if the respective parties to the agreements with the EU also become
MIAM Members. The required detailed changes of the existing bilateral treaties
could be set out in protocols and declarations to the MIAM Statute.
662 Additionally, it should be stipulated in the EU agreements that the parties to the
agreement will actively participate in and join the establishment of a MIAM. Further,
the new EU free trade and/or investment protection agreements that will be negoti-
ated in the future with third countries should also stipulate that both parties to the
agreement will actively participate in the promotion of a multilateral investment
protection system (“snowball system”).
663 Existing EU agreements will be reformed, renegotiated etc. It should be specified
that in the future, the EU will also include the MIAM in all reform negotiations of
existing treaties. For investment disputes, the EU shall take into account the mem-
bership of its partners in the MIAM. For example, the agreements with Mexico and
South Korea could be complemented by investment protection chapters,46 which
also provide for a jurisdiction of the MIAM for legal remedies in investment
protection matters.
664 In the long term, EU Member States could also use their bargaining power to
reform old agreements with their respective parties to the agreement, encourage
them to become members of MIAM, introduce legal remedies in the field of
investment law, and also to work in agreements with other states to establish
MIAM’s jurisdiction (“snowball system”).
665 The modified Member State IIAs could in turn include a clause stating that
MIAM, after its establishment, has the jurisdiction to decide on legal disputes in
investments on the basis of Member States IIAs.
666 Part of the Member States’ IIAs could therefore, in the long term, after amend-
ment, establish a jurisdiction of the MIAM Appellate Body.47
45A possibility for appeal of Investor State Dispute Settlement Awards has been foreseen inter alia
in Art. 29, India-Belarus BIT, 2018; Art. 28(10), USA-Uruguay BIT, 2005; Art. 28(10),
USA-Rwanda BIT, 2008; Annex 8-E, Chapter 8, Canada-Republic of Korea FTA, 2014.
46See European Commission (2015), pp. 35 and 37. The pending negotiations with Mexico and the
already available investment protection chapter do nevertheless not include indications how the
dispute settlement mechanism should be designed.
47List of the bilateral investment agreements referred to in Article 4 para. 1 of Regulation (EU) No.
1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing
transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third
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9.6.3.2 MIAM Statute as an Opt-in Convention to Amend Existing IIAs
667The MIAM Statute could also be designed as an opt-in convention. With each
accession of the parties to an IIA, MIAMwould complement other dispute resolution
mechanisms established in the respective IIA. This applies in all cases where both/all
parties to the disputed IIA are also members of the MIAM. The MIAM could have
jurisdiction if, in the context of legal proceedings against the EU or its Member
States (assuming that the EU and its Member States are parties to the MIAM), the
third country where the complaining investor comes from (and the investor refers to
IIAs of its home country with the EU or its Member State(s)) is also a party to the
MIAM. In this case, a consensual treaty amendment (a bilateral treaty through a
multilateral treaty) can be assumed.48
668The existing IIAs between MIAMMembers, then would not have to be explicitly
amended or renegotiated. Consequently, MIAM’s jurisdiction could be based on an
opt-in convention comparable to the Mauritius Convention49—insofar as the MIAM
Statute is concerned—and the MIAM Statute obliges states to additionally offer an
opportunity to appeal by MIAM. The MIAM Statute and accession to it would then
give MIAM jurisdiction to appeal against decisions of arbitral tribunals or the first
instance of an ICS.
669Comparable to the Mauritius Convention, it should be foreseen that the estab-
lishment of MIAM jurisdiction via MFN clauses is excluded.50 In addition, those
who accede to the MIAM should submit lists to the MIAM Secretariat, which should
state all their respective agreements which establish MIAM jurisdiction. These lists
should also be published.
670The new opt-in convention could establish the jurisdiction of MIAM, as the
Mauritius Convention does,51 for example if only the EU and its Member States
as respondents are party to MIAM but not the state of origin of the claimant, a
“unilateral offer of application”52 could be made by the member states through an
countries, OJ C 149 of 27.4.2016, p. 1 according to which the United Kingdom currently has
concluded 94 bilateral investment agreements.
48Cf. Article 39 VCLT: “A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid
down in Part II apply to such an agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.”
49United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Mauri-
tius Convention on Transparency), has been concluded on 10.12.2014 and entered into force on
18.10.2017.
50Article 2 para. 5 Mauritius Convention: “The Parties to this Convention agree that a claimant may
not invoke a most favoured nation provision to seek to apply, or avoid the application of, the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency under this Convention.”
51Cf. Article 2 para. 2 Mauritius Convention: “Where the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency do
not apply pursuant to paragraph 1, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency shall apply to an
investor-State arbitration, whether or not initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in
which the respondent is a Party that has not made a reservation relevant to that investor-State
arbitration under article 3(1), and the claimant agrees to the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency.”
52So Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 86.
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opt-in convention which could be accepted by the respondent. This alternative
would, however, unlike a unilateral establishment of jurisdiction within a
two-tiered solution, raise considerable additional problems. Therefore, it would
have to be stated exactly as to at what time the jurisdiction of the MIAM should
be constituted by acceptance of the unilateral offer, that is, for example, whether by
filling a claim against a MIAMMember (which also provides a “unilateral offer”) the
full acceptance of the jurisdiction of MIAM by the claimant and the respondent
would take place at the same time. In this context, in the interest of legal certainty for
both the investor and the respondent, it would need to be clarified as soon as possible
to whether the MIAM should be competent in such a case.
671 In principle, the ad hoc inclusion of an appeal and thus the establishment of
jurisdiction in the case of non-membership of the respondent should be rejected. In
particular, there would be no incentive to join MIAM if ad hoc decisions were taken
on whether or not to recognise jurisdiction in appeal proceedings.
672 The MIAM Statute could also apply to multilateral treaties such as the ECT and
be agreed upon as a future Appellate Body in the field of investment protection.
However, this would require either an explicit amendment of the ECT in accordance
with Article 42 ECT with three quarters of the parties to the agreement, but the
amendment would only apply to the parties that approved it. Alternatively, an inter
se modification of the ECT by individual parties in accordance with Article
41 VCLT could again be an option. In any event, in the case of non-ICSID pro-
ceedings, MIAM jurisdiction may be assumed if both the respondent and the home
state of the complaining investor are members of MIAM (within the meaning of
Article 41 para. 1 lit. (b) VCLT). According to Article 16 ECT no deterioration of the
legal positions of investors may occur through subsequent treaty modifications.53
However, the introduction of an additional appeal may hardly be considered as
deterioration, if otherwise substantive protective positions as well as the fundamental
ISDS possibility remained untouched. In addition, ICSID procedures based on the
ECT would still be possible with the corresponding direct ICSID enforcement
mechanism. A problem with investment protection proceedings in the area of the
ECT would be that the first-instance arbitral decisions would continue to be enforce-
able in third countries.
673 In doing so, the MIAM Statute should specify that there is a particular
jurisdiction:
53Article 16 ECT: “Where two or more Contracting Parties have entered into a prior international
agreement, or enter into a subsequent international agreement, whose terms in either case concern
the subject matter of Part III or V of this Treaty, (1) nothing in Part III or V of this Treaty shall be
construed to derogate from any provision of such terms of the other agreement or from any right to
dispute resolution with respect thereto under that agreement; and (2) nothing in such terms of the
other agreement shall be construed to derogate from any provision of Part III or V of this Treaty or
from any right to dispute resolution with respect thereto under this Treaty, where any such provision
is more favorable to the Investor or Investment.”
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a) if, in the future, which means after the MIAM Statute enters into force and on
accession thereto, an IIA is concluded between MIAM States and an investment
arbitration is carried out on the basis of this IIA;
b) if an IIA has in the past been concluded between two MIAMMember States and
a consensual establishment of jurisdiction for that existing agreement has been
given by the MIAM Statute (a list of these agreements should be sent to the
MIAM Secretariat for reasons of legal certainty; lists do not have to be exhaus-
tive) and an investment arbitration is carried out on the basis of this IIA; and
c) where applicable, if an IIA has been designated in the list by a MIAM Member
State (unilateral establishment of jurisdiction for already existing treaties),
which then presents the problem, at which time the jurisdiction of MIAM
must be accepted by the investor and on the basis of this IIA investment
arbitration is carried out.
9.7 Transitional Provisions and System Conformity
of a MIAM
674The MIAM Statute should be seen as an amendment to existing agreements such as
the EU-Vietnam IPA and CETA (see paras. 247 et seqq.), since this is a later
multilateral agreement amending the bilateral agreements among certain parties to
the respective agreement (see in that regard, Article 30 para. 3 and Article
41 VCLT). However, future EU agreements should state that the respective bilateral
dispute settlement mechanism should be modified and amended by the jurisdiction
of the MIAM for appeal when the MIAM Statute enters into force and the respective
party has joined the MIAM together with the EU. At the same time, transitional
provisions should be included in the agreements of the EU under negotiation, in the
event that MIAM commences to operate in the future. In that regard, provision may
be made for dispute settlement procedures already pending in the respective ICS
system to be terminated by the respective bilateral dispute settlement system in the
respective instance, but an appeal can only be lodged before the MIAM.
675In addition, transitional provisions should be made for judges of the second
instance of an ICS already appointed under bilateral agreements, provided that this
second instance is to be replaced by the MIAM; for example, the CETA ICS judicial
remuneration system adopted by the Joint CETA Committee54 may already indicate
that once the MIAM enters into force, it will no longer be allowed to appeal to the
relevant CETA ICS and therefore for the CETA judges concerned, no further
retainer fee will be paid from a certain date on.
676When new members join the MIAM Statute, the financing quotes must be
adjusted accordingly. Representation in plenary should immediately be possible.
54Cf. Article 8.27 para. 12 CETA: “In order to ensure their availability, the Members of the Tribunal
shall be paid a monthly retainer fee to be determined by the CETA Joint Committee.”
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Since MIAM accession will not involve market access obligations as in WTO Law,
but only the recognition of MIAM as a court of appeal for clearly regulated types of
disputes, a MIAM accession should be a matter of unproblematic bargaining.
677 MIAM could also provide in its Statute for jurisdiction to be extended to
investment disputes based on investor-state contracts. The freedom of contract
when concluding an investor-state contract includes the freedom of selection of
dispute settlement options.
9.8 Working and Procedural Language of the MIAM
678 For cost reasons, provisions on the working and procedural languages of the MIAM
must be regulated. As with the MIC, there are good reasons for using English as a
working language (see para. 602).
9.9 Costs of the New System
679 The rules on financing the expected permanent costs of the MIAM, i.e. the staff of
the Secretariat, the judges, as well as the necessary infrastructure in the form of
facilities, equipment etc., will have to be drafted. From an economic point of view,
MIAM makes sense only with a critical mass of Member States sharing the costs of
such a permanent Appellate mechanism. For example, it would certainly reduce the
cost of having a large number of judges in EU bilateral investment tribunals, if the
second instance of the respective investment court system could be closed and the
MIAM takes over their task.55 At a manageable cost, MIAM offers a way to
compensate for the currently discussed deficiencies within the existing ISDS system,
but also as stated in the context of CETA ICS, to ensure greater acceptance in
international investment protection procedures.
680 The MIAM, like other international organisations, should be financed primarily
by members’ contributions, i.e. by the parties to the agreement. Expenditure would
determine the necessary amount, which should be collected proportionally from the
members. Similar to the WTO,56 the quota of MIAM Members could be calculated
by the proportion of foreign direct investment in relation to the share of total
investment of all MIAM Members.
681 With regard to the question of whether court fees should be established, reference
may be made to the comments on the MIC (see paras. 306 et seqq.).
55Hodgson (2014), p. 3 assumes cost amounting to US$373,200 per procedure and party.
56Cf. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib_e.htm.
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9.10 Overview of Necessary Agreements Etc.
682The following agreements and secondary legislation, among others, appear neces-
sary for the establishment of a MIAM:
– Statute of a Multilateral Investment Appellate Mechanism including a code of
conduct for the judges (MIAM Statute);
– Immunity agreements between the Member States of the MIAM (Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the MIAM);
– Seat agreement between the MIAM (with its own legal personality) and the host
state
– Procedural rules of the MIAM;
– Guidelines for the essential content of an application;
– Guidelines for the conduct of oral proceedings;
– Guidelines on court costs (if applicable);
– Guidance on security;
– Retirement provisions for the MIAM staff.
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